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An aligned English translation of this text is available and can be displayed alongside the source text (instructions). Please note that AI has been used in creating these translations. Translation setting: [None] [English]1  | 卷十三水利 Volume Thirteen: Water Conservancy |
《東南水利上 Shang of Southeastern Water Conservancy》 | |
| 1 | 宋范仲淹上呂相公［B083］呈中丞谘目曰：去年姑蘇之水，踰秋不退，某為民之長，豈敢曲阻焉？然初未甚曉，惑於群說，及按而視之，則了然可照。今得一二而陳焉，願垂鈞造，審而勿倦，則浮議自破，斯民之福也。姑蘇四郊略平，窊而為湖者，十之二三。西南之澤尤大，謂之太湖，納數郡之水。湖東一派，濬入于海，謂之松江。積雨之時，湖溢而江壅，橫沒諸邑。雖北壓揚子江而東抵巨浸，河渠至多，堙塞已久，莫能分其勢矣。惟松江退落，漫流始下。或一歲之水，久而未耗，來年暑雨，復為沴焉，人必薦飢，可不經畫？今疏導者，不惟使東南入於松江，又使西北入于揚子之于海也，其利在此。或曰：江水已高，不納此流。某謂不然。江河所以為百谷王者，以其下之，豈獨不下於此耶？江流或高，則必滔滔旁來，豈復姑蘇之有乎？矧今開畎之處，下流不息，亦明驗矣。或曰：日有潮來，水安得下？某謂不然。大江長淮，無不潮也，來之時刻少，退之時刻多，故大江長淮，會天下之水，畢能歸於海也。或曰：沙因潮至，數年復塞，豈人力之可支？某謂不然。新導之河，必設諸閘，常時扃之，其潮來，沙不能塞也。每春理其閘外，工減數倍矣。旱歲亦扃之，駐水灌田，可救熯涸之災。潦水則啟之，疏積水之患。或謂開畎之力，重勞民力。某謂不然。東南之田，所植惟稻，大水一至，秋無他望。災沴之後，必有疾疫。乘其羸敗，十不救一。謂之天災，實由飢耳。或謂力役之際，大費軍食。某謂不然。姑蘇歲納苗米三十四萬斛，官司之糴，又不下數十百萬斛。去秋蠲放者三十萬，官司之糴，無復有焉。玄扈先生曰：宋時歲納之少如此，蠲放之多如此。如豐穰之歲，春役萬人，人食三升，一月而罷，用米九千石耳。荒歉之歲，日食五升，召民為役而賑濟，一月而罷，用米萬五千石耳。量此之出，較彼之入，孰為費軍食哉？何消如此計算？力役者皆人也。不力役其人遂不食耶？或謂陂澤之田，動成渺瀰，導川而無益也。某謂不然。吳中之田，非水不殖，減之使淺，則可播種，非決而涸之，然後為功也。昨開五河，洩去積水，今歲和平，秋望七八。積而未去，猶有二三未能播種。復請增理數道，以分其流，使不停壅。縱遇大水，其去必速，而無來歲之患矣。此理通於天下之水，何必東南？又松江一曲，號曰盤龍。父老傳云：出水猶利。如總數道而開之，災必大減。蘇秀間有秋之半，利已大矣。畎澮之事，職在郡縣，不時開導，刺史縣令之職也。然今之所興作，橫議先至，非朝廷主之，則無功有毀也。守土之人，恐無建事之意矣。蘇常湖秀，膏腴千里，國之倉庾也。浙漕之任，及數郡之守，宜擇精心盡力之吏，不可以尋常資格而授之。恐功利不至，重為朝廷之憂，且失東南之利也。 Song Fan Zhongyan presented a memorandum to Minister Lü [B083], addressed to the Censor-in-Chief, which stated: "Last year's flood in Gusu lasted beyond autumn and did not recede. As your official in charge of the people, how could I dare to unjustly oppose it?" However, at first I was not very clear about it and was confused by various opinions. After investigating and examining it personally, everything became clearly evident. Now I have obtained one or two pieces of information to present, and I hope you will kindly bestow your attention. Please examine it carefully without tiring; then groundless criticisms will naturally be dispelled, which would be a blessing for the people. The four suburbs of Gusu are roughly flat, with low-lying areas forming lakes accounting for about two or three tenths of the area. The marshland in the southwest is especially large; it is called Taihu Lake, which collects water from several prefectures. A branch of the lake flows eastward and is dredged into the sea; it is called Songjiang River. During periods of heavy rain, the lake overflows while the river becomes blocked, causing widespread flooding across various towns. Although it is pressed northward by Yangzi River and extends eastward to vast waters, there are numerous canals and rivers; however, they have long been silted up and cannot help divert the water's force anymore. Only when Songjiang drains away will the floodwaters gradually recede. Sometimes, a year's worth of water remains for a long time without being drained; when the following summer rains come again, it will cause disaster once more. People will inevitably suffer repeated famines—can this not be carefully planned? Now, the dredging efforts are not only to direct water from the southeast into Songjiang but also to channel water from the northwest into the sea via Yangzi River. The benefit lies in this. Some say: "The river's water is already high and cannot accommodate this additional flow." I believe otherwise. Rivers and streams are called the kings of all valleys because they flow downward; how could they not also descend from this source? If a river's current is high, it must necessarily be fed by abundant tributaries flowing in from the sides—how could this not also apply to Gusu? Moreover, where ditches are now being dug, the downstream flow does not cease—it is clearly evident. Some say: "Tides come in daily; how can water possibly drain downward?" I believe otherwise. The great rivers such as the Yangtze and the Huai River all experience tides. The time when tides come in is short, while the time they recede is long; therefore, the Yangtze and Huai Rivers collect water from across the land but ultimately manage to return it to the sea. Some say: "Silt is brought in by tides, and after several years, channels will be blocked again—how can human effort possibly sustain this?" I believe otherwise. The newly dredged rivers must be equipped with sluices; normally, they are closed, so when tides come, the silt cannot block them. Every spring, maintenance is carried out outside the sluices, and the labor required is reduced by several times. During dry years, they are also closed to retain water for irrigation, which can alleviate drought and arid disasters. When there is excessive rainwater, the sluices are opened to relieve the problem of accumulated floodwaters. Some say that the effort required for digging ditches places a heavy burden on the people's labor. I believe otherwise. The fields in the southeast grow only rice; when a major flood occurs, there is no hope for harvests in autumn. After disasters and floods, epidemics are sure to follow. Taking advantage of their weakened state, ten out of ten cannot be saved. Though called a natural disaster, it is in fact caused by famine. Some say that during the period of labor conscription, military provisions are greatly consumed. I believe otherwise. Gusu annually delivers 340,000 hu of young rice as tax; official grain purchases also amount to no less than several hundred thousand hu. Last autumn, 300,000 measures were exempted and released; official grain purchases no longer exist. Xuanhu Xiansheng said: "At that time in the Song dynasty, the amount of annual grain tax was so small, and the amount exempted or released was so large." In a year of abundant harvest, if ten thousand people are conscripted for spring labor, each person consumes three sheng per day; after one month the work is completed. The total grain used would be only 9,000 dan. In a year of famine and poor harvests, if five sheng are provided per day to conscripted people as relief during labor service, after one month the work ends. The total grain consumed would be only 15,000 dan. Comparing this expenditure with that income, which is truly a greater drain on military provisions? Why calculate it in such a way? Those conscripted for labor are all human beings. Does not feeding people mean they will not be conscripted into labor? Some say that fields in low-lying marshy areas are often flooded, and dredging rivers would be of no benefit. I believe otherwise. The fields in Wu require water to cultivate; reducing the water level slightly allows for sowing. It is not necessary to drain and dry them completely before it can be considered a success. Last year, five rivers were dredged to release accumulated floodwater; this year the situation is peaceful, and we hope for a harvest of seven or eight tenths. Where water has accumulated but not yet drained, there are still two or three tenths that could not be sown. I therefore request to further dredge several more channels in order to divide the flow and prevent it from stagnating or blocking. Even if a major flood occurs, its waters will recede quickly, thus avoiding problems in the following year. This principle applies to water management throughout the country; why should it be limited only to the southeast? There is also a bend in Songjiang, known as Panlong. Elders have passed down the saying: "Even a little water flowing out brings benefit." If several channels are dredged altogether, disasters will certainly be greatly reduced. Even if only half of the autumn harvest is obtained between Su and Xiu, it would already be a great benefit. The task of digging ditches and managing waterways is the responsibility of prefectures and counties; to not carry out dredging at appropriate times is the duty of the Prefects and County Magistrates. However, for today's projects, criticisms often come first; without imperial support from the court, there will be no success and only blame. Those in charge of their territory may thus have no intention to initiate any projects. Su, Chang, Hu, and Xiu are fertile for a thousand li; they are the granaries of the nation. The responsibility of transporting grain from Zhejiang and the governance of several prefectures should be entrusted to officials who are meticulous and devoted; they cannot simply be assigned based on ordinary qualifications. Otherwise, benefits may not be achieved, which will become a serious concern for the court and also result in losing the advantages of the southeast region. |
