| | 初見秦: |
臣聞不知而言不智，知而不言不忠，為人臣不忠當死，言而不當亦當死。雖然，臣願悉言所聞，唯大王裁其罪。 |
| | I have heard that to speak without knowing is unwise, and to know but not speak is disloyal. As a subject, to be disloyal deserves death; to speak inappropriately also deserves death. Nevertheless, I wish to state fully what I have heard; only the Great King may determine my punishment.
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| | 初見秦: |
臣聞天下陰燕陽魏，連荊固齊，收韓而成從，將西面以與秦強為難，臣竊笑之。世有三亡，而天下得之，其此之謂乎！臣聞之曰：「以亂攻治者亡，以邪攻正者亡，以逆攻順者亡。」今天下之府庫不盈，囷倉空虛，悉其士民，張軍數十百萬。其頓首戴羽為將軍，斷死於前，不至千人，皆以言死。白刃在前，斧鑕在後，而卻走不能死也。非其士民不能死也，上不能故也。言賞則不與，言罰則不行，賞罰不信，故士民不死也。 |
| | I have heard that the states of Yin and Yan in the north, Wei in the south, connecting with Jing and consolidating Qi, and incorporating Han to form a coalition, intend to face westward to challenge Qin's strength. I secretly find this laughable. There are three ways for a dynasty to perish, and when the world gains power through them—this must be what is meant by that saying! I have heard it said: "He who attacks order with disorder will perish; he who attacks righteousness with injustice will perish; and he who attacks what is right with what is wrong will perish." Now, the treasuries of the world are not full, and the granaries are empty. They have mobilized all their people and soldiers to raise an army numbering tens or even hundreds of thousands. They place a feather on their heads as generals, cutting down the dead in front, yet not reaching a thousand men; all are merely talking about death. With sharp blades before and axes behind, they still cannot die but flee backward. It is not that their people are unwilling to die; it is because the ruler above does not make them do so. When rewards are promised, they are not given; when punishments are announced, they are not carried out. Since rewards and punishments lack credibility, the people do not die for their cause.
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| | 初見秦: |
今秦出號令而行賞罰，有功無功相事也。出其父母懷衽之中，生未嘗見寇耳。聞戰，頓足徒裼，犯白刃，蹈鑪炭，斷死於前者皆是也。夫斷死與斷生者不同，而民為之者，是貴奮死也。夫一人奮死可以對十，十可以對百，百可以對千，千可以對萬，萬可以剋天下矣。今秦地折長補短，方數千里，名師數十百萬。秦之號令賞罰、地形利害，天下莫若也。以此與天下，天下不足兼而有也。是故秦戰未嘗不剋，攻未嘗不取，所當未嘗不破，開地數千里，此其大功也。然而兵甲頓，士民病，蓄積索，田疇荒，囷倉虛，四鄰諸侯不服，霸王之名不成，此無異故，其謀臣皆不盡其忠也。 |
| | Now Qin issues orders and carries out rewards and punishments; those with merit and those without serve accordingly. They are taken from their parents' arms, having never seen an enemy in their lives. When they hear of battle, they stomp their feet and bare their chests, rushing to face sharp blades and tread on red-hot embers; those who cut themselves down in front are everywhere. To die deliberately is different from to live deliberately, yet the people do so; this shows that they value fighting to the death. One man who fights to die can face ten; ten can face a hundred; a hundred can face a thousand; a thousand can face ten thousand; and ten thousand can conquer the world. Now, Qin's territory is measured by cutting short and adding length, spanning thousands of square li, with armies numbering tens or even hundreds of millions. Qin's decrees on rewards and punishments, as well as its knowledge of terrain advantages and disadvantages, are unmatched in the world. With this against the world, it is insufficient to unify and possess all under heaven. Therefore, Qin has never failed in battle, never failed to capture when attacking, and whatever it confronts is always broken. It has opened up thousands of square li of territory—this is its great achievement. However, weapons and armor are worn out; soldiers and people suffer from hardship; reserves are exhausted; fields lie fallow; granaries are empty; neighboring feudal lords do not submit; the name of hegemon or overlord is unachieved. This is no different for a reason: it is because their strategists have not fully devoted their loyalty.
