| | 用民: |
四曰── |
| | Fourthly──
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| | 用民: |
凡用民，太上以義，其次以賞罰。其義則不足死，賞罰則不足去就，若是而能用其民者，古今無有。民無常用也，無常不用也，唯得其道為可。 |
| | When employing the people, the highest approach is through righteousness; the next best is through rewards and punishments. If righteousness alone is insufficient to inspire them to die, and rewards and punishments are not enough to determine their actions or inactions, then no one throughout history has been able to effectively employ the people in such a manner. The people are not always ready for use, nor are they always unused; only by following the right way is it possible.
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闔廬之用兵也不過三萬，吳起之用兵也不過五萬。萬乘之國，其為三萬五萬尚多。今外之則不可以拒敵，內之則不可以守國，其民非不可用也，不得所以用之也。不得所以用之，國雖大，勢雖便，卒無眾，何益？古者多有天下而亡者矣，其民不為用也。用民之論，不可不熟。 |
| | Helu's army did not exceed thirty thousand, and Wu Qi's army did not exceed fifty thousand. A great state with a thousand chariots would still find an army of thirty or fifty thousand to be relatively small. If they are deployed externally, they cannot repel the enemy; if stationed internally, they cannot defend the state. It is not that the people are unusable, but rather that the proper method of employing them has not been found. If one does not know how to employ the people properly, then even if a state is large and its position advantageous, it will still lack soldiers in times of crisis—what benefit is there in that? In ancient times, many rulers who possessed the whole world still perished, because their people would not serve them. The discussion on employing the people cannot be taken lightly; it must be thoroughly understood.
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| | 用民: |
劍不徒斷，車不自行，或使之也。夫種麥而得麥，種稷而得稷，人不怪也。用民亦有種，不審其種，而祈民之用，惑莫大焉。 |
| | A sword does not cut by itself, and a chariot does not move on its own—they are made to function by someone else. If one plants wheat and reaps wheat, or plants millet and reaps millet, people do not find this strange. Employing the people also has its "seeds"—if one does not carefully discern these "seeds," yet hopes for the people's service, there can be no greater confusion.
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當禹之時，天下萬國，至於湯而三千餘國，今無存者矣，皆不能用其民也。民之不用，賞罰不充也。湯、武因夏、商之民也，得所以用之也。管、商亦因齊、秦之民也，得所以用之也。民之用也有故，得其故，民無所不用。用民有紀有綱，壹引其紀，萬目皆起，壹引其綱，萬目皆張。為民紀綱者何也？欲也惡也。何欲何惡？欲榮利，惡辱害。辱害所以為罰充也，榮利所以為賞實也。賞罰皆有充實，則民無不用矣。 |
| | In Yu's time, there were ten thousand states under heaven; by the time of Tang, there remained more than three thousand states—but now none remain. All of them perished because they failed to properly employ their people. The reason the people are not employed effectively is that rewards and punishments are insufficient. Tang and Wu relied upon the people of Xia and Shang dynasties, yet they succeeded because they understood how to properly employ them. Guan Zhong and Shang Yang also relied upon the people of Qi and Qin, yet they succeeded because they knew how to properly employ them. There are reasons for employing the people; if one understands these reasons, then there is no situation in which the people cannot be effectively used. Employing the people requires principles and a central guideline: if one grasps the principle, all details will follow; if one seizes the central guideline, all aspects will be effectively managed. What are the principles and guidelines for employing the people? They are desire and aversion. What do they desire, and what do they dislike? They desire honor and profit, and they dislike disgrace and harm. Disgrace and harm serve as the basis for punishments; honor and profit constitute the substance of rewards. When rewards and punishments are both substantial and effective, then there is no case in which the people cannot be employed.
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| | 用民: |
闔廬試其民於五湖，劍皆加於肩，地流血幾不可止；句踐試其民於寑宮，民爭入水火，死者千餘矣，遽擊金而卻之；賞罰有充也。莫邪不為勇者興懼者變，勇者以工，懼者以拙，能與不能也。 |
| | Helu tested his people at Lake Wu; swords were placed on their shoulders, and blood flowed across the land so profusely that it was nearly impossible to stop. Goujian tested his people in the palace chambers; the people rushed into water and fire, with over a thousand dying—yet he suddenly struck the metal instrument to halt them. Rewards and punishments were indeed substantial. The sword Mouye does not instill fear in the brave or cause change in the timid; the brave wield it skillfully, while the timid use it clumsily—this is a matter of ability and inability.
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夙沙之民，自攻其君，而歸神農。密須之民，自縛其主，而與文王。湯、武非徒能用其民也，又能用非己之民。能用非己之民，國雖小，卒雖少，功名猶可立。古昔多由布衣定一世者矣，皆能用非其有也。用非其有之心，不可察之本。三代之道無二，以信為管。 |
| | The people of Susha attacked their own ruler and submitted to Shen Nong. The people of Mixu bound their lord themselves and handed him over to King Wen. Tang and Wu were not only able to employ their own people, but also the people who did not originally belong to them. If one can employ even those people who do not belong to him, then although the state may be small and its soldiers few, achievements and a reputation for virtue can still be established. In ancient times, there were many who rose from commoners to determine the fate of an entire era—this was because they were able to employ people who did not belong to them. The mindset required to employ those who are not one's own cannot be understood without examining its fundamental principles. The way of the Three Dynasties was not different; it used trust as its guiding principle.
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宋人有取道者，其馬不進，倒而投之鸂水。又復取道，其馬不進，又倒而投之鸂水。如此者三。雖造父之所以威馬，不過此矣。不得造父之道，而徒得其威，無益於御。人主之不肖者，有似於此。不得其道，而徒多其威。威愈多，民愈不用。亡國之主，多以多威使其民矣。故威不可無有，而不足專恃。譬之若鹽之於味，凡鹽之用，有所託也，不適則敗託而不可食。威亦然，必有所託，然後可行。惡乎託？託於愛利。愛利之心諭，威乃可行。威太甚則愛利之心息，愛利之心息而徒疾行威，身必咎矣，此殷、夏之所以絕也。君，利勢也，次官也。處次官，執利勢，不可而不察於此。夫不禁而禁者，其唯深見此論邪。 |
| | A man from Song who was traveling on a road found that his horse would not move forward, so he turned it around and threw it into the Xi River. He once again set out on the road, but his horse still would not move forward; he turned it around once more and threw it into the Xi River again. He did this three times. Even what Zao Fu, the master horseman, could achieve in subduing a horse was no more than this. Without understanding Zao Fu's method and merely imitating his authority over the horse, there is no benefit in terms of horsemanship. Unworthy rulers are similar to this. They do not grasp the proper way, yet merely increase their authority. The more authority they display, the less willing the people become to serve them. Rulers of fallen states often attempted to employ their people through excessive displays of authority. Therefore, authority cannot be entirely absent, but it is insufficient to rely upon exclusively. It is like salt in flavoring: the use of salt depends on something else to support it; if used improperly, it ruins what it supports and becomes inedible. Authority is the same—it must have a foundation upon which to rely before it can be effective. Upon what should authority rest? It should rest upon love and benefit. When the people understand that one's authority is rooted in care and benefit, then such authority can be effectively exercised. If authority is too severe, the people's sense of care and benefit will fade; when this sense fades and one resorts only to harsh displays of power, disaster for oneself is inevitable—this was why the Xia and Shang dynasties perished. A ruler holds a position of advantage and benefit; officials come next in rank. To hold an official post, to wield the power of advantage and benefit—those who do so cannot afford not to understand this clearly. Those who can impose restraint without direct prohibition are perhaps those who deeply comprehend this principle.
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