| 2 | 元任仁發《水利集》曰：議者曰：古者吳淞江狹處尚二里許，猶不能吞受太湖之水，於是添浚三十六浦以佐之，且後時有渰沒田疇之患。今所開江二十五丈，置閘十座，其能去水幾何？其利則未知也。答曰：所開江身二十五丈，置閘十座，每閘闊二丈五尺，可以泄水二十五丈。吳淞江緣潮水往來之故也。此必然之畫。古人論泄水之法極詳，范文正公曰：三分其時，損居二焉。謂如一日十二時，晝夜兩潮，四時辰潮漲，八時辰潮落。所設之閘，晝夜皆去水之時也，所以終江面二里之寬，不如十閘之功也。吳淞二里上海浦未大也。黃浦既闊二里餘，已代吳淞洩水矣。豈開江二十五丈，遂足當二里之舊吳淞哉？任亦不達於水理，亦不考於古今之故矣。且閘止能閉潮無入，豈能晝夜皆去水而當二里餘之舊江也？況今東南有上海浦，泄放澱山湖三泖之水，東則劉家港耿涇，疏通昆承等湖之水。吳淞江置閘十座，以居其中。潮平則閉閘而拒之。潮退，則開閘以放之。滔滔不絕，勢若建瓴，直趨于海，實疏通瀦水之上策也。與古三江，其勢相埒。若夫時水，雖太湖汪洋瀰漫，其涸亦可待矣。旱則閉閘瀦水以灌溉，乃一舉兩得其利也。議者曰：吳淞江自古無閘，今置之，非也。何不開闊疏通，使江復故道，一任潮水往來，豈不便易？答曰：治水之法，先度地形之高下，次審水勢之往來，並追源溯流，各順其性。古人謂水歸深源。又曰：沙泥隨潮而來，清水蕩滌而去。今所往上海劉家港等處，水深數丈，今所開之河，止二丈五尺。若不置閘以限潮沙，則渾潮捲沙而來，清水歸深源而去。新開江道，水性不順，兼以河沙約住河泥，不數月間，必復淺塞，前工俱廢。故閘不可不置也。范文正公曰：新導之河，必設諸閘，正此謂也。若欲再復吳淞江之故道，須候諸閘啟閉流深，眾水歸源，其氵匈湧之勢，孰得而制禁？當於此諸閘都閉，挑開一處堰壩，任潮水往來，借清水力東⒊而洪，自復成江矣。大謬！無此理。《考工記》曰：「善溝水者，水齧之」之謂也。議者曰：吳淞江前時流通，今日何為而塞？豈非海變桑田之說，黃河日走千里，非人力所可為者歟？答曰：東坡有言：若要吳淞江不塞，吳江一縣人民，可盡徙於他處，庶使上流寬瀉，清水力盛，沙泥自不能積，何致有堙塞之患哉？疏通清水，以滌渾潮，自是正論。後來東南治水，宜仿此意。然瀦水之處，日淤日淺，亦天地自然之勢。不然，寶帶垂虹，何自而立哉？歸附之後，將太湖東岸水出去處，或釘木為柵，或用土草為堰，或築狹河身為橋，置為驛路。及有湖泖港汊，又慮私鹽船往，來多行塞斷，所有水脈不通，清水日弱，渾潮日盛，沙泥日積，而吳淞江日就淤塞。今日江勢，正與東坡所見合。如曰海變桑田，黃河奔突，一時之謂，謂黃河非人力可為，亦謬。則聖人手足胼胝，盡力溝洫，皆虛言也。聖人豈欺我哉？所當盡人力而為可見也。議者曰：錢氏有國一百有餘年，止長盈年間一次水災。亡宋南渡一百五十餘年，止景定間一二次水災。今則一二年，或三四年，水災頻仍，其故何也？答曰：錢氏有國，亡宋南渡，全藉蘇湖常秀數郡所產之米，以為軍國之計。當時盡心經理，使高田低田，各有制水之法。其間水利當興，水害當除。合役居民，不以繁難，合用錢糧，不吝浩大。又使名卿重臣，專董其事。富豪上戶，美言不能亂其法，財貨不能動其心。凡利害之端，可以興除者，莫不備舉。又復七里為一縱浦，十里為一橫塘。或作五里一縱浦。田連阡陌，位位相承，悉為膏腴之產。設有水患，人力未嘗不盡，遂使二三百年之間水患罕見。欽惟國朝，四海一統，人才畢集。擢居重任者，或未知風土之所宜也，以為浙西地土水利，與諸處同一例，任地之高下，任天之水旱。所以一二年間，水災頻仍，皆不諳風土之同異故也。諸處何獨不然？蓋天地之間，無一處不宜興修水利者。議者曰：蘇州地勢低，與江水平，故曰平江，故稱澤國。其地不可作田，必然之理也。今欲圍築硬岸，亦逆土之性耳。答曰：晉宋以降，倉廩所積，悉仰給于浙西水田之利，故曰：蘇湖熟，天下足。若謂地勢高下，不可作田，以為必然之理，此誠無用之論也。浙西之地，低于天下，而蘇湖又低於浙西，澱山湖又低於蘇州。此低之又低者也。彼中富戶數千家，于中每歲種植茭蘆，埋釘樁笆，委埋封土，圍築硬岸，豈非逆土之性？何為今日盡成膏腴之田？此明效之驗，不可掩也。既是澱山最低之湖，經理尚可以為田，卻說已成之田，不可作田。天下寧有是理也？議者曰：水旱天時，非人力所可勝。自來討究浙西治水之法，終無寸成。答曰：浙西水利，明白易曉。特行之不得其要，何謂無成？大抵治水之法，其事有三：浚河港必深瀉，築圍岸必高厚，置閘竇必多廣。設遇水旱，有河港深瀉隄防而乘除之，自然不能為害。河港洩瀉，圍岸隄防，閘竇乘除。倘有人力不至，而一切委數于天，天下寧有豐年也？東坡有言：浙西水旱，此謂人事不修之積，非時之數，今之謂也。昔范文正公親開海浦，時議者阻之。公銳意完具，排浮議，疏浚橫潦，數年大稔。乃謂終無寸利？為是說者，皆聽受富家驅使，而妄為無稽之言也。何處水旱，非緣人事不修，人不講不做耳。東南久做久講，所以有人如此說。議者曰：吳淞江開之後，自合浙西永無水害，何為大德十年，自濟以南，直至浙西，有水害甚深？答曰：且體比年浙西所收子粒分數，比之淮北，數幾十倍，皆吳淞江三閘，并諸壩口，出放澇水之力。以未開吳淞江之前，大德七年，亦遭水害，所收子粒分數，比大德十年，不及三分之一。以此論之，則水監豈為無功？天災流行，水淹為害，人力之所致，不見備隄防之，若除一分之害，則享一分之利。謂當永無水害，乃不近人情之論。為執政者，不當便聽其言，不察是否，乃直謂無功而輒罷之，正如咽喉噎而廢食也。況自歸附以來，二三十年，所積之病，豈半年工役之所能盡哉？議者曰：行都水監，既是有益衙門，何謂眾口一詞，皆謂無益，而明議罷之？答曰：「民可使由之，不可使知之。」事之利害，久而復明，非高識遠見，熟于世務，通于水利者，安知有久遠無窮之利？彼愚民無知，但見一時工夫之繁。豪民肆奸，有吝供輸募夫之費。所以百端阻撓，但為無益以敗事。殊不知浙西有數等之水，拯治方略，皆不相同，非專司不能盡力責其成功。使水監衙門，真如無事，古之有國者，亦廢而不舉久矣。何謂周漢唐宋之世，未嘗不一日用心盡力。經營水利之事，列之史傳，代不乏人。故諺曰：「水利通，民力鬆」，斯言信矣。［B083］浙西水利低下之處，不須水監拯治，即今中原高阜之鄉，安用水監河道司為哉？然則高阜之處，水監既不可缺，而低下之處，乃謂不必置立，何不思之甚也？議者曰：水利不可不修，今隴西唐宋二渠，正是責於有司疏浚，田禾有收，民便不擾。浙西水利，與隴西一體，責之有司兼管，豈不便哉？答曰：隴西唐宋二渠，長湖水也，浚成深渠，水自下流，何難拯治？浙西地面，有江海河浦湖泖蕩漾溪澗溝渠汊涇浜漕漊等名；水有長流活水、瀦定死水、往來潮水、泉石迸水、霖淫雨水、風決漲水、潮泥渾水、南來交水、風潮賊水、海嘯淫水等名。水名既異，則拯治方略亦殊。豈可以唐宋二渠長流水例之哉？略舉浙西治水，達堰、壩水、函石、倉石囤、蘧蒢、土帚、剌子、水管、銅輪、鐵筢、木杴、木井、木撚、木匝、水車、風車、手戽、桔槔等器，、竇、碶、斗門。隴西未必有也。今設為此策，乃不知地理之人，如醯雞井蛙，豈足與議遠大之事？宋賢如范文正公蘇文忠公朱文公王荊公，皆命世大儒，經綸天下之大材，尚各各建策，設官置兵，盡力經營水利之事，不令有司兼管，必有所見而為之。當時有司兼管，何往而不敗事？為是說者，未必長於蘇范諸公之議也。況浙西地形高下，水旱不均。古人有言：「東州之官，莫問西州之利。」或利於此，必害於彼，此事今於畿輔最急。便有彼疆我界之分。若無水監通行管領，一體整治，何能用心協力于均水利也哉？ Yuan Renfā's Shuili Ji (Water Conservancy Collection) states: "Some argue that in ancient times, the narrowest part of Wusong River was still about two li wide, yet it could not contain and discharge Taihu Lake's water. Therefore, thirty-six pǔ were added and dredged to assist; however, later there were still periodic floods submerging farmland." Now, twenty-five zhang of river have been dredged and ten sluices built—how much water can this actually drain? Its benefits remain unknown. Answer: The twenty-five zhang of the river that have been dredged, along with ten sluices installed, each gate being two zhang and five chi wide, can discharge water equivalent to twenty-five zhang. Wusong River is affected by the ebb and flow of tidal waters. This is an inevitable plan. Ancients discussed methods of draining water in great detail; Fan Zhongyan, the Righteous Minister of the Fan family, said: "Divide the time into three parts, and two of them will be spent on damage." He meant that in a day with twelve hours, there are two tides during the day and night: four shichen of rising tide and eight shichen of receding tide. The sluices established allow for water drainage both day and night; therefore, a river surface two li wide is not as effective as the function of ten sluices. Wusong's two-li-wide Shanghaipu has not yet been greatly expanded. Huangpu River, now more than two li wide, has already taken over the role of draining water from Wusong. How can dredging twenty-five zhang of a river possibly be sufficient to replace the old two-li-wide Wusong River? This person does not understand water management and has also failed to study historical precedents from ancient and modern times. Moreover, the sluice can only prevent tides from entering; how could it possibly drain water day and night to match the capacity of an old river more than two li wide? Moreover, today in the southeast there is Shanghaipu, which drains and releases water from Dianshanhu and Sanmao; to the east are Liujiagang and Gengjing, which channel water from Kuncheng Lake and other lakes. Ten sluices have been built along Wusong River to serve as its central control points. When the tide is calm, close the sluice gates to resist it. When the tide recedes, open the sluices to release the water. The water flows continuously and powerfully, like pouring from a jug, rushing directly toward the sea—this is indeed an excellent strategy for draining stagnant water. It rivals the ancient Three Rivers in terms of its flow and power. As for seasonal water levels, even though Taihu Lake is vast and expansive, it can also be drained in due time. During droughts, closing the sluices to retain water for irrigation achieves two benefits with one action. Some argue: "Wusong River has never had sluices since ancient times; to build them now is incorrect." Why not widen and dredge the river, restoring it to its original course, allowing tides to flow freely—would that not be more convenient? Answer: The method of water management first involves measuring the elevation and contours of the terrain, then examining the direction and flow patterns of the water, tracing its source and following its course, each in accordance with their natural tendencies. Ancients said that water naturally returns to deep sources. They also said: "Silt and sand come with the