| | 夷狄: |
西夏李繼遷本夷狄，姓托跋，後賜姓李。五代時有其地，國初世襲。太宗欲取之，遂召繼遷歸京師，以別人代之。一日，繼遷逃歸。朝廷費無限心力不能得，遂以其兄繼隆知夏州，令招之。其兄遂陰與之合，每奏朝廷，謂已無事。後朝廷又召其兄歸，繼遷遂復有其地。靈州屬朝廷，又在西夏之外，為西夏截斷，又以兵圖之，使不得通朝廷。靈州絕遠，難救援。又其地渾沙無水，不可掘。每兵行，則用水以自隨，渴殺了多少。人行其沙，地上皆動，陷了數百人馬，只見不在。太宗心欲棄之而不言。時參政張洎南唐亡國之臣，專以諂敗其主。歸，又以諂遭遇。揣知上意，即進可棄之說。上問宰相呂端，又令各進說。端言，如此則各有說，非僉議合謀之意。洎即詆端避事。端言，洎不過揣合上意。後洎即進說，端不曾進。上謂洎揣合果如端言，封還其說。朝廷遂詔靈州守臣出兵與接，漸漸離去棄之。張齊賢以為不可，如此則被夏人掩殺，須是與之戰，勝則得之，不勝則漸漸引去。方議未定，忽報靈州已為夏人所破矣，因而為彼所有。後來朝廷費了幾多氣力去取。韓范輩用兵後，徐禧永樂之敗是也。張魏公舊官於陝西，嘗登高望見西夏界外，則西夏土地亦不甚闊。如何強盛，被他守得如此好！祖宗時，兵每出輒敗。今依舊五州，全又更取過那邊去了，土地合闊矣。只見強盛，虜人亦不柰何，當時亦曾敗於彼。 |
| | The Western Xia ruler Li Jiqian was originally a member of the Yidi ethnic group and bore the surname Tuoba, later being granted the surname Li. During the Five Dynasties period, there were people ruling this territory, and at the beginning of the dynasty they continued to hold power through hereditary succession. Taizong wanted to take control of it, so he summoned Jiqian back to the capital and appointed someone else in his place. One day, Jiqian fled back. The imperial court spent countless efforts and could not capture him, so they appointed his elder brother Jiilong as the governor of Xia Zhou and ordered him to recruit Jiqian. His elder brother then secretly colluded with him, and every time he reported to the imperial court, he claimed that there was no longer any problem. Later, when the imperial court summoned his elder brother back, Jiqian once again regained control of the territory. Ling Zhou belonged to the imperial court and was located outside the Western Xia, but it was cut off by the Western Xia. They then used military forces to attack it in an attempt to prevent communication with the imperial court. Ling Zhou is remote and difficult to rescue. Moreover, the area is filled with shifting sands and lacks water; it cannot be excavated. Whenever troops marched, they had to carry water with them, and many were killed by thirst. When people walked on the sands, the ground would shift beneath their feet; hundreds of soldiers and horses sank into it, never to be seen again. Taizong was determined in his heart to abandon it but did not speak of it. At that time, the Cenzheng Zhang Ji was a minister from the fallen state of Nan Tang and specialized in flattery to undermine his ruler. After returning, he again encountered someone who used flattery. lington Realizing the emperor's thoughts, he immediately proposed the idea of abandoning it. The emperor asked Chancellor Lü Duan and also ordered each official to present their views. Lü Duan said, "If we do this, then everyone will have their own opinion, which is not the intention of reaching a consensus through collective deliberation." Zhang Ji immediately defamed Lü Duan for avoiding responsibility. Lü Duan said, "Zhang Ji is nothing more than someone who guesses and conforms to the emperor's wishes." Later, Zhang Ji immediately presented his argument, while Lü Duan did not do so. The emperor said that Zhang Ji's flattery indeed matched what Lü Duan had claimed and returned the proposal unopened. The imperial court then issued an edict ordering the military governor of Ling Zhou to withdraw troops and gradually abandon it. Zhang Qixian believed this was not advisable, arguing that if they did so, they would be ambushed and killed by the Xia people. He insisted that they must fight them; if victorious, they could retain control, but if defeated, they should gradually withdraw. While the discussion was still ongoing and no decision had been made, a sudden report arrived that Ling Zhou had already been captured by the Xia forces and thus fell into their possession. Later on, the imperial court expended great effort to reclaim it. This was exemplified by Han Fan and others leading military campaigns, such as Xu Xi's defeat at Yongle. Zhang Wei Gong once held an official post in Shaanxi and, upon climbing to a high place, saw beyond the Western Xia border; he observed that the land of the Western Xia was not particularly vast. How could they become so powerful and defend their territory so effectively! During the time of our ancestors, whenever troops were sent out, they would often suffer defeat. Now, following the original five states and completely reclaiming those areas beyond, the territory should be much broader. Yet they were seen as powerful; even the enemy could not do anything about it, and at that time they had also suffered defeat from them.
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| | 夷狄: |
因論西夏事，曰：「當時事不可曉。看來韓范亦無素定基本，只是逐旋做出。且如當時覆軍敗將，這下方且失利，他之勢甚張；忽然自來納款求和，這全不可曉。後來不久，元昊遂死。不知他不死數年，又必有甚姦謀，大未可知。且如當時朝廷必欲他稱臣，遂使契丹號令之。契丹方自以為功，朝廷正未有所處，又卻二國自相侵凌。不爾，則當時又須費力。大抵西人勇健喜鬥，三五年必一次為邊害。本朝韓范張魏公諸人，他只是一箇秀才，於這般事也不大段會。只是被他忠義正當，故做得恁地。」 |
| | While discussing the Western Xia affairs, he said, "The events of that time are hard to understand. It seems Han Fan also had no solid foundation or plan; he merely acted on the spur of the moment." For example, when at that time their army was crushed and generals defeated, this side suffered a loss, and their momentum became very strong; suddenly they came on their own to submit and seek peace—this is entirely inexplicable. Not long afterward, Yuan Hao died. It is unknown what treacherous plans he might have had if he had not died a few years earlier; the possibilities are vast and uncertain. For example, at that time the imperial court insisted that he submit as a vassal, thus allowing the Khitan to issue commands over him. The Khitans took this as their own achievement, while the imperial court had not yet decided on a course of action; yet again, two states were left to attack each other. Otherwise, it would have been necessary to exert great effort at that time. Generally speaking, the western people are brave and fond of fighting; they inevitably cause border troubles once every three or five years. Figures from our dynasty such as Han Fan and Zhang Wei Gong were merely scholars; they did not really know much about such matters. "They only managed to do so because of their loyalty, righteousness, and integrity," he said.
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| | 夷狄: |
或問：「范文正公經理西事，看得多是收拾人才。」曰：「然。如滕子京孫元規之徒，素無行節，范公皆羅致之幕下。後犯法，又極力救解之。如劉滬張亢亦然。蓋此等人是有才底，做事時，須要他用，但要會用得他。」又云：「范公嘗立一軍為『龍猛軍』，皆是招收前後作過黥配底人，後來甚得其用。時人目范公為『龍猛指揮使』。」又曰：「方范公起用事時，軍政全無統紀，從頭與他整頓一番。其後卻只務經理內地，養威持重，專行淺攻之策，以為得寸則吾之寸，得尺則吾之尺。卒以此牽制夏人，遣使請和。」 |
| | Someone asked, "When Fan Zhongyong managed the western affairs, he mainly focused on gathering and cultivating talent." He said, "Yes. For example, people like Teng Zijing and Sun Yuanguī, who had no moral integrity or conduct to speak of, were all gathered by Fan Gong into his staff. Later, when they broke the law, he went out of his way to rescue and defend them. The same was true for Liu Hu and Zhang Kang. These people were talented; when things needed to be done, one had to rely on them, but one also had to know how to use them properly." He also said, "Fan Gong once established a military unit called the 'Longmeng Army,' composed entirely of former convicts who had been branded and exiled. Later on, they proved to be very useful." At that time, people referred to Fan Gong as the 'Commander of the Longmeng.'" He also said, "When Fan Gong first took office and began to assume responsibilities, the military administration had completely collapsed; he started from scratch and thoroughly reorganized it. Afterward, however, he focused solely on managing the interior regions, cultivating authority and prudence, and exclusively implementing a strategy of shallow attacks, believing that gaining an inch would be our inch, and gaining a foot would be our foot. In the end, this approach restrained the Xia people, leading them to send envoys to request peace."
