| Chinese Text Project | |
| Simplified Chinese version |
| Search details: |
|---|
| Scope: Request type: Paragraph |
| Condition 1: References "然而天下之士非兼者之言，犹未止也" Matched:4. |
| Total 4 paragraphs. Page 1 of 1. |
《先秦两汉 - Pre-Qin and Han》 | Related resources |
《墨家 - Mohism》 | Related resources |
《墨子 - Mozi》 | [Spring and Autumn - Warring States] 490 BC-221 BC | Books referencing 《墨子》 Library Resources Introduction Source Related resources |
《卷四 - Book 4》 | Library Resources |
《兼爱下 - Universal Love III》 | English translation: W. P. Mei [?] | Library Resources |
| 4 | 兼爱下: |
然而天下之士非兼者之言，犹未止也。曰：“即善矣。虽然，岂可用哉？”子墨子曰：“用而不可，虽我亦将非之。且焉有善而不可用者？姑尝两而进之。谁以为二士，使其一士者执别，使其一士者执兼。是故别士之言曰：‘吾岂能为吾友之身，若为吾身，为吾友之亲，若为吾亲。’是故退睹其友，饥即不食，寒即不衣，疾病不侍养，死丧不葬埋。别士之言若此，行若此。兼士之言不然，行亦不然，曰：‘吾闻为高士于天下者，必为其友之身，若为其身，为其友之亲，若为其亲，然后可以为高士 于1天下。’是故退睹其友，饥则食之，寒则衣之，疾病侍养之，死丧葬埋之。兼士之言若此，行若此。若之二 士2者，言相非而行相反与？当使若二士者，言必信，行必果，使言行之合犹合符节也，无言而不行也。然即敢问，今有平原广野于此，被甲婴胄将往战3，死生之权未可识也；又有君大夫之远使于巴、越、齐、荆，往来及否未 及否未4可识也，然即敢问，不识将恶也家室，奉承亲戚，提挈妻子，而寄托之？不识于兼之有是乎？于别之有是乎？我以为当其于此也，天下无愚夫愚妇，虽非兼之人，必寄托之于兼之有是也。此言而非兼，择即取兼，即此言行费也。不识天下之士，所以皆闻兼而非之者，其故何也？” |
| Universal Love III: |
Yet the objection is not all exhausted. It is asked, "It may be a good thing, but can it be of any use?" Mozi replied: If it were not useful then even I would disapprove of it. But how can there be anything that is good but not useful? Let us consider the matter from both sides. Suppose there are two men. Let one of them hold to partiality and the other to universality. Then the advocate of partiality would say to himself, how can I take care of my friend as I do of myself, how can I take care of his parents as my own? Therefore when he finds his friend hungry he would not feed him, and when he finds him cold he would not clothe him. In his illness he would not minister to him, and when he is dead he would not bury him. Such is the word and such is the deed of the advocate of partiality. The advocate of universality is quite unlike this both in word and in deed. He would say to himself, I have heard that to be a superior man one should take care of his friend as he does of himself, and take care of his friend's parents as his own. Therefore when he finds his friend hungry he would feed him, and when he finds him cold he would clothe him. In his sickness he would serve him, and when he is dead he would bury him. Such is the word and such is the deed of the advocate of universality. These two persons then are opposed to each other in word and also in deed. Suppose they are sincere in word and decisive in deed so that their word and deed are made to agree like the two parts of a tally, and that there is no word but what is realized in deed, then let us consider further: Suppose a war is on, and one is in armour and helmet ready to join the force, life and death are not predictable. Or suppose one is commissioned a deputy by the ruler to such far countries like Ba, Yue, Qi, and Jing, and the arrival and return are quite uncertain. Now (under such circumstances) let us inquire upon whom would one lay the trust of one's family and parents. Would it be upon the universal friend or upon the partial friend? It seems to me, on occasions like these, there are no fools in the world. Even if he is a person who objects to universal love, he will lay the trust upon the universal friend all the same. This is verbal objection to the principle but actual selection by it - this is self-contradiction between one's word and deed. It is incomprehensible, then, why people should object to universal love when they hear it. 1. 于 : Inserted. 孙诒让《墨子闲诂》 | |
| 5 | 兼爱下: |
然而天下之士非兼者之言，犹未止也。曰：“意可以择士，而不可以择君乎？”“姑尝两而进之。谁以为二君，使其一君者执兼，使其一君者执别，是故别君之言曰‘吾恶能为吾万民之身，若为吾身，此泰非天下之情也。人之生乎地上之无几何也，譬之犹驷驰而过隙也’。是故退睹其万民，饥即不食，寒即不衣，疾病不侍养，死丧不葬埋。别君之言若此，行若此。兼君之言不然，行亦不然。曰：“吾闻为明君于天下者，必先万民之身，后为其身，然后可以为明君于天下。”是故退睹 其1万民，饥即食之，寒即衣之，疾病侍养之，死丧葬埋之。兼君之言若此，行若此。然即交若之二君者，言相非而行相反与？常使若二君者，言必信，行必果，使言行之合犹合符节也，无言而不行也。然即敢问，今岁有疠疫，万民多有勤苦冻馁，转死沟壑中者，既已众矣。不识将择之二君者，将何从也？我以为当其于此也，天下无愚夫愚妇，虽非兼者，必从兼君是也。言而非兼，择即 取兼2，此言行拂也。不识天下所以皆闻兼而非之者，其故何也？” |
| Universal Love III: |
Yet the objection is not all exhausted. It is objected: Maybe it is a good criterion to choose among ordinary men, but it may not apply to the rulers. Let us again consider the matter from both sides. Suppose there are two rulers. Let one of them hold partiality and the other universality. Then the partial ruler would say to himself, how can I take care of the people as I do of myself? This would be quite contrary to common sense. A man's life on earth is of short duration, it is like a galloping horse passing by. Therefore when he finds his people hungry he would not feed them, and when he finds them cold he would not clothe them. When they are sick he would not minister to them, and upon their death he would not bury them. Such is the word and such is the deed of the partial ruler. The universal ruler is quite unlike this both in