tides, while clear water washes them away." Now, places such as Shanghaipu and Liujiagang have water depths of several zhang; the newly dredged river is only two zhang and five chi deep. If sluices are not built to control the tides and silt, then muddy tides will bring sand in, while clear water flows back into deep sources. The newly dredged river channel has water that does not flow smoothly; combined with silt blocking the riverbed, within a few months it will inevitably become shallow and blocked again, rendering all previous efforts useless. Therefore, sluices cannot be omitted. Fan Zhongyan said: "Newly dredged rivers must have sluices installed"—this is precisely what he meant. If one wishes to restore Wusong River's original course, it must wait until the sluices are operated and the water flows deeply again, with all waters returning to their sources. Who could then control or restrict such surging currents? At that time, all these sluices should be closed. A section of a dike or dam should be breached to allow tides to flow freely; by harnessing the power of clear water flowing eastward and surging outward, the river will naturally reform itself. That is greatly mistaken! There is no such logic to it. The Kao Gong Ji says: "This is what is meant by 'those skilled in channeling water let the water erode it.'" Some argue: "Wusong River used to flow freely before; why is it now blocked?" Is this not the saying of "the sea turning into mulberry fields"? The Yellow River shifts its course thousands of li each day, which is beyond human control, right? The answer is: Su Shi once said, "If one wants the Wusong River not to become blocked, all the people of Wujiang County could be relocated elsewhere. This would allow more space upstream for water to flow freely and increase the power of clear waters, so that silt cannot accumulate; how then could there ever be a problem of blockage?" Clearing water to flush out turbid tides is the correct approach. In later times, when managing water in the southeast region, one should follow this principle. However, where water is stagnant, silt accumulates day by day and the depth decreases—it is also a natural trend of heaven and earth. If not so, how could Baodai Bridge (Chuihong) have been built? After the region was incorporated, for the water outlets along the eastern shore of Taihu Lake, some were secured with wooden fences, others used earth and grass to build dikes, or narrow river channels were constructed as bridges, all serving as relay roads. With regard to the lake's branches and inlets, there was also concern about private salt ships passing through. As a result, many were blocked off, cutting off all water channels. The flow of clear water gradually weakened while turbid tides grew stronger day by day; silt accumulated increasingly, causing Wusong River to become more and more silted up over time. The current state of the river perfectly matches what Su Shi observed. If one says that "the sea turns into mulberry fields" and the Yellow River surges suddenly, this refers to a temporary phenomenon. To say the Yellow River is beyond human control is also mistaken. Then all the efforts of sages, who worked with calloused hands and feet to manage irrigation channels, would be empty words. Could sages possibly deceive us? What is needed is to exert all human effort, and the results will be visible. Some argue: The Qi family ruled for over a hundred years, during which there was only one flood disaster in the Changying period. After the fall of the Northern Song Dynasty and its relocation southward for more than one hundred and fifty years, there were only one or two floods during the Jingding period. Nowadays, however, floods occur every one or two years, or even every three to four years; what is the reason for this? The answer is: During the reign of the Qian family and after the Southern Song moved south, they entirely relied on rice produced in several prefectures such as Su, Hu, Chang, and Xiu to support military and state affairs. At that time, they devoted themselves wholeheartedly to managing water resources, ensuring that highland and lowland fields each had their own methods for controlling water. During this period, water conservancy projects should be developed, and water disasters should be eliminated. They mobilized the local residents for labor without regard to difficulty, and allocated money and grain as needed, without stinting on large expenditures. Moreover, they appointed distinguished officials of high rank to oversee the matter exclusively. Wealthy and powerful families could not disrupt its regulations with flattery, nor could wealth sway their determination. Any matters concerning benefits or harms that could be addressed through development or elimination were thoroughly considered and implemented. They also restored the system of one vertical canal every seven li, and one horizontal embankment every ten li. Or they established a longitudinal canal every five li. Fields were connected by roads and ditches, each supporting the next, all becoming fertile land of high yield. Whenever there was a water disaster, human effort was never spared; thus, for two or three centuries, such disasters were rarely seen. May our dynasty be honored: now that the four seas are united under one rule, all talents have gathered together. Those appointed to important positions may not be aware of the local conditions, thinking that water conservancy in western Zhejiang is no different from other regions, leaving land elevation and drought or flood entirely at the mercy of nature. This is why floods have occurred frequently in just one or two years; it is all due to a lack of understanding of the similarities and differences in local conditions. How could other regions be any different? Between heaven and earth, there is not a single place where water conservancy should not be developed. Some argue: "Suzhou's terrain is low, level with the river; hence it is called Pingjiang and known as a land of marshes." It follows that this land cannot be used for farming—it is an inevitable conclusion. Now, if one wishes to enclose and build hard embankments, it is merely going against the nature of the soil. The answer is: Since the Jin and Song dynasties, all grain stored in granaries relied entirely on the benefits of paddy fields in western Zhejiang. Hence it was said: "When Suzhou and Huzhou are productive, the whole world has enough." If one claims that because of high or low terrain, land cannot be farmed and presents this as an inevitable truth, such a statement is truly useless. The land in western Zhejiang lies lower than the rest of the country, and Suzhou and Huzhou lie even lower within western Zhejiang; Dianshan Lake is yet again lower than Suzhou. This is a place that is low upon being low. Thousands of wealthy households there, every year planting water chestnuts and reeds, driving in stakes and fences, burying soil to seal it off, enclosing the land with hard embankments—could this not be going against the nature of the earth? Then why is all of it now fertile farmland today? This is clear evidence and cannot be concealed. If Dianshan Lake, the lowest of all lakes, can still be managed and turned into farmland, then how could one say that already cultivated land cannot be used for farming? Is there anywhere in the world such a principle? Some argue: "Droughts and floods are matters of heaven's timing, beyond human power to overcome." Ever since people