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熹平三年，夏育为护乌桓校尉，六年，夏，鲜卑寇三边，秋，育上言请征幽州诸郡兵出塞击之，帝乃拜田晏为破鲜卑中郞将，大臣多有不同，乃召百官议。议郞蔡邕议曰：书载载作戒，猾夏，易伐鬼方，周有猃狁蛮荆之师，汉有阗颜瀚海之事，征讨殊类，所由尚矣。然而时有同异，势有可否，故谋有得失，事有成败，不可齐也。 |
| | In the third year of Xiping, Xia Yu was appointed as Hu Wuhuan Jiao Wei. In the sixth year, in summer, the Xianbei raided the three borders; in autumn, Yu made a proposal requesting to mobilize troops from various commanderies of Youzhou to cross the frontier and attack them. The emperor then appointed Tian Yan as Po Xianbei Zhonglangjiang, but many ministers disagreed, so he summoned all officials for discussion. Yilang Cai Yong argued: "The Book of Documents records that 'Zai Zuo Jie' [a warning], the Huaxia people, and the Yi Fa Guifang campaign; during the Zhou dynasty there were military expeditions against Xianyun, Manjing, and others; in the Han dynasty there were campaigns such as those at Tianyan and Hanghai. Campaigns to subdue different ethnic groups have long been a tradition." However, circumstances vary over time, and situations may be either feasible or not; therefore, strategies can lead to success or failure, and affairs may end in triumph or defeat. They cannot all be the same.
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武帝情存远略，志辟四方，南诛百越，北讨强胡，西征大宛，东并朝鲜，因文，景之蓄积，藉天下之馀饶，数十年间，官民俱匮，既而觉悟，乃息兵罢役，封丞相为富民侯。故主父偃曰：夫务战胜，穷武事，未有不悔者也。夫以武帝神武，将帅良猛，财富充实，所拓广远，犹有悔焉。况今人财并乏，事劣昔时乎。昔段熲良将，习兵善战，有事西羌，犹十馀年，今育，晏才策，未必过熲，鲜卑种衆，不弱于前，而虚计二载，自许有成，若祸结兵连，岂得中休，当复徵发衆人，转运无已，是为耗竭诸夏，并力蛮夷，夫边垂之患，手足之蚧搔，中国之困，胸背之瘭疽也。 |
| | Emperor Wu was devoted to long-term strategies and determined to expand in all directions. He suppressed the Baiyue in the south, campaigned against powerful Hu tribes in the north, waged war on Dayuan in the west, and annexed Chaoxian in the east. Relying on the accumulated resources from Emperors Wen and Jing and taking advantage of the country's surplus wealth, for several decades both officials and commoners became exhausted. Eventually he realized this situation and ceased military campaigns and labor projects, bestowing a marquis title of Fumin Hou upon the prime minister. Therefore, Zufu Yan said: "Those who pursue military victories and exhaust themselves with warfare have never failed to regret it." Even though Emperor Wu was a divine warrior, his generals were valiant and fierce, and the state's wealth was abundant; yet he still regretted it. How much more so now, when both people and resources are lacking, and circumstances are worse than in the past? In the past, Duan Jiong was an excellent general who was experienced in military affairs and skilled at warfare. When dealing with the western Qiang, it still took more than ten years. Now Yu and Yan's talents and strategies may not surpass those of Jiong; the Xianbei population is no weaker than before. Yet they recklessly estimate that success can be achieved within two years. If disaster leads to prolonged warfare, how could one stop midway? It would then become necessary to conscript more people and transport supplies without end, which would drain the strength of all China and exhaust its resources for the benefit of the barbarians. Border troubles are like insect bites on hands and feet; national crises, however, are like abscesses on the chest and back.
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昔高祖忍平城之耻，吕后弃慢书之诟，方之于今，何者为甚，天设山河，秦筑长城，汉起塞垣，所以别内外，异殊俗也。苟无蹙国内侮之患，则可矣。岂与虫蚁校寇计，争往来哉。虽或破之，岂可殄尽，而方令本朝为之旰食乎。昔淮南王安谏伐越曰：如使越人蒙死以逆执事，厮舆之卒，有一不备而归者，虽得越王之首，犹为大汉羞之，而欲以齐民易丑虏，皇威辱外夷，就如其言，犹已危矣。况乎得失不可量耶，昔珠崖郡反，孝元皇帝纳贾捐之言而下诏罢珠崖郡，此元帝所以发德音也。 |
| | In the past, Emperor Gaozu endured the humiliation of Pingcheng, and Empress Dowager Lü abandoned her pride in response to a letter filled with disrespect. Compared to these situations, which is more severe? Heaven has established mountains and rivers; the Qin dynasty built the Great Wall, and the Han dynasty constructed frontier walls—these were all done to distinguish between inside and outside, and to differentiate among different customs. If there is no threat of internal oppression or external humiliation, then it would be acceptable. How could one engage in a contest with insect-like raiders over back-and-forth campaigns? Even if they are occasionally defeated, can they be completely eradicated? Should the present dynasty then suffer sleepless nights over this matter? In the past, Prince Liu An of Huainan advised against attacking Yue, saying: "Suppose the Yue people risk their lives to resist your forces. If even a single common soldier returns home unprepared and defeated, even if we capture the head of the King of Yue, it would still be a great shame for the Han dynasty. And now you wish to sacrifice ordinary civilians in exchange for defeating these disgraceful barbarians? To humiliate imperial authority before foreign tribes—just as he said, this is already dangerous enough." How much more so when the gains and losses cannot be measured? In the past, when Zhuya commandery rebelled, Emperor Xiaoyuan accepted Jia Juan's advice and issued an edict to abolish the Zhuya commandery—this was why Emperor Yuan became known for his virtue.
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夫恤人救急，虽成郡列县，尚犹弃之，况障塞之外，未曾为民居者乎。守边之术，李牧善其略，保塞之论，严尤申其要，遗业犹在，文章具存，循二子之策，守先帝之规，臣曰可矣。帝不从，遂遣夏育出高柳，田晏出云中，匈奴中郞将臧旻率南单于出雁门，檀石槐命三部大人各帅衆逆战，育等大败，丧其节传辎重，各将数千骑奔还，死者十七八，缘边莫不被毒也。 |
| | To show compassion and relieve urgent distress, even if a commandery is established with multiple counties, it can still be abandoned. How much more so for areas beyond the frontier walls that have never been inhabited by Han people? The strategy for defending the borders was well understood by Li Mu; the theory of protecting frontier walls was clearly articulated by Yan You. Their legacies remain, and their writings are still extant. Following these two men's strategies and adhering to the regulations established by previous emperors, I say it is acceptable. The emperor did not follow this advice, and so dispatched Xia Yu to Gaoliu, Tian Yan to Yunzhong, and the Xiongnu Zhonglangjiang Zang Min, leading the Southern Chanyu, to Yumen. Tanshijun ordered three tribal chieftains each to lead their forces in a counterattack. Yu and others suffered a major defeat, losing their official seals, credentials, supplies, and baggage trains; each led only several thousand cavalrymen back in flight, with seventeen or eighteen out of twenty men perishing. The border regions were no longer spared from suffering.
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