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| | 夷狄: |
問：「本朝建國，何故不都關中？」曰：「前代所以都關中者，以黃河左右旋繞，所謂『臨不測之淵』是也。近東獨有函谷關一路通山東，故可據以為險。又，關中之山，皆自蜀漢而來，至長安而盡。池錄作「關中之山皆自西而東」。若橫山之險，乃山之極高處。橫山皆黃石山，不生草木。本朝則自橫山以北，盡為西夏所有，山河之固，與吾共之，反據高以臨我，是以不可都也。神宗銳意欲取橫山，蓋得橫山，則可據高以臨彼。然取橫山之要，又在永樂。故永樂之城，夏人以死爭之，我師大敗。神宗聞喪師大慟，聖躬由是不豫。」按編年，重和元年，童貫命种師道劉延慶等取夏國求和等寨，大敗夏人而還。六月，夏人納款。初，夏人恃橫山諸險以抗中國。慶曆中，王嗣宗范仲淹建議取之，會元昊納款而止。元豐中，李憲建議，又會王師失利，神宗厭兵，不克行。貫嘗從憲得其規摹。政和初，議進築。至是十餘年，遂得橫山之地。夏人失援，故納款。然國家是時已建下燕之策，益以多故。其後西夏與女真人。乙巳冬，女真圍太原，夏人犯河外，則是橫山之取，有以結怨於彼也。又曰：「神宗初即位，富韓公為相，問為治之要，富公曰：『須是二十年不說著「用兵」二字。』此一句便與神宗意不合。已而擢用王介甫，首以用兵等說稱上旨，君臣相得甚懽。時建昌軍司戶王韶上平戎策，介甫力薦之。初為秦鳳路經略，司機宜，後知通遠軍，遂一戰而復熙河。捷書聞，上大喜，解白玉帶以賜介甫，賞其知人；又加韶為龍圖閣侍待制，以為熙河帥。熙河本鎮洮軍，因復其地，改為熙州。只是廣漠之鄉，有之不加益，無之不加損。狃於一勝之後，廟論一意主於用兵，三敗至於永樂，極矣。永樂之敗，徐禧死之。禧，師川之父，黃魯直之妹夫也。能文章，好談兵，也有進策行於世，文字甚好。二蘇之文未出，學者爭傳誦之。」 |
| | Someone asked, "Why did our dynasty not establish its capital in Guanzhong when it founded the state?" He said, "Previous dynasties chose Guanzhong as their capital because the Yellow River flowed around it on both sides; this is what is referred to as 'facing an unfathomable abyss.'" To the east, there was only one route through Hangu Pass connecting it to Shandong; therefore, it could be relied upon as a strategic pass. Moreover, the mountains of Guanzhong all originate from Shu and Hán, ending at Chang'an. Chi Lu wrote, "The mountains of Guanzhong extend from west to east." If the perilous terrain of Hengshan is considered, it lies at the highest point of the mountain range. Hengshan consists entirely of yellow stone mountains where no grass or trees grow. In our dynasty, from Hengshan northward was entirely under the control of the Western Xia. The natural defenses provided by mountains and rivers were shared with us, yet they occupied the high ground to look down upon us; therefore, Guanzhong could not be chosen as the capital. Shenzong was keen on capturing Hengshan because if they gained control of it, they could occupy the high ground and look down upon their enemies. However, the key to capturing Hengshan lay in Yongle. lø Therefore, the city of Yongle was fiercely contested by the Xia forces at great cost; our troops suffered a major defeat. Upon hearing of the heavy losses, Emperor Shenzong grieved deeply and fell seriously ill as a result." According to the annals, in Zhonghe Year 1, Tong Guan ordered Zhong Shidao, Liu Yankang and others to attack Xia state's camps seeking peace, and they heavily defeated the Xia forces before returning. In June, the Xia submitted with a request for peace. Initially, the Xia relied on the perilous terrain of Heng Shan and other areas to resist the Chinese state. During the Qingli period, Wang Sizong and Fan Zhongyan proposed capturing it, but the plan was abandoned when Yuan Hao submitted with a peace offering. During the Yuang 丰 period, Li Xian proposed it again, but due to military setbacks and Emperor Shenzong's weariness of war, the plan could not be carried out. Tong Guan once followed Li Xian and learned his strategies. At the beginning of Zhenghe, there was a discussion about advancing construction efforts. After more than ten years, they finally gained control of Hengshan territory. The Xia lost their support and therefore submitted with a peace offering. However, at that time the state had already begun implementing plans to subdue Yan, and was further burdened by many other affairs. Afterward, the Western Xia and the Jurchens. In winter of the Yi Si year, the Jurchen surrounded Taiyuan while the Xia attacked beyond the Yellow River—this was a consequence of seizing Hengshan and thus inciting their resentment. He also said, "When Emperor Shenzong first ascended the throne, Fu Han Gong served as chancellor. When asked about the essentials of governance, Fu Gong said: 'We must not even mention the words 'military action' for twenty years.'" This single statement was already at odds with Emperor Shenzong's intentions. Not long after, Wang Jiefu was promoted and appointed to an important position; he first gained favor with the emperor by advocating for military action in accordance with imperial wishes, and thus a harmonious relationship developed between ruler and minister. At that time, Wang Shao, an official in Jianchang Jun, submitted the "Pingrong Strategy," and Wang Jiefu strongly recommended him. Initially serving as a military planner for the Qin Feng Road, and later as an official in Tongyuan Jun, he eventually won back Xihe with one decisive battle. When news of the victory reached the emperor, he was greatly pleased and presented Wang Jiefu with a white jade belt as a reward for his ability to recognize talent; Wang Shao was also promoted to the position of Longtuguo Shidai Zhi and appointed as commander of Xihe. Xihetown originally belonged to Zhending Jun; after its territory was recovered, it was renamed Xizhou. It is merely a vast and sparsely populated region—possessing it brings no additional benefit, and losing it causes no significant loss. Becoming complacent after one victory, the court's discussions became fixated on military action; this led to three defeats, culminating in the disaster at Yongle, which was as far as it could go. In the defeat at Yongle, Xu Xi died. Xu Xi was the father of Shichuan and the brother-in-law of Huang Luzhi. He was capable in writing, fond of discussing military affairs, had also submitted strategies that were circulated in the world, and his writings were very good. Before the essays of the two Sus (Su Shi and Su Xun) became widely known, scholars competed to recite and spread his works."
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| | 夷狄: |
神宗其初要結高麗去共攻契丹。高麗如何去得！契丹自是大國，高麗朝貢於彼，如何敢去犯他！ |
| | At the beginning of his reign, Emperor Shenzong wanted to form an alliance with Goryeo (Korea) to jointly attack the Khitan. How could Goryeo possibly do that! The Khitan were a major power; Goryeo paid tribute to them, so how could they dare to attack them!
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| | 夷狄: |
人主好勤遠略底，也是無意思。當初高麗遣使來，朝廷只就他使者以禮答遣之，神宗卻要別差兩使去。緣他那裏知文，故兩使皆侍從，皆是文人。高麗自是臣屬之國，如何比得契丹！契丹自是敵國。 |
| | It is also meaningless for a ruler to be overly eager about distant strategies. When Goryeo initially sent envoys, the imperial court merely responded politely to their envoys and sent them off accordingly. However, Emperor Shenzong insisted on sending two additional envoys separately. Because the Goryeo court valued literature, both envoys were selected from among the attendants and officials, all of whom were literati. Goryeo was merely a vassal state; how could it be compared to the Khitan! The Khitan were naturally an equal rival.
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| | 夷狄: |
嘗見韓無咎說高麗入貢時，神宗喻其進先秦古書。及進來，內有六經不曾焚者。神宗喜，即欲頒行天下。王介甫恐壞他新經，遂奏云：「真偽未可知。萬一刊行後，為他所欺，豈不傳笑夷夏！」神宗遂止，本亦不傳。以某觀之，未必有是事。蓋招徠高麗時，介甫已不在相位。且神宗是甚次第剛明！設使所進真有契於上心，亦豈介甫所能止之？又記文昌雜錄中說，高麗所進孝經門上下一二句記未真。緯經，只是讖緯之書，必無進先秦古書之事。但嘗聞尤延之云：「孟子『仁也者人也』章下，高麗本云：『義也者，宜也；禮也者，履也；智也者，知也；信也者，實也：合而言之，道也。』」此說近是。 |
| | I once heard Han Wujiu say that when Goryeo sent tribute, Emperor Shenzong instructed them to present ancient books from the Pre-Qin period. When they presented it, there were six Confucian classics among them that had not been burned. Emperor Shenzong was pleased and immediately wanted to issue these texts throughout the empire. Wang Jiefu, fearing that they might undermine his new Confucian canon, then presented a memorial stating: "Their authenticity or forgery is still unknown. If they are published and later proven to be deceptive, would it not become a laughingstock among both Chinese and non-Chinese peoples!" Emperor Shenzong then stopped the plan, and these texts were never circulated. In my view, this event probably did not happen. For when Goryeo was being invited to come, Wang Jiefu had already left his position as chancellor. Moreover, Emperor Shenzong was a ruler of such high caliber and discernment! If the presented items truly resonated with the emperor's interests, how could Wang Jiefu possibly have stopped it? It is also recorded in the "Wenchang Zalu" that one or two sentences of the Book of Filial Piety presented by Goryeo were not accurately remembered. The "Wei Jing" is merely a book on divination and omens; there must have been no event of presenting ancient books from the Pre-Qin era. But I once heard You Yanzhi say: "Under the chapter in Mencius that reads 'Ren ye zhe, ren ye' (仁也者人也), the Goryeo version says: 'Yi ye zhe, yi ye;' (義也者，宜也;)" "Li ye zhe, lü ye;" (禮也者，履也;) "Zhi ye zhe, zhi ye;" (智也者，知也;) "Xin ye zhe, shi ye: He er yan zhi, dao ye.'" (信也者，實也；合而言之，道也。") This interpretation is close to being correct.