have studied methods for managing water in western Zhejiang, there has never been the slightest success. The answer is: Water conservancy in western Zhejiang can be clearly and easily understood. It's simply a matter of not following the essentials when implementing it—how then could one claim there is no success? Generally speaking, the method of managing water consists of three main aspects: dredging river channels must be deep and thorough; building embankments must be high and thick; and installing sluices and culverts must be numerous and extensive. If there is a drought or flood, with deep river channels for drainage and embankments to regulate the water levels, it naturally cannot cause harm. Drainage through river channels, protection by surrounding embankments, and regulation via sluices and culverts. If human effort is not exerted, and everything is left to fate, how can there ever be bountiful harvests in the world? Su Shi once said: "Floods and droughts in western Zhejiang are the accumulated result of neglecting human efforts, not a matter of fate"—this is exactly what we mean today. In the past, Fan Zhongyan personally opened up the Hai Pu river; at that time, some critics opposed it. Determined to complete the project, he dismissed groundless criticism and dredged the stagnant waters; after several years, there was a great harvest. How then could it be said that no benefit whatsoever was achieved? Those who make such claims are all listening to and being directed by wealthy families, spreading baseless nonsense. Wherever there is drought or flood, it is not due to fate but because people neglect their duties and fail to discuss or act on the matter. Because in the southeast region water management has been discussed and implemented for a long time, this is why some people say such things. Some argue: "After the Wusong River was dredged, it should have ensured that western Zhejiang would forever be free of water disasters. Why then in the tenth year of Dade did a severe flood occur from Ji to the south all the way into western Zhejiang?" The answer is: Consider the grain harvests of recent years in western Zhejiang compared to those of northern Huai. The yield is dozens of times greater, all due to the power of the three sluices on Wusong River and various dam outlets releasing floodwaters. Before the Wusong River was opened, in the seventh year of Dade there was also a flood disaster. The grain harvest at that time was less than one-third of what it was in the tenth year of Dage. Judging by this, can we say that water management efforts have been without merit? When natural disasters spread and floods cause harm, it is due to human negligence in not preparing embankments for prevention. If one removes even a small portion of the disaster, one reaps a corresponding measure of benefit. To claim that water disasters can be permanently eliminated is an unrealistic and inhuman argument. Those in power should not hastily accept such claims without investigation, simply dismissing efforts as ineffective and abandoning them. This is like refusing to eat because one has choked once. Moreover, since the region was incorporated into the state's administration two or three decades ago, the accumulated problems over that time could not possibly be resolved in just half a year of labor. Some argue: "If the Office of Water Management is indeed a beneficial institution, why do so many voices unanimously claim it to be useless and demand its abolition?" The answer is: "The people can be guided along a path, but they cannot be made to understand the reasoning behind it." The benefits and harms of a matter become clear only over time. Unless one has lofty insight, long-term vision, is well-versed in worldly affairs, and knowledgeable about water conservancy, how could they possibly recognize the endless, far-reaching advantages? Those ignorant commoners see only the immediate labor involved. Powerful landlords act deceitfully, reluctant to contribute funds for transportation and hiring workers. Therefore, they resort to all sorts of obstructions and delays, merely claiming the work is useless in order to sabotage it. They do not realize that western Zhejiang has several types of water, and the strategies for managing them all differ; without a dedicated authority, it is impossible to fully ensure success. If water management offices were truly unnecessary and had no duties, then in ancient times rulers would have long since abolished them. Why did the Zhou, Han, Tang, and Song dynasties not spare a day in devoting their utmost effort to this? Managing water conservancy was considered an important matter, recorded in historical annals, and each generation had its share of people dedicated to it. Hence the proverb: "When water conservancy is well managed, the people's labor becomes easier"—this saying is indeed true. [B083] In low-lying areas of western Zhejiang, water conservancy does not require the Office of Water Management to intervene. Even now, in high and elevated regions of Zhongyuan, what need is there for a river administration office? If that be the case, then in high-lying areas where water management offices are clearly indispensable, how can one claim they are unnecessary for low-lying regions? This is a most unthinking argument! Some argue: "Water conservancy cannot be neglected. Today, the Tang and Song channels in western Longxi are precisely maintained by officials through dredging; crops have a harvest, and people's lives remain undisturbed." Water conservancy in western Zhejiang and that of western Longxi are the same; assigning responsibility to officials for joint management—would this not be convenient? The answer is: The Tang and Song channels in western Long xi are fed by Changhu Lake water. Once dredged into deep canals, the water naturally flows downstream—what difficulty is there in managing them? In western Zhejiang, the land features include rivers, seas, canals, lakes, marshes, ponds, streams, gullies, ditches, inlets, channels, and waterways with names such as Jiang, Hai, He, Pu, Hu, Mao, Dang, Yang, Xi, Jian, Gou, Qu, Cha, Jing, Bang, Cao, Guan. The waters include perennial flowing water, stagnant still water, ebb and flow tidal water, spring-fed gushing water, continuous rainfall water, wind-caused floodwater, silt-laden turbid water, southern converging water, storm surge intruding water, and seawater surges. Since the names of these waters differ, so too do the strategies for their management. How can they be treated as if they were like the perennially flowing Tang and Song channels? Briefly mentioning the water management tools used in western Zhejiang: da yan, ba shui, han shi, cang shi dun, qu chong, tu zhou, la zi, shui guan, tong lun, tie pa, mu qian, mu jing, mu nian, mu za, shui che, feng che, shou hu, jie gao, and others. Including culverts, stone weirs, and sluice gates. Western Longxi may not have these tools at all. To propose such a plan is to show ignorance of geography, like an acetic fly in a vinegar jar or a frog at the bottom of a well—how could one possibly discuss grand and far-reaching matters with them? Sage figures of the Song dynasty, such as Fan Zhongyan, Su Shi, Zhu Xi, and Wang Anshi, were all great scholars who could manage state affairs. Each proposed their own strategies, appointing officials and mobilizing troops to devote themselves fully to water conservancy projects; they did not allow these matters to be jointly managed by other departments—there must have been a reason for what they did. At that time, whenever officials were assigned joint responsibilities, how often had it not led to failure? Those who argue for this view are certainly no match in wisdom for the discussions of Su Shi and Fan Zhongyan. Moreover, the terrain of western Zhejiang varies in elevation, with uneven distribution of floods and droughts. Ancient people said: "Officials from the eastern states should not inquire about the benefits of the western states." What may be beneficial here will inevitably cause harm there. This matter is most urgent in the capital region today. There are even divisions between their territory and our borders. If there is no unified supervision and management by a water authority to coordinate efforts, how can one possibly devote attention and work together for the equitable distribution of water benefits? |