word and in deed. He would say to himself, I have heard that to be an upright ruler of the world one should first attend to his people and then to himself. Therefore when he finds his people hungry he would feed them, and when he finds them cold he would clothe them. In their sickness he would minister to them, and upon their death he would bury them. Such is the word and such is the deed of the universal ruler. These two rulers, then, are opposed to each other in word and also in deed. Suppose they are sincere in word and decisive in deed so that their word and deed are made to agree like the two parts of a tally, and that there is no word but what is realized in deed, then let us consider further: Suppose, now, that there is a disastrous pestilence, that most people are in misery and privation, and that many lie dead in ditches (Under such circumstances) let us inquire, if a person could choose one of the two rulers, which would he prefer? It seems to me on such occasions there are no fools in the world. Even if he is a person who objects to universal love, he will choose the universal ruler. This is verbal objection to the principle but actual selection by it - this is self-contradiction between one's word and deed. It is incomprehensible, then, why people should object to universal love when they hear it. 1. 其 : Inserted. | |
| 6 | 兼爱下: | 然而天下之士非兼者之言也，犹1未止也。曰：“兼即仁矣义矣，虽然，岂可为哉？吾譬兼之不可为也，犹挈泰山以超江河也。故兼者直愿之也，夫岂可为之物哉？”子墨子曰：“夫挈泰山以赵江河，自古之及今，生民而来，未尝有也。今若夫兼相爱、交相利，此自先圣六王者亲行之。”何知先圣六王之亲行之也？子墨子曰：“吾非与之并世同时，亲闻其声，见其色也。以其所书于竹帛，镂于金石，琢于盘盂，传遗后世子孙者知之。”《泰誓》曰：“文王若日若月，乍照光于四方于西土。”即此言文王之兼爱天下之博大也，譬之日月，兼照天下之无有私也。即此文王兼也。虽子墨子之所谓兼者，于文王取法焉。 |
| Universal Love III: |
Yet the objection is still not exhausted. It points out that universal love may be magnanimous and righteous, but how can it be realized? Universal love is impracticable just as carrying Mt. Tai and leaping over rivers. So, then, universal love is but a pious wish, how can it be actualized? Mozi replied: To carry Mt. Tai and leap over rivers is something that has never been accomplished since the existence of man. But universal love and mutual aid has been personally practised by six ancient sage-kings. How do we know they have done it? Mozi said: I am no contemporary of theirs, neither have I heard their voice or seen their faces. The sources of our knowledge lie in what is written on the bamboos and silk, what is engraved in metal and stones, and what is cut in the vessels to be handed down to posterity. The "Great Declaration" proclaims: "King Wen was like the sun and the moon, shedding glorious and resplendent light in the four quarters as well as over the Western land." This is to say that the love of King Wen is so wide and universal that it is like the sun and the moon shining upon the world without partiality. Here is universal love on the part of King Wen; what Mozi has been talking about is really derived from the example of King Wen. 1. 犹 : Originally read: "独". Corrected by 孙诒让《墨子闲诂》 | |
| 10 | 兼爱下: | 然而天下之非兼者之言，犹未止，曰：“意不忠亲之利，而害为孝乎？”子墨子曰：“姑尝本原之孝子之为亲度者。吾不识孝子之为亲度者，亦欲人爱利其亲与？意欲人之恶贼其亲与？以说观之，即欲人之爱利其亲也。然即吾恶先从事即得此？若我先从事乎爱利人之亲，然后人报我爱利吾亲乎？意我先从事乎恶人之亲，然后人报我以爱利吾亲乎？即必吾先从事乎爱利人之亲，然后人报我以爱利吾亲也。然即之交孝子者，果不得已乎，毋先从事爱利人之亲者与？意以天下之孝子为遇而不足以为正乎？姑尝本原之先王之所书，《大雅》之所道曰：‘无言而不雠，无德而不报’‘投我以桃，报之以李。’即此言爱人者必见爱也，而恶人者必见恶也。不识天下之士，所以皆闻兼而非之者，其故何也？ |
| Universal Love III: | Yet the objection is still not exhausted. It raises the question, when one does not think in terms of benefits and harm to one's parents would it be filial piety? Mozi replied: Now let us inquire about the plans of the filial sons for their parents. I may ask, when they plan for their parents, whether they desire to have others love or hate them? Judging from the whole doctrine (of filial piety), it is certain that they desire to have others love their parents. Now, what should I do first in order to attain this? Should I first love others' parents in order that they would love my parents in return, or should I first hate others' parents in order that they would love my parents in return? Of course I should first love others' parents in order that they would love my parents in return. Hence those who desire to be filial to one another's parents, if they have to choose (between whether they should love or hate others' parents), had best first love and benefit others' parents. Would any one suspect that all the filial sons are stupid and incorrigible (in loving their own parents)? We may again inquire about it. It is said in the "Da Ya" among the books of the ancient kings: "No idea is not given its due value; no virtue is not rewarded. When a peach is thrown to us, we would return with a prune." This is to say whoever loves others will be loved and whoever hates others will be hated. It is then quite incomprehensible why people should object to universal love when they hear it. |
| Total 4 paragraphs. Page 1 of 1. |
|---|