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仁、义、礼、乐，名、法、刑、赏，凡此八者，五帝三王治世之术也。故仁以导之，义以宜之，礼以行之，乐以和之，名以正之，法以齐之，刑以威之，赏以劝之，故仁者所以博施于物，亦所以生偏私，义者所以立节行，亦所以成华僞，礼者所以行谨敬，亦所以生惰慢，乐者所以和情志，亦所以生淫放，名者所以正尊卑，亦所以生矜篡，法者所以齐衆异，亦所以生乖分，刑者所以威不服，亦所以生陵暴，赏者所以劝忠能，亦所以生鄙争。 |
| | Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, music, names, legalism, punishment, and reward—these eight elements are the methods used by the Five Emperors and Three Kings to govern the world. Therefore, benevolence is used to guide people, righteousness to regulate them, propriety to put their conduct in order, music to harmonize them, names to establish correctness, law to unify them, punishment to instill awe, and reward to encourage them. Thus, benevolence enables the broad bestowal of benefits upon things, yet it also gives rise to partiality and favoritism; righteousness establishes moral integrity, yet it may lead to superficial pretense; propriety promotes carefulness and respect, yet it can produce negligence and disrespect; music harmonizes emotions and aspirations, yet it might foster licentiousness and indulgence; names establish the hierarchy of rank and status, yet they can generate arrogance and usurpation; law unifies diverse people, yet it may cause discord and division; punishment instills awe in those who do not submit, yet it could lead to oppression and violence; reward encourages loyalty and ability, yet it might provoke base competition.
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凡此八术，无隐于人，而常存于世，非自显于尧、汤之时，非故逃于桀、纣之朝，用得其道，则天下治，用失其道，则天下乱，过此而往，虽弥纶天地，缠络万品，治道之外，非羣生所餐挹，圣人措而不言也。 |
| | These eight methods are not hidden from people and have always existed in the world. They were neither particularly prominent during the time of Yao and Tang nor deliberately concealed during the reigns of Jie and Zhou. When applied according to the right principles, they bring order to the world; when misapplied, they lead to chaos. Beyond these considerations, even if one could encompass heaven and earth or connect with myriad things, anything outside the realm of governance is not something for which all living beings seek sustenance, so sages set it aside without mentioning it.
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凡国之将存亡有六徵，有衰国，有乱国，有亡国，有昌国，有强国，有治国，所谓乱亡之国者，凶虐残暴不与焉。所谓强治之国者，威力仁义不与焉。君年长，多妾媵，少子孙，疏宗强，衰国也。君宠臣，臣爱君，公法废，私欲行，乱国也。国贫小，家富大，君权轻，臣势重，亡国也。凡此三徵，不待凶虐残暴而后弱也。虽曰见存，吾必谓之亡者也。 |
| | A country on the verge of survival or destruction exhibits six signs: there are declining states, chaotic states, doomed states, flourishing states, strong states, and well-governed states. What is referred to as a state in chaos or on the brink of collapse does not include those that are merely cruel and violent. What is called a strong and well-governed state excludes those where power and force replace benevolence and righteousness. When the ruler is old, has many concubines and attendants, few descendants, and distant relatives who are powerful, it is a declining state. When the ruler favors his ministers and the ministers love their ruler, public law is neglected and private desires prevail—it is a chaotic state. When the country is poor and small but families are rich and powerful, when the ruler's authority is weak and ministers' influence is strong—it is a doomed state. These three signs do not require cruelty or brutality to weaken the state; they are sufficient on their own. Although it may still appear to exist, I would certainly call it a lost state.
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内无专宠，外无近习，支庶繁息，长幼不乱，昌国也。农桑以时，仓廪充实，兵甲劲利，封疆修理，强国也。上不能胜其下，下不能犯其上，上下不相胜犯，故禁令行，人人无私，虽经险易而国不可侵，治国也。凡此三徵，不待威力仁义而后强，虽曰见弱，吾必谓之存者也。 |
| | When there is no exclusive favoritism within the court and no close favorites at court, when collateral branches of the family are numerous and flourishing, and when the hierarchy between elders and juniors remains orderly—it is a flourishing state. When agriculture and sericulture are carried out in season, granaries are well stocked, weapons and armor are strong and sharp, and borders are properly maintained—it is a powerful state. When the ruler cannot overcome his subjects and the subjects do not defy their ruler, when there is no conflict between superiors and inferiors—thus prohibitions and commands are carried out effectively, everyone remains without private interests, and even in times of crisis or ease, the state cannot be invaded—it is a well-governed state. These three signs do not require power, force, benevolence, or righteousness to become strong. Even if the state appears weak, I would certainly say it is still preserved.
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语曰：佞辨可以荧惑鬼神，探人之心，度人之欲，顺人于嗜好而弗敢逆，纳人于邪恶而求利，人喜闻己之美也。善能扬之，恶闻己之过也。而善能饰之，得之于眉睫之间，承之于言行之先，世俗之人，闻誉则悦，闻毁则戚，此衆人之大情，有同己则喜，异己则怒，此人之大情，故佞人善为誉者也。善顺从者也。人言是、亦是之，人言非、亦非之，从人之所爱，随人之所憎，故明君虽能纳正直，未必亲正直，虽能远佞人，未必能疏佞人，故舜、禹者，以能不用佞人，亦未必憎佞人。语曰：佞辨惑物，舜禹不能得憎，不可不察乎。 |
| | It is said: Flattery and eloquence can bewilder gods and spirits. They probe people's minds, gauge their desires, accommodate them in their likes and dislikes without daring to oppose, lead them into evil for personal gain, and people are pleased to hear praise of themselves. Goodness is praised, while faults are not heard when they concern oneself. And goodness can be embellished; one detects it in the subtlest expressions, and supports it before words or actions are taken. People of the world rejoice at praise but grieve at criticism—this is a common sentiment among ordinary people. When something aligns with their own views, they are pleased; when it differs, they become angry—this is human nature. Therefore, flatterers excel in offering praise. They are good at following and obeying. When others say something is right, they also call it right; when others say it is wrong, they also call it wrong. They follow what people love and go along with what people hate. Therefore, even a wise ruler who can accept upright officials may not necessarily be close to them, and although he can distance himself from flatterers, he may not necessarily keep them at arm's length. Thus, Shun and Yu were able to refrain from employing flatterers, but they did not necessarily despise them. It is said: Flattering eloquence confuses people; even Shun and Yu could not completely hate it—this cannot be overlooked.