| 3 | 劉鳳《續吳錄》曰：蘇之三江：曰吳淞江，曰婁河即婁江，曰黃浦即東江。昔嘉定尹龍晉，以御史左官，濬治吳淞百年以來淤滯，民大被其利，名之御史河。方鑿地時，獲一石，上云：「得一龍，江水通。」蓋豫記之矣。近巡撫海公復疏之，後乃專官以憲令督視者累年。蓋吳利水稻，其豐穰，惟在水之節宣得其所。昔單諤有書，繼則沈憲副圖志尤詳，實不越《禹貢》所云「三江既入，震澤底定」二言也。 Liu Feng's Xu Wu Lu states: The three rivers of Suzhou are the Wusong River, the Lou He also known as the Lou Jiang, and the Huangpu River also known as the Dong Jiang. In the past, Long Jin, the magistrate of Jiading, while serving as a left official under the Yushi (Censorate), dredged and managed the silted-up Wusong River that had been stagnant for over a hundred years. The people greatly benefited from this, and they named it "Yushi He" (the Censor's River). When excavating the land at that time, they found a stone with an inscription: "Find one dragon, and the river water will flow." It seems this had been recorded in advance. Recently, the governor Hai Gong dredged it again; afterward, for many years, a dedicated official was assigned to supervise and oversee the project under imperial orders. The Wusong River benefits rice cultivation; its abundance depends entirely on proper regulation and distribution of water. In the past, Shan E wrote a book on this subject; later, Shen Xianfu's illustrated records were especially detailed. In truth, they did not go beyond what was stated in The Tribute of Yu—namely, "the Three Rivers have entered their courses, and Zhenze is stabilized." |
| 4 | 玄扈先生曰：淞江之側，有小聚落，名三江口。酈善長云：「淞江自湖東北徑七十里，至江水分流，謂之三江口。」《吳越春秋》載范蠡去越，乘舟出三江口，入五湖，皆謂此也。三江，即《禹貢》所指者。宜興士人單諤著《吳中水利書》，其說謂：蘇湖常三州之水，瀦為太湖。湖之水，溢于松江以入海，故少水患。今吳江岸，界于松江太湖之間，岸東則江，岸西則湖，江東則大海也。自慶歷二年，欲便糧道，遂築此堤，橫截江流五十里，遂致太湖之水，常溢而不洩，浸灌三州之田。又睹岸東江尾與海相接之處，茭蘆叢生，沙沱漲塞，而又江岸之東，自築岸以來沙漲，今為民居民田。雖增吳江一邑之賦，而三州之賦，不知反損幾百倍矣。今若洩太湖之水，莫若先開江尾茭蘆之地，遷沙村之民，運其所漲之泥，然後以吳江岸，鑿其土，為木橋千所，以通糧運。隨橋谹開茭蘆為港走水，仍於下流開白蜆、安亭二江，使太湖之水，由華亭青龍入海，則三州水患必減。元祐中，東坡在翰苑，奏其書請行之。 Xuanhu Xiansheng said: Along the Songjiang River there is a small settlement named Sanjiangkou. Li Shangzhang said: "The Songjiang River flows northeast for seventy li from the lake, reaching where it diverges into the Jiangshui River; this place is called Sanjiangkou." The Wuyue Chunchun records that Fan Li left Yue, boarded a boat at Sanjiangkou, and entered the Wu Hu lakes—this refers to this very place. The Three Rivers are those referred to in The Tribute of Yu. Shan E, a scholar from Yixing, wrote A Book on Water Conservancy in Wu Zhong. His argument was that the waters of Suzhou, Huzhou, and Changzhou are pooled to form Taihu Lake. The lake's water overflows into the Songjiang River and flows out to sea; thus, there is little flooding disaster. Today, the Wujiang shore lies between the Songjiang River and Taihu Lake; to the east of the shore is the river, to the west is the lake, and to the east of the river is the great sea. Since the second year of Qingli, in order to facilitate grain transport, they built this dike, which crossed and blocked fifty li of river flow. As a result, Taihu Lake's water often overflowed without being discharged, flooding the fields of the three states. Also, at the place where the eastern end of the river meets the sea along the shore, reeds and grasses grow thickly; silt has accumulated and blocked the area. Moreover, to the east of the riverside, since the construction of the embankment, sand has built up over time, and today this land is inhabited by people as farmland. Although the tax burden of Wujiang County has increased, the taxes from the three states have unknowingly been reduced by hundreds of times in return. Now, if one wishes to drain the water from Taihu Lake, there is no better way than first clearing the reed and grassy areas at the river's end, relocating the villagers living on the silted land, transporting the accumulated silt away, and then excavating along the Wujiang shore to build a thousand wooden bridges for grain transport. Alongside the bridges, clear reeds and grass to create channels for water flow. Also, dredge the Bixing and Anting rivers downstream so that Taihu Lake's waters can flow through Huating and Qinglong into the sea; then floods in the three states will certainly decrease. During the Yuanyou period, Dongpo was serving at the Hanyuan (Hanlin Academy) and submitted this book to request its implementation. |
| 5 | 吳恩《吳中水利》曰：蘇州之地，北枕長江，東表溟海，而水泉之勢，則與江平，故曰平江郡。然江水復高于海，而平江之水，決之赴海則順，導之出江則平。是以禹開三江於內地，決震澤之瀦，由三江以入海，而底定之功，垂之百代。逮至有宋，則因吳越錢氏舊議，決湖水以入揚子江，而其地之高下，不甚相懸，所以易為通塞也。唐人竊見一時利害，輕視禹迹，不尋三江之舊，而遂築長隄，橫截江湖之上，凡四十五里，以通漕舟。今寶帶橋一路是也。所賴以洩湖波之怒，下通吳淞者，則有松陵治東之出耳。而元人又有垂虹石梁之築，雖足以為公私病涉之利，而於東南經久之規，殆未嘗有深思遠慮以及之者矣。故其橋洞雖設，而梗塞日滋，沙淤宀浸高，而咽喉益隘，終不若宋時木橋之為得也。今二橋不可去，而三江之上流，實在於此。今欲順其歸海之勢，而議者欲去二橋兩旁之塞，大濬而擴清之，使其深廣峻發。湖不自淺，而清水果盛，則二橋之兩旁，何由而塞？此一說也，惟不得禹之故道。而范文正公，乃欲導之以出揚子江，於是有開濬白茆之議。蓋因唐郡守李人原開常熟塘，借湖水以救旱，而後人因之以分太湖之水耳。議者又欲分太湖之上流，於是單諤欲開濬百瀆橫塘，以分荊谿之流。又欲濬石隄江尾茭蘆之地，改木橋以通壅。蘇文忠公獨取其說，上之於朝，乃謂：「雖增吳江一縣之稅，顧二州之逋失者，蓋不貲也。」獨以開江又不能經久通利，於是郟亶論其不便，蓋自沿江東自江陰，逶常熟太倉，一路高阜之地，謂之崗身，凡三百餘里，闊厚亦不下數十里。其土粗而高燥，脈理椎結。此天所以限長江，而奠生民者也。其中則為低下之田，為圍百萬畝。其南則有太湖之壅，憑陵於上。一遇水澇，則泛溢旁出，以蕩沒低田，無所於救。民天所寄，國需所出，遂為魚龍之宮。識治者蓋所不忍，而必欲為之所者矣。且水澇之年，江水必漲。今鑿崗身，以出湖波，崗身豈所以限長江，乃海之涯也。是引湖水以侵低田，而出江之流，又未免為江潮之壅遏，則倒流入田，其勢亦易見矣。又江潮之入也常速，出也常緩，不幾歲月，淤積泥沙，其塞可期而待也。而其子郟僑復申其說，識者又多之。今欲不廢已成之隄橋，而又欲疏通久長之利，則必悉舉眾議。而於奮入蕪湖之水，限之不使東注，復修常州十四瀆北出之防，而下之江陰，則於太湖之上流，可以分殺矣。又於吳江江尾之壅，決去不疑，而下開澱山湖，以便吳淞江之入。如是而始通白茆入江之路，則可久得其益也。永樂中，夏忠靖公開濬白茆，通八十九年。而今開鑿不過二十年而塞者，得非人力有缺也，如錢氏之撩淺軍歟？得非隄防未至也，如宋人之設閘留清，駛以導之歟？得非濬法未詳也，如古之曲則深、直則塞歟？凡此皆可細究，而通謀盡利之方，厚民益國之務，莫有急於此時者矣。然置閘之法，則不可比京口江陰之例。蓋京口借江水以通漕，不得不閘以其去。江陰地居常熟之上，江水尤高，其外潮之入也有時，而內水之出也有限，故亦可閘。非比白茆之口，即今已一百餘丈矣。若欲置閘，則必厚築兩旁；厚築兩旁，則內水之出也益隘，將欲疏之，適以阻之矣。江闊而以閘束之可乎？必如任仁發之說，江二十五丈則十閘乃可，今言兩旁支港置閘，亦妙，但河身必與江等深，而閘口必與江容等例為是。然欲留清水以滌淤沙，則如之何？謂宜大疏兩旁支港，使節節深濬，橫置木閘大則石閘，俟潮來即閉，潮退則開，庶可少得導沙之益矣。然撩淺之夫，則終不能廢也。其撩淺之法，募人為卒，官為雇值，設四指揮以督事。今若用之，則指揮不必設，而以各縣治水縣丞主之。官為雇卒，而又有本府水利通判督之於上，使憂勤相須，以期事功。事不有益矣乎？夫東南諸郡，國家之外府也，而蘇之貢賦，又半於東南。一遇旱澇，至於逋亡者，不知有若干人於茲矣。隄防之修，旱暵之備，實有不可緩焉者。若救旱之法，則必先於近山高阜之地，多為積水池。如前人開鑿穹窿支溝，瀦蓄雨泉以待用，而于崗身之地，則使多穿陂塘。而又必官為之處，上下提督，則百錢石米之富，可復見於今日也。不然，則東南民事，將不知其所終矣。