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| | 夷狄: |
或問高麗風俗好。曰：「終帶蠻夷之風。後來遣子弟入辟雍，及第而歸者甚多。嘗見先人同年小錄中有『賓貢』者，即其所貢之士也。「賓貢」二字，更須訂證。當時宣賜幣帛之外，又賜介甫新經三十本，盛以黑函，黃帕其外，得者皆寶藏之。 |
| | Someone once asked about the customs and manners of Goryeo, saying they were good. The reply was: "They still retain a barbarian flavor." Later, when they sent their sons and younger generations to the imperial academy, many of them returned after passing the examinations. I once saw in a small record of my late father's contemporaries an entry labeled "Bingong," which referred to the scholars they had presented as tribute. The term "Bingong" requires further verification and confirmation. At that time, in addition to the official bestowal of silk and cloth, thirty copies of Wang Jiefu's new Confucian canon were also granted. They were placed in black lacquered boxes wrapped with yellow silk cloths; those who received them all treasured them as precious items.
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| | 夷狄: |
國家方與女真和時，高麗遣使來求近上醫師二人。上召老醫，擇二人遣往。至則日夕厚禮，皆不問醫，而多問禁中事。二醫怪而問之，高麗主曰：「我有緊密事，欲達宋皇。恐所遣使不能密，故欲得宋皇親近之人而分付之。所以問公禁中事者，欲以見公是所親信耳。」二人因問之，高麗主曰：「聞宋皇欲與女真和，夾攻契丹，此非良策。蓋我國與女真陸路相通，常使人察之。女真不是好人，勝契丹後，必及宋，而吾國亦不能自存，此合當思所以備之。」二人問所以備之之說，曰：「女真作一陣法甚好，我今思得一法勝之。」因令觀教其女真陣，蓋如拐子馬之類。二人歸奏，上怒，召老醫而責之。其一人出門吐血，後不死；其一人歸即死。義剛。儒用錄云：「先生嘗見玉山汪丈云，得之御史臺一老吏。方徽宗通好女真，為滅遼之約，高麗有所聞，欲納忠誠，不可得。遂托病遣使求醫於本朝，且願得供奉內庭、上所親信者。遂擇二國醫以往。至則館御供帳，其禮甚厚，但經月無引見之音。二醫怪之，私有請於館伴者。一日，得旨入見，引至內庭。盡屏左右，諭二醫曰：『寡人非病也。顧有誠款，願效於上國，欲得附卿奏之，幸密以聞！』二醫許諾。則曰：『女真人面獸心，貪婪如豺狼，安可與之共事？今不早圖之，後悔無及！聞其訓練國人皆為精兵，累歲有事於燕，每戰轉勝。小國得一二陣法，可與之角。如欲得之，敢不唯命！』諭畢，方厚為之禮而遣之。二醫歸，具奏本末。徽宗聞之，滋不樂，且懼其語泄。丞相童蔡輩乃為食於家，召二醫以食之，食畢而斃。」 |
| | When the state was just concluding peace with the Jurchen, Goryeo sent envoys to request two of the emperor's most recent and esteemed physicians. The emperor summoned senior physicians and selected two men to send there. Upon their arrival, they were treated with great courtesy day and night; however, the Goryeo officials did not ask about medicine at all but instead inquired extensively about matters within the imperial court. The two physicians were puzzled and asked why, to which the ruler of Goryeo replied: "I have a confidential matter I wish to convey to the Song emperor. I fear that the envoys I send may not be discreet enough, so I want to entrust it to someone close and trusted by the Song emperor." That is why we asked you about matters in the palace—we wanted to see if you were indeed a person of trust and closeness to him." The two physicians then asked, and the ruler of Goryeo said: "I have heard that the Song emperor wants to make peace with the Jurchen and launch a joint attack on the Khitan; this is not a good strategy. For my country shares a land border with the Jurchen, and we often send people to observe them. "The Jurchen are not trustworthy; after they defeat the Khitan, they will inevitably turn on Song China. At that time, my country will also be unable to survive. This is something we should all think about and prepare for." The two physicians asked what method of preparation was being suggested, to which he replied: "The Jurchen have developed a very effective formation; I am now thinking of devising a strategy that can overcome it." He then ordered them to observe the training of the Jurchen's formation, which was similar in nature to the "guai zi ma" (a type of flanking cavalry tactic). The two physicians returned and reported this to the emperor, who became angry and summoned the senior physicians to reprimand them. One of them vomited blood upon leaving the palace but later survived; the other one died immediately after returning home. Yigang. Ruyong Lu records: "The Master once heard from Master Wang of Yushan, who obtained the information from an elderly clerk at the Office of Censors. When Emperor Huizong established friendly relations with the Jurchen to form an agreement for the destruction of Liao, Goryeo heard about it and wished to express its loyalty but was unable to do so. They then pretended that the ruler was ill, sent envoys seeking physicians from our dynasty, and expressed a desire to have someone who served in the imperial court and enjoyed the emperor's trust. Thus, two imperial physicians were selected to go there. Upon their arrival, the envoys of Goryeo lodged them in a luxurious pavilion and provided generous hospitality; however, for an entire month there was no word about arranging an audience. The two physicians found this strange and privately made inquiries to their Goryeo hosts. One day, they received an imperial order to enter for an audience and were led into the inner court. All attendants were dismissed, and the ruler instructed the two physicians: "I am not ill." "I have sincere intentions to express loyalty to your superior state, and I wish for you to submit this on my behalf. Please convey it secretly!" The two physicians agreed. He then said: "The Jurchen people have human faces but beastly hearts; they are greedy like jackals and wolves. How can one possibly cooperate with them? If we do not plan against them early, it will be too late to regret it later!" I have heard that they train their people into elite soldiers and for many years have been active in Yan territory, winning every battle. A small country can match them by mastering one or two formations. "If you wish to obtain these tactics, how could we dare refuse your command!"' After finishing his instructions, the ruler treated them with great courtesy and sent them off. The two physicians returned and fully reported the entire matter to the emperor. Emperor Huizong, upon hearing this, became increasingly displeased and also feared that the information might be leaked. The chancellors Tong Guan and Cai Que then hosted a banquet at their homes, summoned the two physicians to dine with them, and after they had finished eating, poisoned them to death."
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| | 夷狄: |
高麗與女真相接，不被女真所滅者，多是有術以制之。高麗要五十餘主，今此方為權臣所篡而易姓。義剛。又一條云：「高麗得四十主。今已易姓，姓王。」 |
| | Goryeo shared a border with the Jurchen; it was not destroyed by them because they had strategies to counteract their threats. Goryeo has had more than fifty rulers, and only now is it being usurped by a powerful minister who changed the royal surname. Yigang. Another entry says: "Goryeo had forty rulers." Now it has changed its surname, and the current surname is Wang."
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| | 夷狄: |
金虜舊巢在會寧府，四時遷徙無常。春則往鴨綠江獵；夏則往一山，忘其名。極冷，避暑；秋亦往一山如何；冬往一山射虎。今都燕山矣。 |
| | The Jurchen bandits' old base was in Huining Fu; they moved seasonally without a fixed pattern. In spring, they would go to the Yalu River for hunting; in summer, they went to a mountain whose name I have forgotten. It was extremely cold there for wintering; they would go there to avoid the heat in summer; in autumn, they also went to another mountain—its name is unclear. In winter, they would go to a different mountain for tiger hunting. Now their capital is at Yanshan.
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| | 夷狄: |
燕山之北，古有大山嶺為隔，但有一路傍險水。後來石晉以與耶律，則其險路在其度內矣。 |
| | To the north of Yanshan, there was an ancient mountain range called Dashan Ling that served as a barrier, but there was one road running along a dangerous stream. Later, when the Shi Jin dynasty ceded territory to Yelü (the Khitan), this perilous road fell within their control.