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老子曰：民不畏死，如之何其以死惧之，凡人之不畏死，由刑罚过，刑罚过则民不赖其生，生无所赖，视君之威未如也。刑罚中则民畏死，畏死、由生之可乐，故可以死惧矣。此人君之所宜执，臣下之所宜惧之。 |
| | Laozi said: When the people do not fear death, how can one use death to intimidate them? The reason why people do not fear death is because punishments are excessive. When punishments are excessive, the people no longer rely on life; when they have nothing to depend upon in life, their regard for the ruler's authority becomes negligible. When punishments are moderate, people fear death; they fear death because life is seen as pleasant. Therefore, one can use the threat of death to deter them. This is what a ruler should uphold and what subordinates should fear.
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田子曰：人皆自为而不能为人，故君人者之使人，使其自为用、而不使为我用。魏下先生曰：善哉。田子之言，古者君之使臣，求不私爱于己，求显忠于己，而居官者必能，临阵者必勇，禄赏之所劝，名法之所齐，不出于己心，不利于己身。 |
| | Tianzi said: People all act for themselves and cannot act for others. Therefore, a ruler who uses people should make them serve by acting in their own interests, not by making them serve solely for the ruler's benefit. The Master of Wei Xia said: Well spoken. Tianzi's words mean that in ancient times, when a ruler used his ministers, he sought not their private affection for himself but their public loyalty to him. Those who held office must be competent, and those on the battlefield must be brave; rewards and salaries served as encouragement, while names and laws ensured uniformity. These did not arise from one's own heart nor benefit oneself personally.
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语曰：禄薄者不可与经乱，赏轻者不可与入难，此处上者所宜慎者也。父之于子也。令有必行者，有不必行者，去贵妻，卖爱妾，此令必行者也。因曰汝无敢恨，汝无敢思，令必不行者也。故为人上者，必慎所令焉。人贫则怨人，富则骄人，怨人者苦人之不禄施于己也。起于情所难安而不能安，犹可恕也。骄人者无所苦而无故骄人，此情所易制弗能制，不可恕矣。 |
| | It is said: Those who receive meager salaries cannot be relied upon in times of chaos, and those offered light rewards cannot be expected to face danger. This is what superiors should carefully consider. The father toward the son. There are commands that must be obeyed and those that need not necessarily be followed. To send away a beloved wife or sell a cherished concubine—this is an order that must be carried out. Yet to say, "You dare not resent me; you dare not think of it"—such a command cannot possibly be obeyed. Therefore, those in positions of authority must always exercise caution regarding the commands they issue. When people are poor, they resent others; when rich, they look down on them. Those who resent others do so because they suffer from the lack of benefits and favors bestowed upon them by others. Such feelings arise from a difficult situation that cannot be easily accepted, and thus may still be forgiven. Those who look down on others suffer no hardship yet act haughtily without cause; this is a sentiment that should be easily controlled but is not, and thus cannot be forgiven.
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贫贱之望富贵甚微，而富贵不能酬其甚微之望，夫富者之所恶，贫者之所美，贵者之所轻，贱者之所荣，然而弗酬，不与同苦乐故也。虽不酬之，于我弗伤，今万民之望人君，亦如贫贱者之望富贵，其所望者，盖欲料长幼，平赋敛，时其饥寒，省其疾痛，赏罚不滥，使役以时，如此而已，则于人君弗损也。然而弗酬，弗与同劳逸故也。故为人君不可不与人同劳逸焉。故富贵者不可不酬贫贱，而人君不可不酬万民，则万民之所不愿戴，所不愿戴，君位替矣。危莫甚焉。祸莫大焉。 |
| | The hopes of the poor and lowly are very modest, yet those who are rich and noble cannot fulfill these small expectations. What the wealthy despise is what the poor consider admirable; what the noble regard as trivial is what the lowly see as honorable. Yet they still fail to respond—because they do not share in each other's hardships or joys. Even if they are not fulfilled, it does no harm to me. Now, the people's expectations of their ruler are like those of the poor and lowly toward the rich and noble. What they hope for is merely that the ruler will properly distinguish between elders and juniors, fairly collect taxes, provide timely relief from hunger and cold, reduce suffering from illness and pain, administer rewards and punishments without excess, and assign labor at appropriate times—nothing more than this. If a ruler can do so, it would not harm him in any way. Yet if these expectations are unmet, it is because the ruler does not share their toil and ease. Therefore, a ruler must not fail to share in the people's labor and rest. Therefore, the rich and noble must not fail to respond to the poor and lowly, just as a ruler must not neglect the people. If the people are unwilling to support their ruler, and if they do not wish to support him, then his position will be replaced. There is no greater danger than this. No misfortune could be greater than this.
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