| | 禁使: |
人主之所以禁使者，赏罚也。赏随功，罚随罪，故论功察罪，不可不审也。夫赏高罚下，而上无必知其道也，与无道同也。凡知道者，势数也。 |
| Interdicts and Encouragements:...: |
The method by which a ruler of men prohibits and encourages is by means of rewards and penalties. Rewards follow merit and penalties follow crime; therefore is it necessary to be careful in appraising merit and in investigating crime. Now, rewards exalt and punishments debase, but if the superiors have no definite knowledge of their method, it is no better than if they had no method at all. But the method for right knowledge is power and figures. |
| | 禁使: |
故先王不恃其强，而恃其势；不恃其信，而恃其数。今夫飞蓬，遇飘风而行千里，乘风之势也。探渊者知千仞之深，县绳之数也。故托其势者，虽远必至；守其数者，虽深必得。今夫幽夜，山陵之大，而离娄不见；清朝日撽，则上别飞鸟，下察秋毫。故目之见也，托日之势也。得势之至，不参官而洁，陈数而物当。今恃多官众吏，官立丞监。夫置丞立监者，且以禁人之为利也；而丞监亦欲为利，则以何相禁？故恃丞监而治者，仅存之治也。通数者不然，别其势，难其道。故曰：“其势难匿者，虽跖不为非焉。”故先王贵势。 |
| Interdicts and Encouragements:...: |
Therefore, the early kings did not rely on their strength but on their power (shi); they did not rely on their belief but on their figures. Now, for example, a floating seed of the p'eng plant, meeting a whirlwind, may be carried a thousand li, because it rides on the power (shi) of the wind. If, in measuring an abyss, you know that it is a thousand fathoms deep, it is owing to the figures which you find by dropping a string. So by depending on the power (shi) of a thing, you will reach a point, however distant it may be, and by keeping the proper figures, you will find out the depth, however deep it may be. Now, for example, in the darkness of the night, even a Li Lou cannot see a great mountain forest, but in the clear morning light, with the brilliant sun, he can distinguish the flying birds above, and below he can see an autumn hair, for the vision of the eye is dependent on the power of the sun. When the highest condition of power (shi) is reached, things are arranged without a multitude of officials and are made fitting by expounding the system. But nowadays, reliance is placed on a multitude of offices and a host of civil servants, and in the official bureaux assistants and controllers are appointed. Now, the idea of appointing these assistants and controllers is indeed to prevent men from making profit, but these assistants and controllers themselves also desire to make profit. How then can they prevent others from doing so! Therefore, if one relies on assistants and controllers for one's administration, then will it be an administration that can barely maintain itself. It is not thus, if one understands "system"; one separates their power (shi) and puts checks on their conduct. Therefore is it said: 'If the conditions of power (shi) are such that it is difficult to conceal anything, then even a man like Zhi does no wrong. Therefore, the early kings prized power (shi). |
| | 禁使: |
或曰：“人主执虚后以应，则物应稽验，稽验则奸得。”臣以为不然。夫吏专制决事于千里之外，十二月而计书以定，事以一岁别计，而主以一听，见所疑焉，不可蔽，员不足。夫物至，则目不得不见；言薄，则耳不得不闻。故物至则辨，言至则论。 |
| Interdicts and Encouragements:...: |
Some say: 'A ruler of men holds a nominal right of consent, post factum; then things are controlled and examined, and by this control wickedness is discovered.' I do not think that this is right. For officials exert sole authority and take decisions a thousand li away (from the ruler). In the twelfth month, to confirm it, they make a report, in which the affairs of the whole year have separate entries; but as the ruler gives but one hearing, although he sees doubtful cases, he cannot determine whether an official is capable or otherwise.... For example, if objects come near, the eye cannot but see them; if words are insistent, the ear cannot but hear them; for if objects approach, they alter in appearance, and if words draw near, they form coherent speech. |
| | 禁使: |
故治国之制，民不得避罪，如目不能以所见遁心。今乱国不然，恃多官众吏。吏虽众，事同体一也。夫事同体一者，相监不可。且夫利异而害不同者，先王所以为保也。 |
| Interdicts and Encouragements:...: |
So with the organization in a well-governed state, people cannot escape punishment any more than the eyes can hide from the mind what they see. But in the disorderly states of the present time, it is not thus: reliance is placed on a multitude of offices and a host of civil servants, but however numerous the civil servants may be, their affairs are the same and they belong to one body. Now, those whose affairs are the same and who belong to one body, cannot control one another. But by making their interests different and their disadvantages dissimilar, the early kings created guarantees. |
| | 禁使: |
故至治，夫妻交友不能相为弃恶盖非，而不害于亲，民人不能相为隐。上与吏也，事合而利异者也。今夫驺虞，以相监不可，事合而利同者也。若使马焉能言，则驺虞无所逃其恶矣，利异也。利合而恶同者，父不能以问子，君不能以问臣。吏之与吏，利合而恶同也。夫事合而利异者，先王之所以为端也。民之蔽主，而不害于盖，贤者不能益，不肖者不能损。故遗贤去智，治之数也。 |
| Interdicts and Encouragements:...: |
Therefore, in a condition of complete good government, husband and wife and friends cannot abandon each other's evil, cover up wrong-doing and not cause harm to relatives; nor can the men from the people mutually conceal each other from their superiors and government servants. That is because, although their affairs are connected, their interests are different. But nowadays a Zou and a Yu cannot control each other, because their business is the same and their interests are also similar... Suppose that horses could speak, then a Zou and a Yu would have no chance of escaping what they find hateful; that is because their interests would be different. When interests are connected and what they hate is the same, then a father cannot reprimand his son, nor a prince his minister. The relation of government servants to other government servants is this, that their interests are connected and what they hate is the same. Now, the early kings made it a principle that those whose business was connected, should have different interests. Though the people may hide things from their ruler, there is no harm done in thus covering them up, nor can there be advantage in having virtuous men or harm in having worthless ones. The system, therefore, of good government is to neglect the virtuous and to abolish the wise. |
