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| Condition 1: References "不識天下之士，所以皆聞兼而非者" Matched:5. |
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《先秦兩漢 - Pre-Qin and Han》 | Related resources |
《墨家 - Mohism》 | Related resources |
《墨子 - Mozi》 | [Spring and Autumn - Warring States] 490 BC-221 BC | Books referencing 《墨子》 Library Resources Introduction Source Related resources |
《卷四 - Book 4》 | Library Resources |
《兼愛下 - Universal Love III》 | English translation: W. P. Mei [?] | Library Resources |
| 3 | 兼愛下: |
今吾將正求與天下之利而取之，以兼為正，是以聰耳明目相與視聽乎，是以股肱畢強相為動 為1宰乎，而有道肆相教誨。是以老而無妻子者，有所侍養以終其壽；幼弱孤童之無父母者，有所放依以長其身。今唯毋以兼為正，即若其利也，不識天下之士，所以皆聞兼而非者，其故何也？」 |
| Universal Love III: |
When we try to develop and procure benefits for the world with universal love as our standard, then attentive ears and keen eyes will respond in service to one another, then limbs will be strengthened to work for one another, and those who know the Dao will untiringly instruct others. Thus the old and those who have neither wife nor children will have the support and supply to spend their old age with, and the young and weak and orphans will have the care and admonition to grow up in. When universal love is adopted as the standard, then such are the consequent benefits. It is incomprehensible, then, why people should object to universal love when they hear it. 1. 為 : Deleted. 孫詒讓《墨子閒詁》 | |
| 4 | 兼愛下: |
然而天下之士非兼者之言，猶未止也。曰：「即善矣。雖然，豈可用哉？」子墨子曰：「用而不可，雖我亦將非之。且焉有善而不可用者？姑嘗兩而進之。誰以為二士，使其一士者執別，使其一士者執兼。是故別士之言曰：『吾豈能為吾友之身，若為吾身，為吾友之親，若為吾親。』是故退睹其友，飢即不食，寒即不衣，疾病不侍養，死喪不葬埋。別士之言若此，行若此。兼士之言不然，行亦不然，曰：『吾聞為高士於天下者，必為其友之身，若為其身，為其友之親，若為其親，然後可以為高士 於1天下。』是故退睹其友，飢則食之，寒則衣之，疾病侍養之，死喪葬埋之。兼士之言若此，行若此。若之二 士2者，言相非而行相反與？當使若二士者，言必信，行必果，使言行之合猶合符節也，無言而不行也。然即敢問，今有平原廣野於此，被甲嬰冑將往戰3，死生之權未可識也；又有君大夫之遠使於巴、越、齊、荊，往來及否未 及否未4可識也，然即敢問，不識將惡也家室，奉承親戚，提挈妻子，而寄託之？不識於兼之有是乎？於別之有是乎？我以為當其於此也，天下無愚夫愚婦，雖非兼之人，必寄託之於兼之有是也。此言而非兼，擇即取兼，即此言行費也。不識天下之士，所以皆聞兼而非之者，其故何也？」 |
| Universal Love III: |
Yet the objection is not all exhausted. It is asked, "It may be a good thing, but can it be of any use?" Mozi replied: If it were not useful then even I would disapprove of it. But how can there be anything that is good but not useful? Let us consider the matter from both sides. Suppose there are two men. Let one of them hold to partiality and the other to universality. Then the advocate of partiality would say to himself, how can I take care of my friend as I do of myself, how can I take care of his parents as my own? Therefore when he finds his friend hungry he would not feed him, and when he finds him cold he would not clothe him. In his illness he would not minister to him, and when he is dead he would not bury him. Such is the word and such is the deed of the advocate of partiality. The advocate of universality is quite unlike this both in word and in deed. He would say to himself, I have heard that to be a superior man one should take care of his friend as he does of himself, and take care of his friend's parents as his own. Therefore when he finds his friend hungry he would feed him, and when he finds him cold he would clothe him. In his sickness he would serve him, and when he is dead he would bury him. Such is the word and such is the deed of the advocate of universality. These two persons then are opposed to each other in word and also in deed. Suppose they are sincere in word and decisive in deed so that their word and deed are made to agree like the two parts of a tally, and that there is no word but what is realized in deed, then let us consider further: Suppose a war is on, and one is in armour and helmet ready to join the force, life and death are not predictable. Or suppose one is commissioned a deputy by the ruler to such far countries like Ba, Yue, Qi, and Jing, and the arrival and return are quite uncertain. Now (under such circumstances) let us inquire upon whom would one lay the trust of one's family and parents. Would it be upon the universal friend or upon the partial friend? It seems to me, on occasions like these, there are no fools in the world. Even if he is a person who objects to universal love, he will lay the trust upon the universal friend all the same. This is verbal objection to the principle but actual selection by it - this is self-contradiction between one's word and deed. It is incomprehensible, then, why people should object to universal love when they hear it. 1. 於 : Inserted. 孫詒讓《墨子閒詁》 | |
| 5 | 兼愛下: |
然而天下之士非兼者之言，猶未止也。曰：「意可以擇士，而不可以擇君乎？」「姑嘗兩而進之。誰以為二君，使其一君者執兼，使其一君者執別，是故別君之言曰『吾惡能為吾萬民之身，若為吾身，此泰非天下之情也。人之生乎地上之無幾何也，譬之猶駟馳而過隙也』。是故退睹其萬民，飢即不食，寒即不衣，疾病不侍養，死喪不葬埋。別君之言若此，行若此。兼君之言不然，行亦不然。曰：「吾聞為明君於天下者，必先萬民之身，後為其身，然後可以為明君於天下。」是故退睹 其1萬民，飢即食之，寒即衣之，疾病侍養之，死喪葬埋之。兼君之言若此，行若此。然即交若之二君者，言相非而行相反與？常使若二君者，言必信，行必果，使言行之合猶合符節也，無言而不行也。然即敢問，今歲有癘疫，萬民多有勤苦凍餒，轉死溝壑中者，既已眾矣。不識將擇之二君者，將何從也？我以為當其於此也，天下無愚夫愚婦，雖非兼者，必從兼君是也。言而非兼，擇即 取兼2，此言行拂也。不識天下所以皆聞兼而非之者，其故何也？」 |
| Universal Love III: |
