| | 救邊: |
聖王之政，普覆兼愛，不私近密，不忽踈遠，吉凶禍福，與民共之，哀樂之情，恕以及人，視民如赤子，救禍如引手爛。是以四海歡悅，俱相得用。 |
| | The administration of a sage ruler universally covers and loves all, showing no partiality toward the near or intimate, nor neglecting those who are distant. Calamities and blessings, whether auspicious or ominous, are shared with the people; feelings of sorrow and joy are extended to others through empathy. The ruler regards the people as his own children and rescues them from misfortune as easily as one would pull away a burning hand. Therefore, all under heaven are joyful and harmoniously united in their use of each other.
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| | 救邊: |
往者羌虜背叛，始自涼、并，延及司隸，東禍趙、魏，西鈔蜀、漢，五州殘破，六郡削迹，周迴千里，野無孑遺，寇鈔禍害，晝夜不止，百姓滅沒，日月焦盡。而內郡之士不被殃者，咸云當且放縱，以待天時。用意若此，豈人心也哉！ |
| | In the past, the Qiang bandits rebelled, beginning in Liang and Bing, spreading to Sili, causing calamity in the east as far as Zhao and Wei, and raiding in the west as far as Shu and Han. Five states were devastated, six commanderies lost all traces of life; for a thousand li around, not even one person remained in the fields. The raids and disasters continued day and night without ceasing, causing the people to perish and be consumed until nothing was left. As for those in the interior commanderies who had not yet suffered misfortune, they all said that they should temporarily relax their efforts and wait for a favorable time from heaven. To have such intentions—how could this be the will of the people!
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| | 救邊: |
前羌始反，公卿師尹咸欲捐棄涼州，卻保三輔，朝廷不聽。後羌遂侵，而論者多恨不從惑議。余竊笑之，所謂媾亦悔，不媾亦有悔者爾，未始識變之理。地無邊，無邊亡國。是故失涼州，則三輔為邊；三輔內入，則弘農為邊；弘農內入，則洛陽為邊。推此以相況，雖盡東海猶有邊也。今不厲武以誅虜，選材以全境，而云邊不可守，欲先自割，偄寇敵，不亦惑乎！ |
| | When the Qiang first rebelled, the high officials and ministers all wished to abandon Liangzhou and retreat to defend Sanfu, but the imperial court did not agree. Later, when the Qiang continued their invasion, many critics regretted that they had not followed the misguided advice. I secretly find this amusing—it is merely an example of regret whether one yields or not, without ever truly understanding the principles of change. The land has no boundary; a state with no boundaries will perish. Therefore, if Liangzhou is lost, then Sanfu becomes the frontier. If Sanfu falls inward, then Hongnong becomes the frontier; If Hongnong falls inward, then Luoyang becomes the frontier. Extending this line of reasoning to compare and infer, even if one reaches the East Sea, there will still be a frontier. Now, if we do not strengthen our military to punish the bandits and select capable individuals to preserve our territory, yet claim that the frontier cannot be defended and wish instead to cut off our own land first, thereby inviting the enemy—this is not also bewildering!
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| | 救邊: |
昔樂毅以慱慱之小燕，破滅彊齊，威震天下，真可謂良將矣。然即墨大夫以孤城獨守，六年不下，竟完其民。田單師窮，率五千騎，擊走卻，復齊七十餘城，可謂善用兵矣。圍聊、莒連年，終不能拔。此皆以至彊攻至弱，以上智圖下愚，而猶不能克者何也？曰：攻常不足，而守恆有餘也。前日諸郡，皆據列城而擁大眾。羌虜之智，非乃樂毅、田單也；郡縣之阨，未若聊、莒、即墨也。然皆不肯專心堅守，而反彊驅劫其民，捐棄倉庫，背城邑走。由此觀之，非苦城乏糧也，但苦將不食爾。 |
| | In the past, Yue Yi, with the small state of Yan, defeated the powerful Qi and terrified all under heaven—truly he may be called a capable general. Yet the 大夫 of Jimo defended his isolated city alone, holding out for six years without surrendering and ultimately preserving his people. Tian Dan, with limited resources, led five thousand cavalry to drive them away and recover more than seventy cities of Qi—truly he may be said to have been skillful in the use of troops. The sieges of Liaocheng and Ju continued for many years, yet they could never be captured. These were all cases where the extremely strong attacked the extremely weak, and those of supreme wisdom plotted against the profoundly foolish, yet still could not achieve victory—why was this? It is said: Attack is often insufficient, while defense is always abundant. On previous days, all the commanderies held fortified cities and commanded large forces. The intelligence of these Qiang bandits is not comparable to that of Yue Yi or Tian Dan; the strategic difficulties of the commanderies and counties are not as severe as those of Liaocheng, Ju, and Jimo. Yet none were willing to devote themselves wholeheartedly to steadfast defense, but instead forcefully drove away their people, abandoned granaries and treasuries, and fled from the cities. From this we can see, it is not that the fortified cities lack food supplies, but rather that it is the generals who are unwilling to endure hardship.