然此其大略也，來源去委，並列於後： Wu En's Water Conservancy of Wu Zhong states: The land of Suzhou is bordered to the north by the Yangtze River and faces the eastern sea. As for its water sources, their level corresponds with that of the river; thus it is called Pingjiang Jun (the Prefecture of Level Rivers). However, the river water is higher than the sea level; thus, if the waters of Pingjiang are released toward the sea, they flow smoothly. If guided to exit through the river, their levels remain balanced. Therefore, Yu opened the Three Rivers inland and drained the stagnant water of Zhenze through them into the sea. This achievement in stabilizing the waters has been passed down for a hundred generations. By the time of the Song dynasty, they followed the old proposal of Wu Yue's Qian family and drained lake water into Yangzi River. Since the elevation differences in this region were not great, it was relatively easy to manage flow and blockage. Tang dynasty officials, seeing only the immediate benefits and harms, lightly disregarded Yu's achievements. Without seeking to restore the old Three Rivers, they hastily built a long dike across the upper reaches of the river and lake for forty-five li in order to facilitate canal boats. This is now known as Baodai Bridge Road. What has relied on to release the fury of lake waves and connect downward to Wusong is only the outlet at Zhi Dong in Songling. The Yuan dynasty people further constructed the Chuihong Stone Bridge. Although it was sufficient to benefit both public and private crossings, no one had ever deeply considered or planned for its long-term impact on the southeast region. Thus, although bridge arches were built, blockages increased daily; silt accumulated and the water level rose, making this choke point increasingly narrow. In the end, it was not as effective as the wooden bridges of the Song dynasty. Now that these two bridges cannot be removed, the upper reaches of the Three Rivers actually lie here. Now, to follow the natural trend of water flowing toward the sea, some suggest removing the blockages on both sides of the two bridges and thoroughly dredging and clearing them to make the channel deeper, wider, and more robust. If the lake is not naturally shallow and the fruit of clear water flourishes, how could the areas on both sides of the two bridges become blocked? This is one argument; however, it does not restore Yu's original channel. Fan Zhongyan, however, wished to guide the water out through Yangzi River, and thus proposed the plan to dredge Baomao. This was because during the Tang dynasty, the prefect Li Renyuan excavated the Changshu Tanga to borrow lake water for drought relief; later people followed this practice and used it as a way to divert Taihu Lake's waters. Some also proposed dividing the upper reaches of Taihu Lake, so Shan E wished to dredge Ba 渎 and Hengtang to divert the flow from Jingxi. They also wanted to dredge the silted area at the end of Shidi River where reeds and grass grow thickly, replacing wooden bridges to clear blockages. Su Shi alone adopted this argument and submitted it to the imperial court, stating: "Although the tax of Wujiang County may increase slightly, the losses avoided in two states are immeasurable." However, because opening the river could not ensure long-term smooth flow, Jia Dan argued against it. He pointed out that from Jiangyin along the eastern bank of the Yangtze to Changshu and Taicang, there is a stretch of elevated land known as Gangshen, extending over three hundred li in length and no less than several dozen li in width and thickness. The soil here is coarse and dry, with compacted layers. This is how Heaven has set the Yangtze as a boundary to stabilize the people's livelihood. In between, there are low-lying fields enclosed in millions of mu. To the south lies the stagnant water of Taihu Lake pressing down from above. Whenever there is heavy rain or flooding, the waters overflow and spread sideways, submerging the low-lying fields with no way to rescue them. The people's livelihood depends on this land, which is also where the state derives its needs; yet it has become a domain for fish and dragons. Those who understand governance would find this unbearable and must take action to address it. Moreover, in years of heavy rain and flooding, the river water inevitably rises. Now, if we excavate Gangshen to release lake waters, Gangshen is not the boundary of the Yangtze—it is actually the edge of the sea. This would be leading lake water to invade the low-lying fields, and the outflow into the river would inevitably be blocked by tidal surges; thus, water could flow backward into the fields, a situation easily foreseeable. Moreover, river tides enter quickly but exit slowly; within a few years, silt and sand will accumulate, and blockage is inevitable. His son Jia Qiao further reiterated this argument, and many discerning people supported it. Now, if one wishes not to abandon the already constructed dikes and bridges yet also seek long-term benefits through dredging, it is essential to fully consider all public opinions. By controlling the water rushing into Wuhu and preventing it from flowing eastward, while also repairing the defenses of the fourteen dugs in Changzhou to channel water northward down to Jiangyin, one can regulate and reduce the flow at the upper reaches of Taihu. Also, without hesitation, clear the blockage at the lower end of Wujiang River and dredge Dianshan Lake below to facilitate the inflow into Wusong River. Only in this way can the route from Baomao into the river be opened, and long-term benefits may then be achieved. During the Yongle period, Xia Zhongjing dredged Baomao, achieving smooth flow for eighty-nine years. Yet today, the newly dredged channels become blocked within twenty years—could this not be due to human effort falling short, as with Qian's "Liaodian Army" (a group responsible for clearing shallow waters)? Is it not also possible that the dikes and defenses are insufficient, as was done by the Song people who built sluices to retain clear water and guide its flow? Is it not also possible that dredging methods are still insufficiently detailed, as the ancients said: "curved channels become deep, straight ones get blocked"? All of these matters can be carefully studied. At present, there is no task more urgent than devising comprehensive plans to maximize benefits for the people and the state. However, the method of building sluices cannot be compared to the examples at Jingkou and Jiangyin. This is because at Jingkou, river water was borrowed for canal transport; sluices had to be built to regulate its flow. Jiangyin lies upstream of Changshu, where river water is especially high. Tides from the outside enter at certain times, while internal waters have limited outflow; thus, sluices can also be built there. This is not comparable to the mouth of Baomao River, which has already been dredged for over one hundred zhang today. If one wishes to build a sluice, the banks on both sides must be reinforced. However, reinforcing these banks will make the outflow of internal waters even narrower; thus, an attempt to dredge would only end up blocking it further. How can a wide river be effectively controlled by a sluice? One must follow Ren Renfa's argument: for a river twenty-five zhang wide, ten sluices would be necessary. Now, the suggestion to place sluices in side channels on both banks is clever, but it requires that the channel depth match the river and that the sluice openings conform proportionally to the river's capacity. Yet how can one retain clear water to flush out silt? It is said that one should thoroughly dredge the side channels on both sides, making them deep at each section. Wooden sluices or stone sluices for larger ones should be placed across them; when tides come in, they are closed, and when tides recede, they are opened—thus, some benefit may be gained from guiding silt away. However, the laborers responsible for clearing shallow areas (the "liaodian" workers) cannot ultimately be dispensed with. The method of employing these laborers involves recruiting people as soldiers, with the government paying their wages and appointing four commanders to oversee operations. Now, if this method is used today, there would be no need for