Yet the objection is not all exhausted. It is objected: Maybe it is a good criterion to choose among ordinary men, but it may not apply to the rulers. Let us again consider the matter from both sides. Suppose there are two rulers. Let one of them hold partiality and the other universality. Then the partial ruler would say to himself, how can I take care of the people as I do of myself? This would be quite contrary to common sense. A man's life on earth is of short duration, it is like a galloping horse passing by. Therefore when he finds his people hungry he would not feed them, and when he finds them cold he would not clothe them. When they are sick he would not minister to them, and upon their death he would not bury them. Such is the word and such is the deed of the partial ruler. The universal ruler is quite unlike this both in word and in deed. He would say to himself, I have heard that to be an upright ruler of the world one should first attend to his people and then to himself. Therefore when he finds his people hungry he would feed them, and when he finds them cold he would clothe them. In their sickness he would minister to them, and upon their death he would bury them. Such is the word and such is the deed of the universal ruler. These two rulers, then, are opposed to each other in word and also in deed. Suppose they are sincere in word and decisive in deed so that their word and deed are made to agree like the two parts of a tally, and that there is no word but what is realized in deed, then let us consider further: Suppose, now, that there is a disastrous pestilence, that most people are in misery and privation, and that many lie dead in ditches (Under such circumstances) let us inquire, if a person could choose one of the two rulers, which would he prefer? It seems to me on such occasions there are no fools in the world. Even if he is a person who objects to universal love, he will choose the universal ruler. This is verbal objection to the principle but actual selection by it - this is self-contradiction between one's word and deed. It is incomprehensible, then, why people should object to universal love when they hear it. 1. 其 : Inserted. | |
| 9 | 兼愛下: | 「且不惟《誓命》與《湯說》為然，《周詩》即亦猶是也。《周詩》曰：『王道蕩蕩，不偏不黨，王道平平，不黨不偏。其直若矢，其易若厎，君子之所履，小人之所視』，若吾言非語道之謂也，古者文武為正，均分賞賢罰暴，勿有親戚弟兄之所阿。」即此文武兼也。雖子墨子之所謂兼者，於文武取法焉。不識天下之人，所以皆聞兼而非之者，其故何也？ |
| Universal Love III: | Still again, it is true not only in the "Oath of Yu" and the "Oath of Tang" but also with the " Poems of Zhou." To quote: "the way of the (good) emperor is wide and straight, without partiality and without favouritism. The way of the (good) emperor is even and smooth, without favouritism and without partiality. It is straight like an arrow and just like a balance. The superior man follows it, (even) the unprincipled looks on (without resentment)." Thus the principle that I have been expounding is not to be regarded as a mere doctrinaire notion. In the past, when Wen and Wu administered the government both of them rewarded the virtuous and punished the wicked without partiality to their relatives and brothers. This is just the universal love of Wen and Wu. And what Mozi has been talking about is really derived from the examples of Wen and Wu. It is incomprehensible then why people should object to universal love when they hear it. | |
| 10 | 兼愛下: | 然而天下之非兼者之言，猶未止，曰：「意不忠親之利，而害為孝乎？」子墨子曰：「姑嘗本原之孝子之為親度者。吾不識孝子之為親度者，亦欲人愛利其親與？意欲人之惡賊其親與？以說觀之，即欲人之愛利其親也。然即吾惡先從事即得此？若我先從事乎愛利人之親，然後人報我愛利吾親乎？意我先從事乎惡人之親，然後人報我以愛利吾親乎？即必吾先從事乎愛利人之親，然後人報我以愛利吾親也。然即之交孝子者，果不得已乎，毋先從事愛利人之親者與？意以天下之孝子為遇而不足以為正乎？姑嘗本原之先王之所書，《大雅》之所道曰：『無言而不讎，無德而不報』『投我以桃，報之以李。』即此言愛人者必見愛也，而惡人者必見惡也。不識天下之士，所以皆聞兼而非之者，其故何也？ |
| Universal Love III: | Yet the objection is still not exhausted. It raises the question, when one does not think in terms of benefits and harm to one's parents would it be filial piety? Mozi replied: Now let us inquire about the plans of the filial sons for their parents. I may ask, when they plan for their parents, whether they desire to have others love or hate them? Judging from the whole doctrine (of filial piety), it is certain that they desire to have others love their parents. Now, what should I do first in order to attain this? Should I first love others' parents in order that they would love my parents in return, or should I first hate others' parents in order that they would love my parents in return? Of course I should first love others' parents in order that they would love my parents in return. Hence those who desire to be filial to one another's parents, if they have to choose (between whether they should love or hate others' parents), had best first love and benefit others' parents. Would any one suspect that all the filial sons are stupid and incorrigible (in loving their own parents)? We may again inquire about it. It is said in the "Da Ya" among the books of the ancient kings: "No idea is not given its due value; no virtue is not rewarded. When a peach is thrown to us, we would return with a prune." This is to say whoever loves others will be loved and whoever hates others will be hated. It is then quite incomprehensible why people should object to universal love when they hear it. |
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