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| | 救邊: |
折衝安民，要在任賢，不在促境。齊、魏卻守，國不以安。子嬰自削，秦不以在。武皇帝攘夷拆境，面數千里，東開樂浪，西置燉煌，南踰交阯，北築朔方，卒定南越，誅斬大宛，武軍所嚮，無不夷滅。今虜近發封畿之內，而不能擒，亦自痛爾，非有邊之過也。唇亡齒寒，體傷心痛，必然之事，又何疑焉？君子見機，況已著乎？ |
| | To repel aggression and ensure peace for the people, the key lies in appointing capable officials, not in hastily retreating from the frontier. Qi and Wei retreated to defend their territories, yet this did not bring safety to their states. Ziying voluntarily ceded territory, but the state of Qin did not thereby survive. The Martial Emperor repelled the barbarians and expanded the borders, adding thousands of li in all directions. To the east he opened Lelang, to the west established Dunhuang, to the south crossed Jiaozhi, and to the north built Shuofang; ultimately he pacified Nanyue, defeated Dayuan, and wherever his military forces were directed, none could resist—they were all annihilated. Now the bandits have recently risen within the imperial capital's vicinity, yet we cannot capture them—this is our own shame, not a fault of having frontiers. When the lips are gone, the teeth feel cold; when the body is injured, the heart feels pain—this is an inevitable occurrence, what is there to doubt? A gentleman recognizes opportunity; how much more so when the signs are already evident!
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| | 救邊: |
乃者，邊害震如雷霆，赫如日月，而談者皆諱之，曰焱并竊盜。淺淺善靖，俾君子怠，欲令朝廷以寇為小，而不蚤憂，害乃至此，尚不欲救。曰：「痛不著身言忍之，錢不出家言與之。」假使公卿子弟有被羌禍，朝夕切急如邊民者，則競言當誅羌矣。 |
| | In recent times, the frontier disasters have raged like thunder and lightning, blazing brightly as the sun and moon; yet those who speak of them all avoid the truth, calling them merely flickering bandits and thieves. This superficial calmness fosters complacency among the virtuous, wishing to lead the imperial court into regarding bandits as trivial and not worrying about them early enough. As a result, harm has reached this point, yet there is still no desire to rescue the situation. It is said: "When pain does not touch one's own body, it is easy to speak of endurance; when money does not come from one's own home, it is easy to talk about giving." If the sons and descendants of high officials were themselves suffering from the Qiang's calamity, with urgent distress day by day just like those on the frontier, then they would all clamor that the Qiang must be punished.
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| | 救邊: |
今苟以己無慘怛冤痛，故端坐相仍，又不明脩禦之備，陶陶問澹，臥委天聽。羌獨往來，深入多殺，己乃陸陸，相將詣闕，諧辭禮謝，退云狀，會坐朝堂，則無憂國哀民懇惻之誠，苟轉相顧望，莫肯違止，日晏時移，議無所定，己且須後。後得小安，則恬然棄忘。旬時之間，虜復為害，軍書交馳，羽檄狎至，乃復怔忪如前。若此以來，出入九載，庶曰式臧，覆出為惡，佪佪潰潰，當何終極！《春秋》譏「鄭棄其師」，況棄人乎？一人吁嗟，王道為虧，況百萬之眾，號哭泣咸天心乎？ |
| | Now, because they themselves suffer no grievous sorrow or injustice, they sit idly by in succession, without clearly preparing defenses against the threat, indulging in idle talk and apathy, lying passively and leaving matters to fate. The Qiang bandits move freely, penetrate deeply and kill many, yet these officials proceed leisurely, accompanying one another to the palace, offering polite words of thanks, then retreating with their reports. When they gather in court, there is no genuine concern for the state or compassion for its people; instead, they merely glance at each other hesitantly, none daring to oppose or halt the proceedings. As time passes and day wanes, no decision is made, and matters are postponed until later. When a slight peace is achieved afterward, they become complacently indifferent and forgetful. Within the span of ten days, the bandits once again cause harm; military reports fly in from all directions and urgent messages arrive constantly. Only then do they become startled and confused as before. Since this has been the case, coming and going for nine years, one might say that order was once restored, yet disorder arises again; wavering and disintegrating in this way, what possible end can there be! The Spring and Autumn Annals censures "Zheng abandoning its army"—how much more so is it to abandon the people? The sigh of one person causes a deficiency in the king's way; how much more so is this true when millions cry out and weep, their voices reaching Heaven's heart!