commanders; instead, the county magistrates in charge of water management from each county could oversee it. The government would hire workers, and at the same time, a special commissioner for water conservancy appointed by the prefecture could supervise from above, ensuring diligence and cooperation to achieve results. Would this not be beneficial? The various prefectures in the southeast are the outer granaries of the state, and Suzhou's tribute and taxes alone account for half of those from the entire southeast region. Whenever drought or flood strikes, countless people suffer losses and abandon their homes—how many are affected in this way is unknown. The repair of dikes and preparation for droughts are truly matters that cannot be delayed. As for methods to relieve drought, one must first construct numerous water storage pools in high and mountain-adjacent areas. As the ancients did, by excavating branches of Qionglong Gou to store rainwater and spring water for future use; in Gangshen areas, one should dig many ponds and reservoirs. Moreover, it must be the government that oversees these projects with supervision from both upper and lower levels; only then can the prosperity of "a hundred coins for a stone of rice" be seen again today. Otherwise, the people's affairs in the southeast will have no clear resolution. However, these are only general outlines; detailed sources and outcomes will be listed below: |
| 6 | 一、太湖所受之水。吳為澤國，其藪具區，其浸五湖，又曰震澤，曰笠澤，即今太湖也。酈道元曰：「萬水所聚，觸地成川。」一自建康常潤宜興，由荊溪以入；一自天目宣歙臨安苕霅諸溪以入。周圍五百里，浸泆三州，而瀦聚汪洋，盈溢東注，則皆東南出吳江，奔流分三道以入海。謂之三江，禹治之舊跡也。 1. The waters flowing into Taihu Lake. Wu is a land of lakes and marshes; its marshland is called Juqu, its flooded areas the Five Lakes. It was also known as Zhenze or Lize, which is today's Taihu Lake. Liu Dao yuan said: "A myriad of streams converge here; wherever the water touches, it forms a river." One stream originates from Jiankang, Changrun, Yixing, and flows in via Jingxi; another comes from Tianmu, Xuanshe, Lin'an, and various streams such as Tiao Zha. Surrounded by 500 li, it floods three prefectures. When the waters accumulate and overflow toward the east, they all flow out through Wujiang in the southeast, rushing forward to split into three channels before entering the sea. They are called the Three Jiangs, the old traces of Yu the Great's water control efforts. |
| 7 | 一、三江遺迹。《史記正義》、《吳地記》所載三江，並難尋究。唐宋土人所稱，獨指吳淞一江為存耳。今考自吳縣齾塘即俗人所謂鯰魚口北折，經郡城之婁門者，為婁江。從吳江縣長橋東北，合龐山湖者，為淞。其自大姚分支，入長洲縣界，彙澱山湖，東出嘉定縣界，合於黃浦，經嘉定之江灣，青浦東北行，名吳淞江者，為東江。此曲說也。震澤出海，實無三江。《禹貢》所謂，自指大江為三江耳。 1. Traces of the Three Jiangs The "Shiji Zhengyi" and "Wudi Ji," which record the Three Jiangs, both present difficulties in tracing their exact locations. Only during the Tang and Song dynasties did local people refer to a single river, Wusong Jiang, as still existing. Now examining the river that turns north from Yue Tang in Wu Xian also known as Niaoyukou by common people, passing through Lou Men of the prefectural city, it is called Lou Jiang. From Changqiao in Wujiang Xian to the northeast, where it converges with Pangshan Lake, it is called Song. The branch that splits off from Dayao, enters the jurisdiction of Changzhou Xian, converges with Dianshan Lake, flows eastward out of Jiading Xian's boundary, joins Huangpu River, passes through Jiangwan in Jiading, and proceeds northeast to Qingpu, known as Wusongjiang, is called Dong Jiang. This is a convoluted explanation. In reality, Zhenze drains to the sea without involving three rivers. What is referred to as "Sanjiang" in the "Yugong" actually points only to a single great river, called Sanjiang. |
| 8 | 一、太湖小肢，其東出胥口，與別流彙于石湖。復東行抵郡城，折北至閶門婁東入常熟塘，下入白茆浦。其分水墩，北走觀瀆橋，散出楊涇者，皆入常熟塘。其合沙湖者，入崑山至和塘，直入太倉者，歸於海，及分合于吳淞江，向東而行。 1. A small branch of Taihu flows east from Xukou and converges with other streams at Shihu. It continues eastward to the prefectural city, turns north toward Changmen and Loudong, enters Changshu Tang, and flows downward into Baomao Pu. The branch at Fenshuidun flowing north to Guandu Qiao and dispersing through Yangjing all enters Changshu Tang. The stream that converges with Shahu enters Kunshan to He Tang, flows directly into Taicang, and joins the sea as well as merges with Wusongjiang before heading eastward. |
| 9 | 一、吳江石隄，隔塞江路。自唐元和中，刺史王仲舒，築石隄以達松江糧運，長亙數十里，橫截江路，隄外為江，隄內為湖。雖橋洞僅通五十三處，名曰寶帶橋，而宣洩細澀，終不輕快。回流積淤，漸盤蘆葦，而向所謂可敵千浦之江，遂為淺渚平沙之境矣。當時經制權宜，實為有益，不虞水道漸塞，竟為諸郡良田之梗也。 1. The stone dikes in Wujiang block the river passage. During the Yuanhe period of the Tang dynasty, Prefect Wang Zhongshu built stone dikes to facilitate grain transport via Songjiang. These dikes stretched for dozens of li, cutting across the river course; outside the dikes was the river, and inside were lakes. Although there were only 53 bridge arches for passage, named Baodai Bridge, the water flow remained slow and sluggish due to limited discharge capacity. The backflow silted up the riverbed, gradually encroaching on reeds and cattails; thus, what was once a mighty river capable of rivaling a thousand streams became a shallow marshland of flat sand. At the time, this temporary measure was indeed beneficial; however, it was unforeseen that the waterway would gradually become clogged and eventually obstruct the fertile farmland of various prefectures. |
| 10 | 一、垂虹橋復阻東流之勢。自石隄橫截江路，所恃以東注者，淞陵治東之泄也。但湖水為石隄所拘，湍怒流急，遂折縣治之旁為二，於是風濤盛，而公私隔矣。慶歷中，縣尉王庭堅作木橋以利來往，而吳淞江獨然通利。至元泰定中，州判張顯祖遂構石梁，而虛洞列至六十之外，僅如管窺，蓋不知前人立木之意也，遂使流沙日壅，裹湖水而不得出。而山原溪洞之來，又成日至。其泛溢自恣，瀰漫浸淫，無怪乎其然矣。 1. Chuihong Bridge again hinders the eastward flow. Since the stone dikes cut across the river course, the only reliance for eastward discharge was through the outflow at Songling Zhi Dong. However, the lake water constrained by the stone dikes became turbulent and fast-flowing, splitting into two streams along the side of the county seat. As a result, waves grew fierce, separating public and private areas. During the Qingli period, county 尉 Wang Tingjian built a wooden bridge to facilitate travel, and Wusongjiang remained uniquely unimpeded. By the Taiding period of the Yuan dynasty, Zhou Pan Zhang Xianzu constructed a stone bridge with over 60 arches, each narrow like a tube—clearly unaware of the original intention behind building wooden bridges. As a result, silt gradually accumulated, trapping lake water and preventing its outflow. Meanwhile, streams and gullies from mountainous areas continued to flow in daily. With the waters overflowing unchecked and spreading widely, it is no wonder that such a situation occurred. |
| 11 | 一、澱山湖狹隘不能展舒吐納。吳中諸湖，惟澱山為最下，而界於崑山、吳江、長洲之間，南屬華亭，而太湖之水入於淞江，藉此以為傳送者也。元時，尚有僧寺特立湖中，而今則寺在良田之中，則水路之隘可知矣。議者欲復辟其故道，暢而通之，則未易為力。然此湖獨為低下，而吐納之機，實在於此，則其說或可也。自古無濬湖受水者，不知濬法如何。 1. Dianshan Lake is narrow and cannot expand or freely discharge water. Among the lakes in Wu Zhong, Dianshan is the lowest-lying. It lies between Kunshan, Wujiang, and Changzhou, with its southern part belonging to Huating. The waters of Taihu flowing into Songjiang rely on this lake as a conduit for transmission. During the Yuan dynasty, there was still a Buddhist temple uniquely located in the middle of the lake; today, however, the temple lies within fertile farmland, clearly indicating how narrow and constricted the waterway has become. Those who propose restoring its original channel to make it open and flowing again find this difficult to achieve. Yet, since this lake is uniquely low-lying and the mechanism for water discharge truly depends on it, such a proposal may still be valid. Since ancient times, there has been no precedent of dredging a lake to receive water; the method for dredging remains unknown. |