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| | 夷狄: |
燕山是古幽州；石晉割賂契丹。契丹既為金人所滅，其種之傑者遂來據燕。其主死，其妻蕭太后主之。童貫蔡攸往取之番。番兵敗後，金人自取之。朝廷求之，遂盡載數州之物、婦女之類而去，更索厚資賣之。朝廷以其所索之物與之，遂得數州空地，朝廷空內資以守之。郭藥師者，燕將，初歸本朝。金人來取燕，遂歸金，郭只留守燕。及本朝得燕，郭又迎降。金人一日大節，冬至之類。官吏都集賀郭。郭留飲，盡取各人家屬之類盡來飲。少頃，金人兵至，無一人得脫者，自此遂入寇矣。朝廷與大遼結好百十年矣，一日忽與金人約共攻遼，而本朝無一人往。是時方十三起，童貫自這邊來了，遂不及往。既失約，後取燕又是金人。金人見本朝屢敗兵於燕，遂有入寇之心。是時相王黼主其事，童貫主兵，蔡攸副之。蔡京不主，作詩送其子云：「百年信約宜堅守，六月師徒早罷休。」京作事都作兩下：取燕有功，則其子在；無功，則渠不曾主。又有一子絛上書言其父不是，聞亦是其父之謀也。金寇初圍城時，京云：「有一策可使虜人一兵不反。」朝廷使人問之，云：「見上方可言。」寇去，人問之，云：「決汴河可以灌之。」後寇再來，未至時已決之矣。東南數千里，渺然巨浸，西北遂為寇所據。四方音問一信不通，以此故也。 |
| | Yanshan is the ancient Youzhou; the Shi Jin dynasty ceded it to the Khitan as a tribute. After the Khitan were destroyed by the Jurchen, some of their outstanding descendants came and occupied Yan. When its ruler died, his wife, Empress Dowager Xiao, assumed control. Tong Guan and Cai You went to attack the frontier region. After the border forces were defeated, the Jurchen themselves took control of it. When the imperial court demanded its return, they loaded away all the goods and women from several states and departed, further demanding a heavy ransom to sell them back. The imperial court gave them the items they demanded, and thus obtained several empty states of land, leaving itself depleted in resources to defend it. Guo Yaoshi was a general from Yan who initially submitted to our dynasty. When the Jurchen came to take Yan, he defected to them, and Guo Yaoshi remained as the sole garrison commander in Yan. Later, when our dynasty regained Yan, Guo once again surrendered. The Jurchen observed major festivals on certain days, such as the winter solstice. Government officials all gathered to congratulate Guo. Guo invited them to stay for a banquet, and took the families of everyone involved and brought them together for drinking. After a short while, Jurchen troops arrived, and not a single person managed to escape; from then on, they began their invasions. For more than a hundred years, the imperial court had maintained good relations with the Great Liao. One day it suddenly made an agreement with the Jurchen to jointly attack Liao, yet not a single official from our dynasty went there. At that time, only thirteen days had passed since the beginning of the month; Tong Guan came from this side and thus it was too late to go. Having broken the agreement, later when Yan was taken, it was once again the Jurchen who did so. Seeing that our dynasty repeatedly suffered military defeats in Yan, the Jurchen began to harbor ambitions of invading. At that time, Chancellor Wang Fu was in charge of the matter, Tong Guan commanded the troops, and Cai You served as his deputy. Cai Jing did not take charge; he composed a poem to send off his son, saying: "A hundred-year agreement of trust should be firmly upheld; let the army and its troops cease their efforts early in the sixth month." Cai Jing always acted with dual intentions: if taking Yan was successful, then his son would remain; if there was no success, then he had never been in charge. Another of his sons, Tao, submitted a memorial stating that his father was wrong; it is said this was also the plan of his father. When the Jurchen first besieged the city, Cai Jing said: "I have a strategy that can make these bandits not send back a single soldier." The imperial court sent someone to ask him about it, and he replied: "I will speak of it only when I see the emperor in person." After the invaders withdrew, people asked him again, and he said: "Diking the Bian River can flood them out." Later, when the invaders came again, it had already been breached before they arrived. Thousands of miles to the southeast became a vast expanse of water; as a result, the northwest was soon occupied by the invaders. Communication with all directions came to a complete halt, and this was the reason for it.
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| | 夷狄: |
粘罕圍太原一年有餘，姚師古輩皆為其戰退，遂破太原。張孝純守太原一年，多少辛苦。及城破，●一死不得，遂降，後為劉豫處官。太原既破，遂一直圍京城。 |
| | Nianhan besieged Taiyuan for more than a year, and generals such as Yao Shigu were all defeated in battle against him, leading to the fall of Taiyuan. Zhang Xiaochun defended Taiyuan for a year, enduring great hardship. When the city fell, he was unable to die by suicide and thus surrendered; later, he became an official under Liu Yu. After Taiyuan fell, they immediately proceeded to besiege the capital city.
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| | 夷狄: |
李若水勸欽宗出。李謂虜人可信，醉後枕人睡熟，以此信之。 |
| | Li Ruoshui advised Emperor Qinzong to leave. Li claimed the bandits could be trusted, saying that after drinking they would fall asleep with their heads resting on others' shoulders—this was how he believed them.
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| | 夷狄: |
金人初起時，初未立將。臨發兵，召集庭下問之，有能言其策之善者，即授以將，使往。及成功而歸，又集庭下問眾人而賞之金幾多。眾人言未得，又加之。賞罰如此分明，安得不成事！ |
| | When the Jurchen initially rose up, they had not yet appointed a general. Before launching their troops, they convened an assembly and asked those present; whoever could propose a good strategy was immediately appointed as general and sent off. After the campaign succeeded and they returned, they once again gathered before the court to ask the people present how much gold should be awarded as a reward. Before an answer was given by the crowd, more rewards were added. With such clear and decisive rewards and punishments, how could they fail to achieve success!
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| | 夷狄: |
虜人有一謀時，聚諸尊長於一屋內，全不言，只用一物畫地，謀了便各去做。如其事難決，便出野外無人處去商量。 |
| | When the bandits had a plan, they would gather all their elders in one room. They said nothing at all but used an object to draw on the ground; once the plan was decided, each person went off to carry it out. If a matter proved difficult to decide, they would go to an uninhabited area in the wilds to discuss it.
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| | 夷狄: |
兀朮征蒙，死於道，有三策獻於虜主：一則以汴京立淵聖，欲招致江南之人；二則以近上宗室守邊；三則講和。曰：「若行前二者，也被他攪。」又曰：「道君有子四十人，只放二十人歸來。這二十人親王，也要物事供他。」 |
| | Wuzhu campaigned against the Mongols and died on his way. Three strategies were submitted to the bandit ruler: first, to establish Yuan Sheng in Bianjing as a puppet emperor, intending to attract people from Jiangnan; second, to station nearby imperial family members on the frontier for defense; third, to negotiate peace. They said: "If the first two options are carried out, they will also be disrupted by them." It was also said: "Daojun had forty sons; only twenty of them were allowed to return." "These twenty princes, even though they are close relatives, still need supplies provided for them."
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| | 夷狄: |
「虜至紹興，守臣李鄴降虜。及駕至明州，張俊大殺一番。駕泛海，虜人走。明州人今尚怨張俊不乘時殺去，可大勝，遂休了。辛巳，逆亮來時，一隊自海中來，李寶自膠西殺敗。李鄴既降，與虜酋並馬出。有一衛士赴駕不及，尚留紹興見之。以一大方磚逐打其酋，幾中，因被害，死之。今立一廟在其所，賜旌忠額。後人皆於其廟賣酒，某至，一切逐去之，說與王書，令崇奉之。」先生又云：「某在時，更為大其廟。其衛士姓唐。」 |
| | "When the bandits reached Shaoxing, the defending official Li Ye surrendered to them. When the imperial procession arrived at Mingzhou, Zhang Jun carried out a great massacre." The emperor's entourage fled by sea, and the bandits withdrew. The people of Mingzhou still resent Zhang Jun for not seizing the opportunity to eliminate them, which could have led to a great victory; instead, he let it go and ceased hostilities. On the Xinsi day, when Niliang came, one unit arrived from the sea, but Li Bao defeated them from Jiaoxi. After Li Ye surrendered, he rode out alongside the bandit chieftain on parallel horses. A palace guard who failed to catch up with the imperial procession remained in Shaoxing and witnessed this scene. He chased after the bandit leader, throwing a large square brick at him; it nearly hit its mark, but as a result he was attacked and killed. A temple has now been built in his honor at the site where he died, and it has been bestowed with an imperial plaque inscribed "Jing Zhong" (Loyal Valor). Later, people all sold wine at his temple. When someone arrived, he drove them all away and informed the imperial court in writing, ordering that it be revered with proper veneration." The master also said: "When I was alive, I further expanded his temple. "The palace guard's surname is Tang."
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| | 夷狄: |
劉豫來寇，朝廷只管謀避計。李伯紀云：「自南京退維揚，遂失河東北；自維揚退金陵，遂失京東西。一番退，一番失。設若是金人來，柰熱不得，亦著去，不能久留。今又只是劉豫，只是這邊人。渠得一邑，守一邑；得一郡，守一郡。如何只管遠避！」 |
| | Liu Yu launched an invasion, and the imperial court only focused on planning strategies to avoid confrontation. Li Boji said: "Retreating from Nanjing to Weiyang caused us to lose the area east of the Yellow River; retreating from Weiyang to Jinling resulted in losing the regions west and east of Jing. Each retreat led to another loss. If the Jurchen had come, we could not have resisted them; we would also have had to leave and could not stay for long. Now it is only Liu Yu, just one of our own people. He captures a county and holds onto that same county; he takes a prefecture and defends it. "Why keep fleeing so far away!"
