| | 慎法: |
凡世莫不以其所以乱者治。故小治而小乱，大治而大乱。人主莫能世治其民，世无不乱之国。奚谓以其所以乱者治？夫举贤能，世之所以治也；而治之所以乱。世之所谓贤者，言正也；所以为言正者，党也。听其言也，则以为能；问其党，以为然。故贵之，不待其有功；诛之，不待其有罪也。此其势，正使污吏有资而成其奸险，小人有资而施其巧诈。初假吏民奸诈之本，而求端悫其末，禹不能以使十人之众，庸主安能以御一国之民？ |
| Attention to Law: |
Generally, there is no one in the world, who does not base order on the causes of disorder. Therefore, to a limited degree of order corresponds a limited degree of disorder, and to a great degree of order corresponds a great degree of disorder: There is no ruler of men who can give order to his people for all time, nor is there a country in the world that has not known disorder. What do I mean by saying that one bases order on the causes of disorder? Raising virtuous and capable men is the cause of bringing order into the world, but it is also the cause of order becoming disorder. Those whom the world calls virtuous are men whose words are upright. the reason why they are regarded as upright in words is due to their partizans. Hearing their words, one takes them to be capable, and on asking their partizans, one thinks that they are indeed so. Therefore, one prizes them without waiting for them to acquire actual merit, or one punishes them without waiting for them to commit crimes. In these circumstances, vile officials are given precisely the opportunity to accomplish their wicked and dangerous acts, and small-minded men have an opportunity to apply their dexterous and crafty tricks. If in the beginning a basis for wickedness and craftiness is provided for officials and people, then if finally one tries to make them correct and guileless, even (a great sage like) Yu could not succeed in causing as many as ten men to be like that. How then could an ordinary ruler manage the people of the whole country in this way? |
| | 慎法: |
彼而党与人者，不待我而有成事者也。上举一与民，民倍主位而向私交。民倍主位而向私交，则君弱而臣强。君人者不察也，非侵于诸侯，必劫于百姓。彼言说之势，愚智同学之。士学于言说之人，则民释实事而诵虚词。民释实事而诵虚词，则力少而非多。君人者不察也，以战必损其将，以守必卖其城。 |
| Attention to Law: |
Those people who form parties with others do not need Us for obtaining success, and if superiors pull one way with the people, then the latter will turn their backs on the ruler's position and will turn towards private connections. When this is the case, the prince will be weak and his ministers strong, and if the ruler does not understand this, then if the country is not annexed by the feudal lords, it will be robbed by the people. Both stupid and wise will, alike, try to acquire that power of eloquence, and if scholars study with those eloquent speakers, then people will lose touch with reality and will recite empty phrases. Should this be the case, then their strength will decrease and wrong-doing will increase; and if the prince does not understand it, in battle he will lose his generals, and in defence his cities will certainly be sold. |
| | 慎法: |
故有明主忠臣产于今世，而能领其国者，不可以须臾忘于法。破胜党任，节去言谈，任法而治矣。使吏非法无以守，则虽巧不得为奸；使民非战无以效其能，则虽险不得为诈。夫以法相治，以数相举，誉者不能相益，訾言者不能相损。民见相誉无益，相管附恶；见訾言无损，习相憎不相害也。夫爱人者不阿，憎人者不害，各以其正，治之至也。臣故曰：“法任而国治矣。” |
| Attention to Law: |
Therefore, if there is an intelligent ruler or a loyal minister born in this age who wishes to lead his country, then he should not for one moment be forgetful of the law, but he should conquer and destroy cabals, control and abolish eloquence, and relying on the law, the country will enjoy order. If a condition is brought about where, for government servants, there is no other standard maintained than the law, then, however tricky they may be, they will be unable to commit wickedness, and if, for the people, a condition is brought about where there is no other way of exerting their capacities than in war, then, however great the danger may be, no deceit will be possible. Indeed, if people control each other by law and recommend each other by following systematic rules, then they cannot benefit each other with praise nor harm each other with slander. If the people see that there is no benefit in praising each other, they will become used to loving each other without flattery, and if they see that there is no harm in slandering each other, they will become used to hating each other without injuring each other. If the love of men does not mean flattery, and the hatred of men does not mean causing injury, then both love and hatred will be pure, which is the highest degree of order. Therefore do I say: "If one relies on law, the country will enjoy order". |
| | 慎法: |
千乘能以守者，自存也；万乘能以战者，自完也；虽桀为主，不肯诎半辞以下其敌。外不能战，内不能守，虽尧为主，不能以不臣谐所谓不若之国。自此观之，国之所以重，主之所以尊者，力也。耕战二者，力本。而世主莫能致力者，何也？使民之所苦者无耕，危者无战。二者，孝子难以为其亲，忠臣难以为其君。今欲驱其众民，与之孝子忠臣之所难，臣以为非劫以刑，而驱以赏莫可。 |
| Attention to Law: |
A country of a thousand chariots is able to preserve itself by defence, and a country of ten thousand chariots is able to round itself off by fighting - even (a bad ruler like) Jie would not be able to twist one word of this statement in order to subdue his enemies; and if, abroad, one is incapable of waging war, and at home one is incapable of defence, then even (a good ruler like) Yao could not pacify, for any misbehaviour, a country that (normally) would be no match. Looking at it from this point of view, that through which the country is important and that through which the ruler is honoured is force. Force being the basis of both, how is it then that no ruler on earth succeeds in developing force? Bring about a condition where people find it bitter not to till, and where they find it dangerous not to fight. These are two things which filial sons, though they dislike them, do for their fathers' sake, and loyal ministers, though they dislike them, do for their sovereign's sake. Nowadays, if you wish to stimulate the multitude of people to make them do what even filial sons and loyal ministers dislike doing, I think it is useless unless you compel them by means of punishments, and stimulate them by means of rewards. |
| | 慎法: |
而今夫世俗治者，莫不释法度而任辩慧，后功力而进仁义，民故不务耕战。彼民不归其力于农，即食屈于内；不归其节于战，则兵弱于外。入而食屈于内，出而兵弱于外，虽有地万里，带甲百万，与独立平原一也。且先王能令其民蹈白刃，被矢石，其民之欲为之，非好学之，所以避害。故吾教令民之欲利者，非耕不得；避害者，非战不免。境内之民，莫不先务耕战而得其所乐。故地少粟多，民少兵强。能行二者于境内，则霸王之道毕矣。 |
| Attention to Law: |
But nowadays, the ordinary types of ruler all neglect laws and measures, and rely on sophistry and cleverness; they push back men of merit and force, and advance those of benevolence and righteousness, with the result that people do not devote themselves to agriculture and warfare. If such people do not turn their energies to agriculture, at home their food-supply will be exhausted, and if they do not turn to their duty in warfare, abroad the army will be weak; then, though one may have a territory of ten thousand li, and a million armed men, it will be the same as a plain that has to depend on its own resources. Furthermore, the early kings were able to command their people to walk on bare swords and to suffer arrows and stones, and the people were willing to do so, not because they liked learning such things, but because they escaped harm thereby. Therefore my teaching is to issue such orders that people, if they are desirous of profit, can attain their aim only by agriculture, and if they want to avoid harm, can only escape it by war. There will be no one within the borders who will not devote himself at first to ploughing and fighting, in order thereby later to obtain that which gives him pleasure. Therefore, though the territory may be small, the produce will be plentiful, and though the population may be sparse, the army will be strong. If one can achieve these two things within the territory, then the road to becoming a lord-protector or king of the whole empire is fully prepared. |