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| | 初見秦: |
臣敢言之，往者齊南破荊，東破宋，西服秦，北破燕，中使韓、魏，土地廣而兵強，戰剋攻取，詔令天下。齊之清濟濁河，足以為限；長城巨防，足以為塞。齊五戰之國也，一戰不剋而無齊。由此觀之，夫戰者，萬乘之存亡也。且聞之曰：「削跡無遺根，無與禍鄰，禍乃不存。」秦與荊人戰，大破荊，襲郢，取洞庭、五湖、江南，荊王君臣亡走，東服於陳。當此時也，隨荊以兵則荊可舉，荊可舉，則民足貪也，地足利也。東以弱齊、燕，中以凌三晉。然則是一舉而霸王之名可成也，四鄰諸侯可朝也。而謀臣不為，引軍而退，復與荊人為和，令荊人得收亡國，聚散民，立社稷，主置宗廟，令率天下西面以與秦為難，此固以失霸王之道一矣。天下又比周而軍華下，大王以詔破之，兵至梁郭下，圍梁數旬則梁可拔，拔梁則魏可舉，舉魏則荊、趙之意絕，荊、趙之意絕則趙危，趙危而荊狐疑，東以弱齊、燕，中以凌三晉。然則是一舉而霸王之名可成也，四鄰諸侯可朝也。而謀臣不為，引軍而退，復與魏氏為和，令魏氏反收亡國，聚散民，立社稷，主置宗廟，令，此固以失霸王之道二矣。前者穰侯之治秦也，用一國之兵而欲以成兩國之功。是故兵終身暴露於外，士民疲病於內，霸王之名不成，此固以失霸王之道三矣。 |
| | I dare to speak: In the past, Qi defeated Jing in the south, Song in the east, subdued Qin in the west, and Yan in the north; it dominated Han and Wei in the center. Its territory was vast and its army strong, achieving victories in battle and capturing cities, issuing decrees throughout the world. Qi's clear Ji River and turbid He River were sufficient as boundaries; Its long walls and great fortifications were sufficient to serve as barriers. Qi was a state that had fought five wars; if it lost one battle, there would be no more Qi. From this we can see that war is the determining factor for the survival or destruction of a great state with ten thousand chariots. Moreover, I have heard it said: "Cut off the traces completely without leaving roots; do not let misfortune be your neighbor, and calamity will not exist." Qin fought against Jing, greatly defeating it. They captured Ying and took Dingtai, Wuhu, and the southern bank of the Yangtze River. The king and ministers of Jing fled eastward to submit in Chen. At that time, if one followed up with troops against Jing, then Jing could be completely subdued. If Jing were subdued, the people would be sufficient to exploit, and the land would provide ample advantage. To the east, Qi and Yan could be weakened; in the center, the Three Jin states could be dominated. Thus, with one such move, the name of hegemon or emperor could be achieved, and neighboring feudal lords would come to pay homage. Yet the strategists did not do so, withdrew their troops instead, and made peace with Jing. This allowed the people of Jing to recover their lost state, gather scattered civilians, establish altars and ancestral temples, and lead all under heaven westward in opposition to Qin. This was indeed the first loss of the path to hegemony or imperial rule. The world then formed an alliance and stationed troops at Huaxia. The Great King issued orders to defeat them, advancing his army as far as the walls of Liang. If Liang were besieged for several weeks, it could be captured; capturing Liang would mean Hui could be subdued. Subduing Wei would cut off Jing and Zhao's intentions; cutting off Jing and Zhao's intentions would place Zhao in peril. With Zhao in danger, Jing would become uncertain. To the east, Qi and Yan would be weakened; in the center, control over the Three Jin states would be established. Thus, with one such action, the name of hegemon or sovereign could be achieved; neighboring feudal lords could come to pay homage. Yet the strategists did not act, withdrew their troops instead, made peace with Wei again, and allowed the House of Wei to recover its lost state, gather scattered people, establish altars, and set up ancestral temples. This was indeed a second loss of the path to hegemon or imperial rule. Previously, when Rang Hou governed Qin, he used the forces of one state yet wished to achieve the accomplishments of two states. Therefore, troops remained exposed in battlefields for life; soldiers and civilians grew weary and sick within. The name of hegemon or ruler was not achieved—this was indeed the third loss of the path to dominance.