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| | 夷狄: |
逆亮入寇時，劉信叔在揚州。亮欲至，劉盡焚城外居屋，盡用石灰白了城，多寫「完顏亮死於此」字。亮多忌，見而惡之，遂居龜山。人多不可容，必致變，果死滅。 |
| | When Niliang invaded, Liu Xinshu was in Yangzhou. Niliang intended to advance, and Liu Xinshu burned all the houses outside the city walls completely. He covered the entire city with lime plaster and wrote many instances of the words "Wanyan Niliang died here." Niliang was very superstitious; upon seeing this, he became resentful and thus took up residence on Guishan Mountain. A place with too many people cannot be accommodated, inevitably leading to disaster; as it turned out, he indeed died there.
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| | 夷狄: |
王仲衡云：「虜中大臣有過時，用紫茸观鋪地，令伏其上杖之，嘗有一宰相、一駙馬受杖。駙馬因此悒怏而死，非恨其杖也，恨不得紫茸观也。」又曰：「嘗有一官人出，有一吏人來，至其花園中，背上黃袱，袱得一束文字。某問：『何文字？』曰：『史書也。』那官人伊是史官。某問：『可借否？』曰：『不妨。』遂開看。內有一段云：『詔曰：「宰相姓名某。謀南伐，若以為是，合盡心以贊其謀；以為不是，合盡忠極力以諫之。不可依違以敗成算。今某人略略諫之，可杖六十。」』」 |
| | Wang Zhongheng said: "When high-ranking officials in the bandit court committed offenses, purple velvet was laid on the ground and they were made to kneel upon it while being caned. Once, a chancellor and a son-in-law of the emperor received this punishment." The son-in-law died from depression as a result; he did not resent being caned, but rather resented the fact that he could not obtain the purple velvet." He also said: "Once, an official went out and a clerk came to his garden. The clerk had a yellow cloth bundle on his back, which contained a bundle of writings." Someone asked, "What kind of writings are these?" He replied: "They are historical records." That official was a historian. Someone asked: "May I borrow them?" He replied: "Go ahead." They then opened and read it. Inside, there was a passage that said: "The imperial decree stated: 'The name of the chancellor is certain person." "Planning to launch a southern campaign, if you believe this, you should wholeheartedly support his plan; if you do not believe it, you must use your utmost loyalty and strength to advise against it." One must not waver or compromise in a way that undermines the plan. "Now, someone merely gave slight advice against it; he should be caned sixty times."'"
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| | 夷狄: |
「楊割大師阿骨打、楊割之子。吳乞買。阿骨打之弟。完顏亶、乞買之子。完顏亮、完顏雍、葛王璟、斡離不、斡離嗢、兀朮，皆阿骨兄弟也。阿骨打既死，諸酋立其弟吳乞買，乞買死，國人欲立阿骨打之子暗版孛訖烈。此五字不知如何，記不得。暗版孛訖烈，名宗盤。虜中謂『大官人』也。暗版者，大也；孛訖者，官人也。『大官人』者，即所謂太子也。諸酋不肯，復立乞買之子完顏亶，而以暗版孛訖烈為相。暗版孛訖烈實懷怨望，云己當為主。亶覺之，遂殺宗盤。一日遂盡誅二十七王，悟室亦被誅，孛訖烈亦在其中，二十七王皆其黨與兄弟也。連蔓宗族親舊皆殺了。亶又為亮所弒，自立。葛王先名褎，後以其字似「衰」字，遂改名雍。亶、亮皆兄弟也。亶之父行名皆從「宗」，兄弟名皆從「上」。粘罕亦阿骨打族人，嘗為相。初入中國，破京師，斡離不、粘罕也。斡離不早死，斡離嗢後亦早死。粘罕後來勸立劉豫，內則蕭慶主其事，蕭慶用事久。及兀朮撻懶廢劉豫而誅蕭慶，粘罕爭之不能得，亶遂忌之，粘罕悒怏而死。後來獨兀朮得後死。初，虜入中國，問何姓最大。中原人答以王姓最大。虜人呼王為『完顏』。自是王者之後，遂姓完顏。」又問：「虜人今漸衰替？」曰：「卒急倒他未得。被他立得箇頭勢大，若十分中做得一兩分事，便足以扶持振起。除是大無道殘暴酷虐，則不知如何。若是如此做將去，無大段殘暴之事，恐卒消磨他未得，蓋其勢易以振起也。」 |
| | "Yanggeda Dashī Aguda, son of Yanggeda." Wu Qimai. He was the younger brother of Aguda. Wanyan Dan, son of Qimai. Wanyan Liang, Wanyan Yong, Ge Wang Jing, Wochu, Wolibu, and Wuzhu were all brothers of Aguda. After Aguda died, the chieftains enthroned his younger brother Wu Qimai; after Qimai's death, the people of the state wanted to appoint Anban Boqilie, a son of Aguda. I don't know how these five characters are written; I can't remember them. Anban Boqilie's name was Zongpan. He was called "the great official" among the Jurchens. Anban means "great"; Boqi means "official." "The great official" is the same as what was called the crown prince. The chieftains refused, and instead enthroned Wanyan Dan, the son of Qimai, appointing Anban Boqilie as chancellor. Anban Boqilie actually harbored resentment and claimed that he should have been the ruler. Dan became aware of this, so he killed Zongpan. One day, Dan had twenty-seven princes executed entirely; Wushi was also killed, and Boqi Lie was among them. The twenty-seven princes were all his allies and brothers. He even killed the entire extended family, relatives, and close associates of their clan. Dan was later assassinated by Liang, who then declared himself ruler. Ge Wang's original name was You; later, because his character resembled the word "shuai," he changed his name to Yong. Dan and Liang were brothers. The names of Dan's father and his generation all included the character "Zong," while the names of his brothers and himself all included the character "Shang." Nianhan was also a clansman of Aguda and once served as chancellor. When they first entered China, the forces that captured the capital were led by Wolibu and Nianhan. Wolibu died early on, and Woliwu also died at an early age later. Later, Nianhan advised the establishment of Liu Yu; internally, Xiao Qing was in charge of this matter and held power for a long time. When Wuzhu Tielan deposed Liu Yu and executed Xiao Qing, Nianhan protested but failed to succeed. Dan then became suspicious of him, and Nianhan died in sorrow and frustration. Later, only Wuzhu survived until the end. Initially, when the Jurchens entered China, they asked which surname was the most prominent. The people of Zhongyuan answered that the Wang surname was the greatest. The Jurchens referred to "Wang" as "Wanyan." From then on, descendants of kings adopted the surname Wanyan." Someone else asked: "Are the Jurchens gradually declining now?" He replied, "They haven't been overthrown yet. If they manage to establish a strong position and accomplish even one or two parts out of ten, it would be sufficient to support and revive their power. Unless they become extremely tyrannical, cruel, and brutal, I don't know what else could happen. "If they continue to act in this manner without committing major acts of cruelty, I fear we will not be able to completely wear them down, for their power is easily revived."
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| | 夷狄: |
論及北虜事，當初起時，如山林虎豹縱於原野，豈是人！伯謨曰：「當時曲端獻策，不出十年，彼必以酒色死，方可取。」先生曰：「阿骨打纔得幽州，便死。曾見有人論虜人無事權在其主，用兵權在將，故虜主不用兵。此說是。大抵當初出時是夷狄，及志得意滿，與我何異？」因與某人欲請邊郡自效。先生曰：「易曰：『知進退存亡而不失其正者，其惟聖人乎！』上之人不欲用兵，而我自欲為之，是不識時。」問：「恢復之事，多始勤終怠，如何？」曰：「只以私意為之，不以復讎為念。」 |
| | When discussing the northern Jurchens, when they first rose to power, it was as if tigers and leopards from the mountains were unleashed into the plains—how could they be considered human! Bomo said: "At that time, Qu Duan submitted a strategy, saying that within ten years, they would certainly die from wine and lust; only then could we take them." The teacher said: "Aguda had just captured Youzhou when he died. I have seen someone argue that the Jurchen rulers do not hold actual power, while military authority lies with the generals; therefore, the Jurchen leaders themselves do not command troops. This statement is correct. Generally speaking, when they first emerged, they were Yidi barbarians; but once they achieved their ambitions and became complacent, how are they different from us?" Because of this, he and someone else wanted to request a border prefecture to demonstrate their loyalty. The teacher said: "The Book of Changes says: 'He who knows when to advance and retreat, when life is preserved or lost, yet does not lose his righteousness—this must be the sage!'" If those in power do not wish to wage war, but we desire to do so ourselves, this is a failure to recognize the times." Someone asked: "In matters of restoration and recovery, many begin with diligence but end in idleness. What should be done?" He replied: "It is merely done out of personal ambition, not driven by the desire for revenge."