| 12 | 一、白茆河形。夫水性，帶東南則稍下，帶北則稍高。而今之白茆，則直向東北合，亦從其下趨之勢，因其勢而利導之，古之善經也。而近年開鑿，已非夏忠靖舊開之路，是以通塞久近，為驗較然矣。其必於近江二三十里處，相其形便，開向東南，以從其性，或可久得其利也。 1. The Shape of Baomao River The nature of water is such that it flows lower when heading toward the southeast and higher when moving northward. Today's Baomao River flows directly northeast, following the natural downward trend. By guiding it in accordance with its flow, this is an ancient example of wise water management. However, recent excavations have deviated from the old route established by Xia Zhongjing; thus, whether it is open or blocked over time can be clearly observed. It must be excavated at a location 20 to 30 li from the river, choosing an advantageous site and directing it toward the southeast in accordance with water's nature; this may ensure long-term benefits. |
| 13 | 一、夾浦橋不可立。湖自大姚分肢，一從柳胥港瓜涇而北，又一從吳江縣北門，委直北至夾浦橋而入，以下吳淞。此僅一脈之存耳。國初嘗有石梁，為水齧廢，而周文襄公乃使造舟為梁，鎖兩端而中貫之，以通行者，至今為便。而近者鄉人，又謀疊石，此政不可許也。 1. Jiapu Bridge Should Not Be Built A branch of the lake splits off from Dayao; one flows north through Liuxu Gang and Guajing, while another proceeds directly north from Wujiang Xian's northern gate to Jiapu Bridge before entering Wusong River. This is merely a single remaining channel. At the beginning of the dynasty, there was once a stone bridge, which was eventually eroded and abandoned by water. The Duke Zhou Wenxiang then ordered boats to be used as piers, linking them together with locks at both ends to form a bridge for passage; this method has remained convenient until today. Recently, local people have plotted to build another stone bridge—this policy must not be approved. |
| 14 | 一、疏通次第。夫旱暵之年，來源必少，霜降水涸，可以賦功。若使先疏上源，則下流必壅，合無先啟白茆之路乎？其次，則七丫浦。又其次，則吳江堤長橋之導。而又次，則理百瀆以北，以下江陰之江，分荊溪之注。又次，則理宣歙九陽江之水，以入蕪湖。而中間各縣，隄渠水竇之設，則分投就近得利之家，隨宜開浚，則施工之日，遂為三州有秋之望矣。 lineno 1. Sequence of Dredging In years of drought, the water supply is inevitably reduced; when frost falls and water dries up, it becomes possible to carry out construction work. If one first dredges the upper reaches, the lower stream will inevitably become blocked—shouldn't the route through Baomao be opened first? Secondly, there is Qiya Pu. Next in order is the regulation of the dike and Changqiao in Wujiang. Still further down, one must manage the area north of Baodu to regulate the river below Jiangyin and divide the inflow from Jingxi. lø Next in order, one must manage the waters of Xuanshe Jiuyang River to direct them into Wuhu. The dikes, canals, and water outlets established in the intermediate counties should be directed to benefit nearby households according to local conditions. If these are appropriately dredged and opened as needed, then the day of construction will become a time of hope for bountiful harvests across the three prefectures. |
| 15 | 一、開江始末。夫田租始加於漢唐，而徵輸遂極於後代。徵法愈倍，則耕法愈詳。何者？民之苦於不得已也。故沿江之民，鑿崗身以救旱，而於其中低窪之處，了不相涉。而水澇之年，則太湖被隄橋之壅，泛溢瀰漫，而各縣之低田，遂成巨浸。於是內水高而江水下，而見者遂欲決之以入於江，此開江之說所由起也。暫時處置，實為有益。及至江水復漲，則內水高而不得出，亦有時而然者。此皆一時所見，而欲節宣不費，永益良田，以無失東南之利者，則人事之修，不可以不詳定也。然禹治震澤，則分疏東南之流，以歸于海，無紛紛多事。而後人開江，得一益或生一事，至紛紜補葺，煩切而不可救，而又不能已者，何也？蓋自井邑丘甸之設，則必有卒兩軍師之制，水利之興，則江防不可不留意也。一自江陰之江開，始以通魚鹽之利耳，而竟開北兵窺南之路，偽吳守之以捍吳，而國家得之以入金陵。一自福山之江開，為張士誠襲蘇之徑，而國家亦因之以取吳。一自許浦白茆之江開，而金人每於此窺宋。其後李寶破敵兵於此，遂設許浦軍，而白茆乃有制置節度之設，宿重兵而恒恐其不足。一自劉家港之江開，而元人以之通海運，交六國巿舶，而朱清、張瑄之徒，為患不絕。其後二人招懷，而海邊之軍鎮，遂相望而列矣。然永樂中，尚有倭賊之寇，又設守千戶所于崇明沙。今縱不能如禹之行水，而上下煩勞，則皆開江之利啟之也。然地維開張，本為國家之用，而竊發時見，未清消弭之源，則其敦本厚民之實，力田務農之政，誠不可漫為之說者矣。但積沙既為漲灘，而富家因為己有，是以客土恃勢力以負國，暴水縱積怒以困民，其害相因而不解也。 1. Beginning and End of River Excavation Land taxes first increased during the Han and Tang dynasties, and their collection became especially burdensome in later generations. As tax collection methods grew more severe, farming practices also became increasingly refined. Why is this so? Because the people suffer from unavoidable hardships. Therefore, people along the river dig into the gao shen (high ground) to relieve droughts, yet these efforts have no effect on low-lying areas. In years of flooding, however, Taihu Lake is blocked by dikes and bridges, causing water to overflow and spread widely; as a result, the low-lying fields in various counties become submerged. Thus, when the water inside is high and river levels are low, onlookers propose breaching dikes to release it into the river—this is how the idea of excavating rivers originated. Such temporary measures were indeed beneficial. However, when river levels rise again, the internal waters become high and cannot drain out—this situation also occurs at times. These are all temporary observations; if one wishes to regulate water flow without waste and permanently benefit the fertile fields, ensuring no loss of advantages in the southeast region, then human efforts must be carefully planned. Yet Yu the Great managed Zhenze by diverting and dredging its eastern and southern flows to return them to the sea, without causing unnecessary complications. Later generations excavated rivers, gaining one benefit but often creating new problems. Matters became so complicated and required constant repairs that they became burdensome and difficult to resolve, yet people could not stop—why is this? It is because once wells, towns, hills, and fields are established, there must be a system of soldiers and military commanders. When water conservancy projects are initiated, river defenses cannot help but require careful attention. The excavation of the river at Jiangyin initially aimed only to facilitate fish and salt trade, yet it inadvertently opened a northern military route for probing the south. The false Wu regime defended it to protect Wu, but the state later seized control through this route to enter Jinling. The excavation of Fushan River became the path for Zhang Shicheng's surprise attack on Suzhou, yet the state also used this route to capture Wu. The excavation of Xupu and Baomao rivers became a route through which the Jin people often probed into the Song dynasty. Later, Li Bao defeated the enemy troops here, leading to the establishment of Xupu Army. Consequently, Baomao was assigned a military command and garrisoned with a large force, yet there was always concern that it remained insufficient. The excavation of the Liujiagang river allowed the Yuan people to connect with maritime transport, facilitating trade with six foreign countries through their customs offices. However, figures like Zhu Qing and Zhang Xuan continued to cause trouble without end. After these two were pacified, military garrisons along the coast began to be established in succession. Yet during the Yongle period, there were still Japanese pirates raiding; thus, a garrison of thousand-households was established on Chongming Sha. Nowadays, even if we cannot achieve Yu the Great's level of water management, all the troubles and efforts from top to bottom are initiated by the benefits brought about through river excavations. However, the expansion of land and waterways was originally intended for national use. Yet, as illicit activities occasionally arise without a clear source to suppress them, it is truly essential not to casually discuss policies that strengthen fundamentals, promote agriculture, and encourage farming. However, as accumulated silt forms sandbanks and wealthy families claim these for themselves, outsiders take advantage of their power to betray the state. Floodwaters surge with fury, trapping the people in hardship—these harms reinforce each other and remain unresolved. |
URN: ctp:ws965456
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