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| | 初見秦: |
趙氏，中央之國也，雜民所居也。其民輕而難用也。號令不治，賞罰不信，地形不便，下不能盡其民力。彼固亡國之形也，而不憂民萌。悉其士民，軍於長平之下，以爭韓上黨。大王以詔破之，拔武安。當是時也，趙氏上下不相親也，貴賤不相信也。然則邯鄲不守。拔邯鄲，筦山東河間，引軍而去，西攻脩武，踰華，絳上黨。代四十六縣，上黨七十縣，不用一領甲，不苦一士民，此皆秦有也。以代、上黨不戰而畢為秦矣，東陽、河外不戰而畢反為齊矣，中山、呼沱以北不戰而畢為燕矣。然則是趙舉，趙舉則韓亡，韓亡則荊、魏不能獨立，荊、魏不能獨立則是一舉而壞韓、蠹魏、拔荊，東以弱齊、燕，決白馬之口以沃魏氏，是一舉而三晉亡，從者敗也。大王垂拱以須之，天下編隨而服矣，霸王之名可成。而謀臣不為，引軍而退，復與趙氏為和。夫以大王之明，秦兵之強，棄霸王之業，地曾不可得，乃取欺於亡國，是謀臣之拙也。且夫趙當亡而不亡，秦當霸而不霸，天下固以量秦之謀臣一矣。乃復悉士卒以攻邯鄲，不能拔也，棄甲負弩，戰竦而卻，天下固已量秦力二矣。軍乃引而復，并於孚下，大王又并軍而至，與戰不能剋之也，又不能反運，罷而去，天下固量秦力三矣。內者量吾謀臣，外者極吾兵力。由是觀之，臣以為天下之從，幾不難矣。內者，吾甲兵頓，士民病，蓄積索，田疇荒，囷倉虛；外者、天下皆比意甚固。願大王有以慮之也。 |
| | Zhao is a central state, where mixed peoples reside. Its people are light-hearted and difficult to employ in warfare. Decrees lack order, rewards and punishments lack credibility; the terrain is inconvenient, and those below cannot fully mobilize their people's strength. That state already shows signs of collapse, yet it does not worry about its people or the common folk. It mobilized all its soldiers and civilians, stationing an army at Changping to contend for Shangdang in Han. The Great King issued orders and defeated them, capturing Wu'an. At that time, the upper and lower ranks of Zhao did not care for each other; nobles and commoners did not trust one another. Therefore, Handan could not be defended. Capturing Handan, controlling the area between Donghe and Jian, leading troops away to attack Xiushu in the west, crossing Hua Mountain, and seizing Shangdang. Dai's forty-six counties and Shangdang's seventy counties were all taken without a single soldier being clad in armor, nor any hardship imposed on the soldiers or people—these were all acquired by Qin. Dai and Shangdang were completely incorporated into Qin without a battle; Dongyang and the area beyond the He River returned to Qi without resistance; Zhongshan, Hutuo, and areas north of them became Yan's territory without fighting. Thus, Zhao's subjugation would mean Han's destruction; with Han destroyed, Jing and Wei could not stand alone. If Jing and Wei could not remain independent, then in one move, Han would be ruined, Wei weakened, and Jing captured. To the east, Qi and Yan were weakened. Opening the mouth of Baima River to flood Wei territory—this single action would destroy the Three Jin states, and the alliance would collapse. The Great King need only sit idly by to await this; all under heaven would follow in submission, and the name of hegemon could be achieved. Yet the strategists did not take action, withdrew their troops, and once again made peace with Zhao. With the Great King's wisdom and Qin's strong army, to abandon the cause of hegemony, when even land could not be gained, yet instead to be deceived by a fallen state—this is the incompetence of the strategists. Moreover, Zhao should have perished but did not; Qin should have become a hegemon but did not. The world has already measured the incompetence of Qin's strategists once. Then, mobilizing all troops again to attack Handan, they could not capture it. Discarding armor and carrying bows, the soldiers trembled in fear and retreated—thus, the world has already measured Qin's strength a second time. The army withdrew and regrouped at Fuxia. The Great King then combined forces to arrive, but could not defeat the enemy; he was also unable to retreat in order, so he abandoned the campaign and left—thus, the world measured Qin's strength for a third time. Internally, they have assessed our strategists; externally, they have tested our military might to its limits. From this we can see, I believe the alliance of all under heaven is nearly within reach. Internally, our weapons and armor are worn out, soldiers and people are weary, reserves have been exhausted, fields lie fallow, and granaries stand empty; Externally, all under heaven have formed a very solid alliance. I hope the Great King will take this into careful consideration.