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| | 夷狄: |
葛王大故會。他所以要和親者，蓋恐用兵時諸將執兵權，或得要己。不如和親，可坐享萬乘之樂。其初雖是利於用兵，到後來惟恐我與他冢殺。 |
| | Ge Wang Daguhui. The reason he wanted to marry into the imperial family was because he feared that when waging war, the generals in command of military power might seize control over him. It is better to seek a marriage alliance and thus enjoy the pleasures of imperial rule without effort. Initially, they may have benefited from waging war; but later on, they only feared that we would fight them to the death.
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| | 夷狄: |
葛王便是會底。他立得年號也強，謂之「大定」。 |
| | Ge Wang was indeed Hui Di. He established a strong era name, calling it "Dading."
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| | 夷狄: |
葛王懲逆亮之敗，一向以仁政自居。 |
| | Ge Wang, having been punished for the defeat of Niliang, always claimed to govern with benevolence.
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| | 夷狄: |
先生喟然歎曰：「某要見復中原，今老矣，不及見矣！」或者說：「葛王在位，專行仁政，中原之人呼他為『小堯舜』。」曰：「他能尊行堯舜之道，要做大堯舜也由他。」又曰：「他豈變夷狄之風？恐只是天資高，偶合仁政耳。」 |
| | The teacher sighed deeply and said: "I wanted to see the restoration of Zhongyuan; now I am old, and I will not live long enough to witness it!" Some people said: "While Ge Wang was in power, he exclusively practiced benevolent governance; the people of Zhongyuan called him 'the little Yao and Shun.'" He replied: "If he is able to truly follow the way of Yao and Shun, then it would be up to him to become a great Yao or Shun." He also said: "How could he change the customs of the Yidi? It is likely only due to his high natural talent, coincidentally aligning with benevolent governance."
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| | 夷狄: |
南渡之後，說復讎者，惟胡氏父子說得無病，其餘並是半上落下說。雖魏公要用兵，其實亦不能明大義，所以高宗只以區區成敗進退之。到秦檜主和，虜歸河南，上下欣然，便只說得地之美，更不說不義。若無范伯達如圭，則陵寢一向忘之矣！魏公時謫永州，亦入文字，只說莫與之和，如何感動！魏公傾五路兵為富平之敗，又潰於淮上。若無氣力，也是做不得事。韓魏公煞是箇人物，然亦適是人事恰做得。若更向上，且怕難擔當。賀孫。 |
| | After the southern migration, those who spoke of revenge were only the Hu family father and son whose arguments were sound; all others merely made half-hearted or superficial claims. Although Wei Gong wanted to wage war, in reality he could not clearly uphold the great principles of righteousness; therefore, Emperor Gaozong only treated him according to minor successes and failures. When Qin Hui advocated peace, the Jurchens returned Henan to us; people at all levels were delighted and only praised the beauty of the land, no longer speaking of its injustice. If it had not been for Fan Boda Rugui, the ancestral tombs would have long been forgotten! When Wei Gong was exiled to Yongzhou, he also wrote texts, merely stating that one should not make peace with them—how could this move people! Wei Gong lost the five divisions of his army in the defeat at Fuping, and was again routed on the Huai River. Without strength or capability, one cannot accomplish anything. General Han Wei Gong was indeed a remarkable person, yet he only managed to do what the circumstances allowed. If one were to go even further, it might be difficult for him to bear the responsibility. Hesun.
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| | 夷狄: |
檜死，上即位，正大有為之大機會！ |
| | After Qin Hui's death, the emperor ascended the throne—this was precisely a great opportunity for significant achievement!
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| | 夷狄: |
邵弘取泗州，胡昉取海州。邵公人腳家。胡角場牙人。唐鄧汝三州，皆官軍取之，王師駸駸到南京矣，而諸將虜掠●女之類不可言。吳玠更要人錢，虜騎來，走歸矣！虜人一番圍泗洲，弘力扼之，後救兵至，方解。 |
| | Shao Hong captured Su Zhou, and Hu Fang captured Hai Zhou. The Shao family was a military household. Hu Jiaochang was a broker. The three states of Tang, Deng, and Ru were all captured by government troops; the imperial army was rapidly approaching Nanjing. Yet the actions of various generals—such as looting and seizing women—were unspeakable. Wu Jie demanded money from people, and when enemy cavalry arrived, he fled back! The Jurchens once besieged Su Zhou; Hong fought hard to hold the city. Later, when reinforcements arrived, the siege was lifted.
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| | 夷狄: |
泗海唐鄧四州，皆可取西京中原之地。逆亮來時用兵，僅取得此四州，而湯思退無故與之，惜哉！ |
| | The four states of Su, Hai, Tang, and Deng are all key to reclaiming the western capital and central plains. When Niliang launched a campaign, he captured only these four states; yet Tang Sui returned them without cause—what a pity!
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| | 夷狄: |
晉人下吳，卻是已得蜀。從蜀一造船，直抵南岸。周世宗只圖江南，是時襄漢蜀中別有主，所以屯淮上，開河抵江。今蜀中出兵，可以入武關；從襄漢樊鄧可以擣汝洛；由淮上可以取徐州。辛巳間，官軍已奪宿州。國家若大舉，只用十五萬精兵。 |
| | The Jin forces advancing into Wu had already captured Shu. A ship was built from Shu and sailed directly to the southern bank. Emperor Zhou Shi Zong only aimed at Jiangnan; at that time, Xiang, Han, and Shu had other rulers, so he stationed troops along the Huai River and dug a canal to reach the Yangtze. Now that troops are coming out of Shuzhong, they can enter Wuguan Pass; From Xiang, Han, Fan, and Deng, one can launch a surprise attack on Ru and Luoyang. By advancing along the Huai River, one can capture Xuzhou. During the Xinsi period, government troops had already captured Suzhou. If the state launches a major campaign, it would only require 150,000 elite soldiers.
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| | 夷狄: |
江州皇甫將名倜。曾領兵守信陽，作山寨三年。云：「由其山接金房諸山而出，取西京中原。」云：「國家用事，某願當此一路。」云：「都不用國家兵糧，沿路人皆自願為兵，且與糧。」其人忠醇，能同甘苦，得士心，不附內貴，然亦未必能以律御兵而戰也。 |
| | Jiang Zhou's commander Huangfu was named Ti. He once led troops to defend Xinyang, building mountain strongholds for three years. It was said: "Because the mountains connect with those of Jin and Fang, one can advance to capture the western capital and central plain." It was said: "If the state undertakes military action, I am willing to take command of this route." It was said: "There is no need for the state's troops or provisions; people along the way will volunteer as soldiers and also provide food." This man was loyal and sincere, able to share hardships and joys with his soldiers, earning their loyalty. He did not attach himself to powerful court officials; yet it is uncertain whether he could effectively command troops in battle according to strict discipline.