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| | 救邊: |
且夫國以民為基，貴以賤為本。是以聖王養民，愛之如子，憂之如家，危者安之，亡者存之，救其災患，除其禍亂。是故鬼方之伐，非好武也，玁狁于攘，非貪土也，「以振民育德」，安彊宇也。「古者，天子守在四夷」，「自彼互、羌，莫不來享」，普天思服，行葦賴德。況近我民蒙禍若此，可無救乎？ |
| | Moreover, a state takes its people as its foundation, and the noble takes the lowly as its root. Therefore, a sage ruler nurtures the people, loves them as one's own children, and worries for them as for one's family. He brings safety to those in peril, preserves those on the brink of destruction, rescues them from disasters, and removes their calamities and disorders. Therefore, the campaign against Gui Fang was not an eagerness for war, and repelling Xianyun was not a desire to seize land—it was "to uplift the people and cultivate virtue," thus ensuring peace and stability throughout the realm. "In ancient times, the Son of Heaven guarded against the four barbarian regions," "From those in Hu and Qiang, none failed to come offering tribute"—all under heaven longed for submission, relying on virtue as reeds depend upon water. How much more so when our own people nearby suffer calamities like this—can we remain without offering aid?
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| | 救邊: |
凡民之所以奉事上者，懷義恩也。痛則無恥，福則不仁。忿戾怨懟，生於無恥。今羌叛久矣！傷害多矣！百姓急矣！憂禍深矣！上下相從，未見休時。不一命大將以掃醜虜，而州稍稍興役，連連不已。若排榩障風，探沙灌河，無所能禦，徒自盡爾。今數州屯兵才餘萬人，皆廩食縣官，歲數百萬斛，又有月直。但此人耗，不可勝供，而反憚暫出之費，甚非計也。 |
| | The reason why the people serve and obey their superiors is that they cherish righteousness and kindness. When one suffers pain, there is no shame; when one enjoys blessings, yet remains unkind—this is the lack of benevolence. Wrath, resentment, and grudges arise from a lack of shame. The Qiang have rebelled for a long time now! Much harm has been caused! The people are in dire straits! Their worries and calamities run deep! Superiors and subordinates follow this course, yet no sign of respite is seen. Without appointing a single great general to sweep away these disgraceful bandits, yet the states gradually raise military campaigns, one after another without end. It is like arranging boards to block the wind or scooping sand to pour into a river—utterly ineffective in defense, only exhausting oneself in vain. Now the garrison troops of several states number barely ten thousand men, all supported by government rations, costing hundreds of thousands of hu annually, in addition to monthly stipends. Yet this drain on resources is unsustainable and cannot be adequately supplied, yet people are reluctant even to bear the temporary cost of action—this is a most unwise strategy.
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| | 救邊: |
是夫危者易傾，疑者易化。今虜新擅邊地，未敢自安，易震蕩也。百姓新離舊懷，思慕未衰，易將厲也。誠宜因此遣大將誅討，迫脅離逖破壞之。如寬假日月，蓄積富貴，各懷安固之後，則難動矣。《》曰：「凡彼聖人必趨時。」是故戰守之策，不可不早定也。 |
| | Indeed, what is in danger is easily overturned, and what is doubtful is easily transformed. Now the bandits have newly seized frontier lands and dare not yet feel secure—this makes them easy to shake and overthrow. The people, having recently suffered separation from their former homes, still harbor strong yearnings that have not yet faded—this makes them easy to rally and inspire. It is indeed appropriate to take advantage of this situation by dispatching a great general to punish and attack, compelling the rebels to disband and their forces to be shattered. If we grant them more time, allowing days and months to pass while they accumulate wealth and security, each growing attached to their present stability, then it will become difficult to move them. The Zhou Shu says: "All those sage men must act in accordance with the right time." Therefore, strategies for war and defense cannot be left undetermined for long.
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