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| | 初見秦: |
且臣聞之曰：「戰戰栗栗，日慎一日，苟慎其道，天下可有。」何以知其然也？昔者紂為天子，將率天下甲兵百萬，左飲於淇溪，右飲於洹谿，淇水竭而洹水不流，以與周武王為難。武王將素甲三千，戰一日，而破紂之國，禽其身，據其地而有其民，天下莫傷。知伯率三國之眾以攻趙襄主於晉陽，決水而灌之三月，城且拔矣；襄主鑽龜筮占兆，以視利害，何國可降。乃使其臣張孟談於是乃潛於行而出，知伯之約，得兩國之眾以攻知伯，禽其身以復襄主之初。今秦地折長補短，方數千里，名師數十百萬，秦國之號令賞罰，地形利害，天下莫如也，以此與天下，天下可兼而有也。臣昧死願望見大王言所以破天下之從，舉趙、亡韓，臣荊、魏，親齊、燕，以成霸王之名，朝四鄰諸侯之道。大王誠聽其說，一舉而天下之從不破，趙不舉，韓不亡，荊、魏不臣，齊、燕不親，霸王之名不成，四鄰諸侯不朝，大王斬臣以徇國，以為王謀不忠者也。 |
| | Moreover, I have heard it said: "With trembling caution and growing care each day, if one carefully follows the right path, all under heaven can be possessed." How do I know this to be true? In the past, King Zhou was emperor and led a hundred thousand troops of all under heaven. He drank on his left at Qixi and on his right at Huaxi; the Qi River dried up while the Hua River ceased to flow as he opposed King Wu of Zhou. King Wu led only three thousand white-armored soldiers, fought for one day, and destroyed King Zhou's state. He captured the tyrant himself, occupied his land, and ruled over its people—without any harm to all under heaven. Zhibo led the forces of three states to attack Zhao Xiangzhu at Jinyang, diverting water to flood it for three months; the city was nearly captured. Xiangzhu drilled tortoise shells and cast yarrow sticks, consulting omens to see which state could be surrendered to for advantage. He then sent his minister Zhang Mengtan, who secretly left the city and made an agreement with Zhibo. With the forces of two states, they attacked Zhibo, captured him, and restored Xiangzhu's original position. Now, Qin's territory, measured by cutting short and extending length, spans thousands of square li. Its armies number tens or even hundreds of millions; its decrees on rewards and punishments and knowledge of terrain advantages are unmatched in the world. With this strength against all under heaven, it is possible to unify and possess them all. I, at the risk of my life, humbly request an audience with the Great King to speak on how to break the alliance of all under heaven, subdue Zhao, destroy Han, bring Jing and Wei into submission, be friendly with Qi and Yan, thus achieving the name of hegemon and making neighboring feudal lords come to pay homage. If the Great King truly listens to this advice, then if in one action the alliance of all under heaven will not be broken; Zhao will not fall, Han will not perish, Jing and Wei will not submit, Qi and Yan will not become allies, the name of hegemon will not be achieved, neighboring feudal lords will not come to pay homage, the Great King may execute me in public as an example for those who are disloyal in their counsel to the king.
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