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| | 夷狄: |
陳問：「復讎之義，禮記疏云：『穀梁春秋許百世復讎』又某書，庶人許五世復讎。又云：『國君許九世復讎。』又，某人引魯桓公為齊襄公所殺，其子莊公與齊桓公會盟，春秋不譏。自桓至定公九世，孔子相定公，會齊侯於夾谷，是九世不復讎也。此說如何？」曰：「謂復百世之讎者是亂說。許五世復讎者，謂親親之恩欲至五世而斬也。春秋許九世復讎，與春秋不譏、春秋美之之事，皆是解春秋者亂說。春秋何嘗說不譏與美他來！聖人作春秋，不過直書其事，美惡人自見。後世言春秋者，動引譏、美為言，不知他何從見聖人譏、美之意。」又曰：「事也多樣。國君復讎之事又不同。」僩云：「如本朝夷狄之禍，雖百世復之可也。」曰：「這事難說。」久之，曰：「凡事貴謀始，也要及早乘勢做。才放冷了，便做不得。如魯莊公之事，他親見齊襄公殺其父，既不能復；又親與之宴會，又與之主婚，築王姬之館於東門之外，使周天子之女去嫁他。所為如此，豈特不能復而已？既親與讎人如此，如何更責他報齊桓公！況更欲責定公夾谷之會，爭那裏去？見讎在面前，不曾報得，更欲報之於其子若孫，非惟事有所不可，也自沒氣勢，無意思了。又況齊桓公率諸侯尊周室以義而舉，莊公雖欲不赴其盟會，豈可得哉！事又當權箇時勢義理輕重。若桓公不是尊王室，無事自來召諸侯，如此，則莊公不赴可也。今桓公名為尊王室，若莊公不赴，非是叛齊，乃叛周也。又況桓公做得氣勢如此盛大，自家如何便復得讎？若欲復讎，則襄公殺其父之時，莊公當以不共戴天之故，告之天子、方伯、連率，必以復讎為事，殺得襄公而後已，如此方快。今既不能然，又親與之同會，與之主婚，於其正當底讎人尚如此，則其子何罪？又況其子承其被殺後而入國，又做得國來自好，莊公之所不如，宜其不能復而俛首事之也。」陳問：「若莊公能殺襄公了，復與桓公為會，可否？」曰：「既殺襄公，則兩家之事已了，兩邊方平，自與桓公為會亦何妨？但莊公若能殺襄公，則『九合諸侯，一正天下』之功，將在莊公而不在齊桓矣。惟其不能，所以只得屈服事之也。只要乘氣勢方急時便做了，方好。才到一世二世後，事便冷了。假使自家欲如此做，也自鼓氣不振。又況復讎，須復得親殺吾父祖之讎方好。若復其子孫，有甚意思？漢武帝引春秋『九世復讎』之說，遂征胡狄，欲為高祖報讎，春秋何處如此說？諸公讀此還信否？他自好大喜功，欲攘伐夷狄，姑托此以自詭耳！如本朝靖康虜人之禍，看來只是高宗初年，乘兀朮粘罕斡離不及阿骨打未死之時，人心憤怒之日，以父兄不共戴天之讎，就此便打疊了他，方快人意。孝宗即位，銳意雪恥，然事已經隔，與吾敵者，非親殺吾父祖之人，自是鼓作人心不上。所以當時號為端人正士者，又以復讎為非，和議為是。而乘時喜功名輕薄巧言之士，則欲復讎。彼端人正士，豈故欲忘此虜？蓋度其時之不可，而不足以激士心也。如王公明炎虞斌父之徒，百方勸用兵，孝宗盡被他說動。其實無能，用著輒敗，只志在脫賺富貴而已。所以孝宗盡被這樣底欺，做事不成，蓋以此耳。」僩云：「但不能殺虜主耳。若而今捉得虜人來殺之，少報父祖之怨，豈不快意？」曰：「固是好，只是已不干他事，自是他祖父事。你若捉得他父祖來殺，豈不快人意！而今是他子孫，干他甚事？」又問：「疏中又引君以無辜殺其父，其子當報父之讎，如此則是報君，豈有此理？」曰：「疏家胡說，豈有此理！」又引伍子胥事，說聖人是之。曰：「聖人何嘗有明文是子胥來！今之為春秋者都是如此。」胡問：「疏又引子思曰：『今之君子，退人若將墜諸淵。毋為戎首，不亦善乎！』言當執之，但勿為兵首，從人以殺之可也。」曰：「盡是胡解！子思之意，蓋為或人問『禮為舊君有服』，禮歟？子思因云，人君退人無禮如此，他不為戎首來殺你，已自好了，何況更望其為你服？此乃自人君而言，蓋甚之之辭；非言人臣不見禮於其君，便可以如此也。讀書不可窒塞，須看他大意。」 |
| | Chen asked: "Regarding the righteousness of revenge, the commentary on Li Ji says: 'The Guliang Zhuan of the Spring and Autumn Annals permits revenge even after a hundred generations.' Another text states that commoners may seek revenge up to five generations later. It also says: "A state ruler is permitted to take revenge even after nine generations." Also, a certain person cited the case of Lu Huangong, who was killed by Duke Xianggong of Qi. His son Zhuanggong later formed an alliance with Duke Huan of Qi, and this was not criticized in the Spring and Autumn Annals. From Duke Huan to Duke Dinggong, there were nine generations. Confucius served as an official under Duke Dinggong and met with the ruler of Qi at Jiagu; this shows that revenge was not taken after nine generations. What is your view on this argument?" He replied: "The idea that one may take revenge for a grudge after a hundred generations is nonsense. Allowing revenge up to the fifth generation implies that the affection between close relatives diminishes and eventually ceases by the fifth generation. The Spring and Autumn Annals permitting revenge after nine generations, as well as the interpretations that claim certain actions were not criticized or even praised by the Annals, are all erroneous explanations by those who misinterpret the text. The Spring and Autumn Annals never actually said that it did not criticize or praised them! Sages who compiled the Spring and Autumn Annals merely recorded events truthfully; whether a person was virtuous or wicked became evident to readers. Later commentators on the Spring and Autumn Annals often cite supposed criticisms or praises as their basis, yet they do not know where these so-called expressions of censure or commendation by sages could possibly be found. He also said: "There are many different kinds of events. The matter of a state ruler taking revenge is yet another category." Xian said: "For example, the calamity brought by the Yidi to our dynasty—revenge even after a hundred generations would be justified." He replied: "This matter is hard to define." After a long pause, he said: "In all matters, it is important to plan carefully at the beginning and also to act early while the opportunity still favors you. Once the momentum has cooled down, it becomes impossible to proceed." Take the case of Duke Zhuanggong of Lu: he personally witnessed Duke Xianggong of Qi kill his father, yet was unable to take revenge; he also personally attended banquets with him, participated in arranging a marriage for him, and built a palace at the eastern gate for Wang Ji, the daughter of the Zhou emperor, to marry him. To act in such a manner—does this not go far beyond merely being unable to take revenge? If one personally interacts with an enemy like that, how can one then hold him responsible for avenging Duke Huan of Qi! Moreover, how could one even dare to blame Duke Dinggong at the Jiagu meeting—where would such a claim stand? When an enemy is right in front of you and you cannot take revenge, how could one possibly seek vengeance from his son or grandson? Not only is such a matter impractical, but it also lacks strength and makes no sense at all. Moreover, Duke Huan of Qi led the feudal lords to uphold the Zhou dynasty with righteousness. Duke Zhuanggong, even if he had wanted not to attend their alliance meeting, could he have possibly done so! One must weigh the circumstances and consider which is more important: the situation or the principles of righteousness. If Duke Huan had not been upholding the royal house, but instead summoned feudal lords for no reason, then it would have been acceptable for Duke Zhuanggong to refuse to attend. Now that Duke Huan is nominally upholding the royal house, if Duke Zhuanggong had refused to attend, it would not have been an act of rebellion against Qi, but rather against Zhou. Moreover, considering how powerful and grand Duke Huan's influence was at the time, how could one possibly take revenge under such circumstances? If revenge were to be taken, then when Duke Xiang killed his father, Duke Zhuang should have declared the grievance of a shared hatred with heaven itself and informed the Son of Heaven, regional lords, and military commanders. He must have made it clear that seeking vengeance was his sole purpose, killing Duke Xiang before stopping—only in this way would justice be satisfied. Now that he was unable to do so, yet still personally attended meetings with him and arranged a marriage for him—toward the very person who had been his legitimate enemy, he acted in this manner. Then what crime did his son commit? Moreover, the son inherited the throne after his father's murder and ruled the state well, achieving a level of governance that Duke Zhuang could not match. It is therefore understandable why he was unable to take revenge and had no choice but to submit to him." Chen asked: "If Duke Zhuang had been able to kill Duke Xiang, and then formed an alliance with Duke Huan, would that have been acceptable?" He replied: "Once Duke Xiang was killed, the matter between the two sides would have been settled and both parties reconciled. It would then be perfectly acceptable to form an alliance with Duke Huan." But if Duke Zhuang had been capable of killing Duke Xiang, then the merit of 'uniting the feudal lords nine times and restoring order to the world once' would have belonged to Duke Zhuang rather than to Duke Huan of Qi. Because he was not capable, that is why he had no choice but to bow and submit to him." It is best to act decisively while the momentum is still strong. Once it reaches one or two generations later, the matter naturally cools down. Even if one wished to act in such a way, by then one's own resolve would already be weak and lacking in vigor. Moreover, revenge is only justified when it is taken against the person who personally killed one's father or ancestors. If one takes vengeance on a descendant instead of the actual killer, what meaning does that have? Emperor Wu of Han cited the Spring and Autumn Annals saying "revenge after nine generations is justified," so he launched campaigns against the Hu and Di peoples, seeking to avenge Emperor Gaozu. But where in the Annals does it say such a thing? Do you gentlemen still believe this?" He was ambitious and fond of great achievements, desiring to conquer the Hu and Di peoples. He merely used this as an excuse to justify his actions!" Take, for example, the disaster brought by the Jurchens during the Jingkang period of our dynasty. It seems that if at the very beginning of Emperor Gaozong's reign, when Wushu, Nianhan, Woli Buji, and Aguda were still alive and public anger was high, we had treated them as enemies who shared a common hatred with heaven for having harmed our father and elder brothers, and decisively crushed them at that time, it would have satisfied the people's will. When Emperor Xiaozong ascended the throne, he was determined to avenge past humiliations. However, by then the events had already passed many years; those we now considered our enemies were not the ones who personally killed our fathers and ancestors, so it naturally failed to stir public morale effectively. Therefore, at that time even those who were called upright and virtuous men regarded revenge as wrong and peace negotiations as the right course of action. Yet opportunists eager for fame, shallow individuals, and those who spoke flatteringly took advantage of the situation to advocate revenge. Could those upright and virtuous men have deliberately wanted to forget this enemy? They simply assessed the situation as impractical, and felt it was insufficient to inspire the morale of soldiers. People like Wang Gongming, Yan Yu, and Bin Fu advised in every possible way to launch military campaigns, and Emperor Xiaozong was ultimately swayed by their arguments. In reality, they were incapable; whenever they led troops into battle, they suffered defeat. Their true aim was merely to seek wealth and honor through deception. Therefore, Emperor Xiaozong fell entirely under the influence of such people, leading to failed endeavors—this was precisely the reason." Xian said: "But they were simply unable to kill the Jurchen leader. If we could now capture a Jurchen and kill him, somewhat avenging the grudge against our fathers and ancestors, would that not be satisfying?" He replied: "Certainly it is good, but in truth, it has nothing to do with him personally—it was his grandfather's matter. If you could capture and kill his own ancestors, would that not satisfy people's feelings!" But now he is their descendant—what does this have to do with him?" He asked again: "The commentary also cites the case where a ruler kills someone's father without cause, and it says that the son should take revenge for his father. In this way, taking revenge would be against the ruler—how could such logic possibly make sense?" He replied: "This is nonsense from the commentator—how absurd!" They also cited Wu Zixu's case, claiming that sages approved of it. He replied: "How could the sages have ever explicitly endorsed Wu Zixu in clear writing!" This is how all those who interpret the Spring and Autumn Annals today behave." Hu asked: "The commentary also cites Zisi saying: 'The gentlemen of today push others as if they were about to fall into a deep abyss. 'Do not be the leader in conflict—would this not be good!'" It means one should hold them accountable, but must not take the initiative to start a war; it is acceptable to follow others in killing them." He replied: "This is all nonsense!" Zisi's meaning was probably in response to someone asking, 'Is it proper according to rites for one to wear mourning clothes for a former ruler?' Is this about rites? Zisi then said that if a ruler treats people so disrespectfully, it is already good enough if he does not take the lead in killing you; how could one possibly expect him to mourn for you? This statement was made from the perspective of a ruler, and it is an exaggerated way of expressing the matter; it does not mean that if subjects are treated disrespectfully by their ruler, they may then act in this manner. When reading texts, one must not be rigid or narrow-minded; it is essential to grasp the overall meaning."
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| | 夷狄: |
恢復之計，須是自家喫得些辛苦，少做十年或二十年，多做三十年。豈有安坐無事，而大功自致之理哉！ |
| | The plan for restoration must involve enduring some hardships ourselves, and we should prepare to do this for at least ten or twenty years, preferably thirty. How could there be a principle that one can sit idly by without effort and yet achieve great success effortlessly!
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| | 夷狄: |
今朝廷之議，不是戰，便是和；不和，便戰。不知古人不戰不和之間，亦有箇且硬相守底道理，卻一面自作措置，亦如何便侵軼得我！今五六十年間，只以和為可靠，兵又不曾練得，財又不曾蓄得，說恢復底，都是亂說耳。 |
| | The current discussions in the imperial court are not about war, but rather about peace; If there is no peace, then it will be war. People do not realize that between neither waging war nor seeking peace, the ancients also had a principle of firmly holding their ground while making preparations on their own. How could they possibly easily encroach upon us! In the past fifty or sixty years, we have only relied on peace as a trustworthy strategy; our military has not been properly trained, and our resources have not been adequately accumulated. Those who talk about restoration are merely speaking nonsense.
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| | 夷狄: |
某嘗謂恢復之計不難，惟移浮靡不急之費以為養兵之資，則虜首可梟矣。 |
| | I once said that the plan for restoration is not difficult; if only we could transfer the expenditures on frivolous and non-urgent matters to serve as funds for maintaining our troops, then we would be able to decapitate the enemy leader.
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| | 夷狄: |
近見吳公濟會中朋友讀時文策，其間有問道德功術者二篇：一篇以功術為不好；一篇以為有道德，則功術乃道德之功術，無道德則功術不好。前篇不如後篇。某常見一宰相說，上甚有愛人之心，不合被近日諸公愛說恢復。某應之曰：「公便說得不是，公何不曰愛人乃所以為恢復，恢復非愛人不能？」因說為政篇道、德、政、刑與此一般。有道德，則刑政乃在其中，不可道刑政不好，但不得專用政刑耳。 |
| | Recently, I saw a friend of Wu Gongji at an assembly reading contemporary essays. Among them were two policy discussions on morality and strategies: one essay argued that strategies are undesirable; the other maintained that if there is virtue, then strategies become the strategies of virtue; but without virtue, such strategies are undesirable. The former essay is inferior to the latter. I often heard a prime minister say that the emperor has a very kind heart, and thus it is inappropriate for recent officials to constantly talk about restoration. I replied, "You are mistaken. Should you not say that loving people is precisely the way to achieve restoration, and without such love, restoration cannot be achieved?" I then explained how this relates to the chapter on Dao (the Way), De (virtue), politics, and punishment in the Analects. With virtue and morality, punishments and political measures are naturally included within them; one cannot say that punishments and politics are undesirable, but they should not be used exclusively.
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| | 夷狄: |
本朝禦戎，始終為「和」字壞。後來人見景德之和無恙，遂只管守之。殊不知當時本朝全盛，抵得住。後來與女真，彼此之勢如何了！揚。 |
| | The Song dynasty's approach to dealing with the northern nomadic tribes was ultimately ruined by the word "peace" from beginning to end. Later generations, seeing that the peace of Jingde did not lead to any problems, simply continued to uphold it without question. They failed to realize that at that time our dynasty was in its prime and could afford to withstand the consequences. But later, when dealing with the Jurchens, how did the balance of power between us compare! Yang.
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| | 夷狄: |
問：「不能自強，則聽天所命；修德行仁，則天命在我。」因說靖康之禍云云，「終始為講和所誤。虜人至城下，攻城，猶說講和。及高宗渡江，亦只欲講和。」問：「秦檜之所以力欲講和者，亦以高宗之意自欲和也。」曰：「然。是他知得虜人之意是欲厭用兵。他當初自虜中來時，已知得虜人厭兵，故這裏迎合高宗之意，那箇又投合虜人之意。虜人是時子女玉帛已自充滿厭足，非復曩時長驅中原之銳矣，又被這邊殺一兩陳怕了。兼虜之創業之主已死，他那邊兄弟自相屠戮，這邊兵勢亦稍稍強，所以他亦欲和。」 |
| | Asked: "If one cannot strengthen oneself, then one must accept what Heaven ordains; cultivate virtue and practice benevolence, then the Mandate of Heaven is in our hands." He then mentioned the calamity of Jingkang, saying, "It was ultimately a mistake caused by seeking peace from beginning to end. Even when the enemy forces arrived at the city gates and began attacking the walls, they still insisted on talking about peace. And even after Emperor Gaozong crossed the Yangtze River, he also only wanted to seek peace." Asked: "The reason Qin Hui strongly advocated for peace was because Emperor Gaozong himself desired it." He replied, "Yes. It was because he understood that the enemy's intention was to grow weary of waging war. When he first came from the enemy territory, he already knew that they were tired of war. Therefore, here he flattered Emperor Gaozong's wishes, and there he also catered to the enemy's desires. At that time, the enemy already had more than enough women, jade, and silk to satisfy their desires; they were no longer as fiercely determined to advance deep into Central China as before. Moreover, they had been frightened by our side's defeat of one or two of them. In addition, the founder who had established their empire was already dead; there were internal conflicts and mutual slaughter among his brothers on their side. Meanwhile, our military strength had also somewhat improved, so they too desired peace."
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| | 夷狄: |
秦檜自虜中歸，見虜人溺於聲色宴安，得之中國者日夜爛熳，亦有厭兵意。秦得此意，遂歸來主和。其初亦是矣，然猶已奉之，蕩不為一毫計。使其和中自治有策，後當逆亮之亂，一掃而復中原，一大機會也，惜哉！ |
| | After Qin Hui returned from the enemy territory, he saw that they were indulging in music, beauty, and luxurious ease. The things they had obtained from China were enjoyed day and night with great extravagance; thus, there was also a sense of weariness toward war on their part. Qin grasped this sentiment and therefore returned to advocate for peace. At first, it was indeed so; yet still, we submitted without a single thought of resistance or calculation. If during the peace negotiations there had been strategies for self-governance and preparation, then when later facing the rebellion of Nizhong (Ning Liang), we could have swept them away and restored Central China. It would have been a great opportunity—what a pity!
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| | 夷狄: |
秦檜講和時，歲幣絹二萬五千匹，銀二萬五千兩。今歲絹減五千匹，銀減五千兩，此定數。每常往來人事禮數，皆用金銀器盛腦子貴藥物之類，所費不貲。大約等絹三千五百文一匹，銀二千五百文一兩，大數一百二十萬緡。彼來時，只是些羊巴匹段之類，甚微。揚。百三十四 |
| | When Qin Hui negotiated peace, the annual tribute included 250,000 bolts of silk and 250,00 tons of silver. Now, the amount of silk has been reduced by 5,000 bolts and silver by 5,00 taels; this is a fixed quota. The regular expenses for social interactions and ceremonial gifts all involved using gold and silver vessels to hold expensive medicines, brain tonics, and the like; these expenditures were enormous. Roughly speaking, each bolt of silk was worth 350 coins and each tael of silver 250 coins; the total amount would be approximately 1.2 million strings of coins. When they came, it was only some woolen cloth and similar items—very meager in value. Yang. 134
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